



Pulse Survey

Citizens' Perceptions, Expectations, and Experiences

Phase 3



BRAC Institute of Governance and Development (BIGD)
BRAC University



Knowledge for a
Better
World

Pulse Survey

Citizens' Perceptions, Expectations, and Experiences

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BRAC Institute of Governance and Development (BIGD),
BRAC University

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1. Introduction

The July 2024 Uprising was a watershed moment for Bangladesh, marking the end of over a decade of authoritarian rule. In response to this political shift, the BRAC Institute of Governance and Development (BIGD) at BRAC University launched the Rapid Research Response (RRR 2024) initiative to generate rigorous, timely, and actionable insights that support informed decision-making for the interim government, political parties, students, and citizens. As part of this initiative, BIGD conducted three rounds of the *Pulse Survey: Citizens' Perceptions, Expectations, and Experiences* (August 2024, October 2024, and July 2025). Guided by the principles of “rapid, rigorous, and repeated” research, these telephone-based surveys, conducted using a nationally representative database, aimed to explore and track public perceptions of the economy, governance, and politics in Bangladesh.

As sampling frames for the different rounds of this telephone survey, BIGD utilized two earlier surveys conducted in 2022 and 2024 in collaboration with The Asia Foundation (TAF). The Pulse Surveys are designed to include repeated questions from previous Pulse Surveys rounds and from the TAF-BIGD surveys, enabling comparative analysis. Another focus is on contemporary issues related to politics and governance that are pertinent to the present context.

This report provides a descriptive analysis of Phase 3 of the Pulse Survey, conducted from July 1 to July 20, 2025. It also presents comparative findings with the earlier survey rounds.



2. Survey Methodology

The survey was conducted among 5,489 men and women across the country. The male-to-female ratio was 52:48, and the rural-to-urban ratio was 73:27. For this survey, we used the 2022 Survey of the Bangladeshi People—a nationally representative survey of 10,240 respondents conducted in partnership with TAF. Among these 10,240 respondents, phone numbers were available for 9,203. Approximately 10% could not be reached because their phone numbers were unavailable. Of those we approached, 5,489 respondents (60%) successfully interviewed 5,489 (60% of the

sample) respondents, who completed all sections of the questions. They were representative at the divisional level, and responses were disaggregated from all the districts. One notable change in sample characteristics relates to the rural-to-urban proportion (73% vs 23%), compared to the national rate of 68% vs 28%. This difference is based on respondents' current location. We applied a statistical weight to correct this small imbalance in rural-urban composition. Annexe 1 provides a detailed discussion of the 2022 survey, which served as the sampling frame for this survey.



3. Demographic and Socioeconomic Profile

In the Pulse Survey round 3 follow-up, 5,489 participants were reached from the 10,240 sampled respondents. Of these, approximately 53% were male and 47% were female. Just over half of the respondents were younger than 35 years: around 30% were between 18 and 27 years old, and 26% were between 28 and 35 years old. A further 30% were between 36 and 50 years old, while 19% were older than 50 years. Nearly three-quarters (73%) of respondents lived in rural areas, compared to approximately 27% in urban areas.

Table 3.1. Age and Gender Distribution

	Category	Percentage (%)	Sample size
Gender	Male	52.76	2,896
	Female	47.24	2,593
Age group	18–27	24.94	1,369
	28–35	26.02	1,428
	36–50	30.32	1,664
	50 & above	18.73	1,028
Location	Rural	73.18	4,017
	Urban	26.82	1,472

Just over one-tenth of respondents (12%) reported having no formal education. This proportion was slightly higher among men (14%) than women (9%). Fewer than one-fifth (19%) had a primary level of education or less, with no significant gender difference. The largest share of respondents held Secondary School Certificate (SSC)/Higher Secondary Certificate (HSC) qualifications (30%), with only marginal gender differences. This was followed by respondents with a secondary-level education (29%), where the proportion of females (34%) was higher than that of males (24%). Overall, 11% of respondents reported having a graduate degree or higher (see Figure 3.1).

3.1. Household Income Distribution

Overall, urban households reported slightly higher earnings than rural households. Half of the respondents earned between BDT 10,000 and BDT 20,000 per month (50.23%), with minimal difference




Figure 3.1. Education Levels (Total and Gender-Disaggregated)

between urban (52%) and rural (49%) households. However, compared to urban households (17%), rural households were more likely (28%) to fall into the lower-income category of BDT 5,001–10,000. Urban households were nearly twice as likely as rural households to earn BDT 20,001–30,000 (20.4% vs 13.7%). High-income households (earning more than BDT 30,000) were also more common in urban areas (9%) compared to rural areas (4%), both below the overall average of 5.59%. Only a small proportion (4%) of households reported earning less than BDT 5,000, with the incidence slightly higher in rural areas (4%) than in urban areas (2%) (see Figure 3.2)




Figure 3.2. Monthly Household Income (By Location)

4. Perceptions of Politics and the Economy

4.1. The Direction of the Country

4.1.1. Political Direction

The survey asked respondents whether they thought Bangladesh was moving in the right or wrong direction, considering the political situation over the past six months. About 42% said the country was moving in the right direction, while 36% disagreed. Seventeen per cent responded “do not know” and 5% refrained from answering.

Figure 4.1 shows the change in public sentiment over an 18-month period. With the exception of the high optimism expressed in August 2024—immediately after the July Uprising—public perception of the country’s political direction remained relatively stable. In August 2024, 71% of respondents perceived that the country was on the right track politically, while only 12% viewed it negatively. The next survey, conducted in October 2024, showed a sharp 15-percentage-point decline in optimism, accompanied by a 22-percentage-point rise in pessimism. By July 2025, optimism further declined by 14 percentage points, while pessimism increased by two percentage points. During this period, uncertainty also grew substantially, rising from 8% to 17%—a nine-percentage-point

increase. The findings suggest a surge of optimism in mid-2024, followed by a steady decline. By July 2025, uncertainty and scepticism had grown considerably, with levels of optimism comparable to those observed in January 2024, when the TAF-BIGD survey was conducted just before the mass insurrection.

4.1.2. Economic Direction

The survey examined perceptions of Bangladesh’s economic direction over the past six months, covering different periods from January 2024 to July 2025.

In July 2025, approximately 45% of respondents believed the economy was on the right track, while 37% thought it was heading in the wrong direction. A further 15% said they did not know, and 3% declined to answer (Figure 4.2).

This more balanced outlook contrasts with earlier fluctuations. In January 2024, pessimism was widespread: 62% of respondents stated that the economy was moving in the wrong direction, while only 32% expressed optimism. By August 2024, sentiment had reversed dramatically, with




Figure 4.1. Considering the Situation of the Last Six Months, Do You Think the Country Is Heading in the Right Direction or Wrong Direction Politically?

60% viewing the economy positively and just 27% negatively, reflecting the high hopes following the July Uprising. However, by October 2024, negative views resurfaced, with 52% of respondents saying the economy was declining, compared to 43% who felt it was improving. In July 2025, compared to January and October 2024, optimism outweighed pessimism. Nevertheless, the decline in negative sentiment did not directly translate into optimism; instead, a significant share of respondents (15%) were uncertain about the country’s future economic direction.

Increase in Uncertainty

The survey also tracked the proportion of respondents who either chose “do not know” or gave no response when asked about Bangladesh’s political and economic direction between January 2024 and July 2025. For the political direction question, the share of uncertain or non-responding participants was 16% in January 2024, then rose slightly to 17% in August 2024, before falling to 10% in October 2024 and increasing significantly to 23% by July 2025. For the economic direction question, the pattern was similar: 6% in January 2024, climbing to 13% in August 2024, dropping to 5% in October 2024, and finally rising sharply to 18% in July 2025. These results suggest that while uncertainty and non-response fluctuated during this

period, both reached their highest levels by mid-2025, reflecting growing hesitation or reluctance among citizens to express clear views on the country’s political and economic trajectory.

The survey also reveals notable gender-based differences in perceptions of Bangladesh’s political and economic direction during January–June 2025. In terms of political outlook, fewer women (38%) than men (46%) believed the country was moving in the right direction. Uncertainty was more pronounced among women, with 22% responding “do not know,” compared to only 12% of men. These statistics indicate that men were somewhat more confident in their political assessments, whereas women were more cautious or hesitant to provide a definite judgment (Figure 4.3).

When considering the economic situation, the pattern was similar. Half of the men (50%) expressed optimism, saying the economy was on the right track, compared to 40% of women. The proportion perceiving the economy as moving in the wrong direction was similar across genders: 37% for men and 36% for women. Again, uncertainty was more prevalent among women, with 20% saying “do not




Figure 4.2. Considering the Situation of the Last Six Months, Do You Think the Country Is Heading in the Right Direction or Wrong Direction Economically?




Figure 4.3. Considering the Situation of the Last Six Months, Do You Think the Country Is Heading in the Right Direction or the Wrong Direction Politically? (By Gender)




Figure 4.4. Considering the Situation of the Last Six Months, Do You Think the Country Is Heading in the Right Direction or Wrong Direction Economically? (By Gender)

know,” compared to 10% of men (Figure 4.4). Overall, these findings suggest that men tended to express greater optimism and certainty regarding both politics and the economy, while women demonstrated comparatively higher levels of uncertainty. This divergence highlights the importance of incorporating gender perspectives when analyzing public opinion, as men and women may weigh confidence, risks, and information differently when evaluating national conditions.

When disaggregated by location, there was no striking difference in responses. However, variation appeared across education levels (Figure 4.5). The share of “right direction” responses increased with higher levels of education, while “wrong direction” responses increased only minimally. The proportion of “do not know” responses decreased substantially, with a slight increase in the share of “no response” category.




Figure 4.5. Considering the Situation of the Last Six Months, Do You Think the Country Is Heading in the Right Direction or the Wrong Direction Economically? (By Education Group)

4.2. The Major Problems Faced by the Country

In previous rounds of the TAF-BIGD survey, starting in 2019, economic problems were consistently reported as the country’s major issue. In all three rounds (2019, 2022, and 2024), people identified price hikes as the top concern, followed by economic downturn, unemployment, and related issues. The Pulse Survey continued to ask this question in all three phases (August 2024, October 2024, and July 2025).

Figure 4.6 shows that the nature of problems remained multifaceted, with some notable differences from previous rounds. First, growing political uncertainty, deterioration of law and order, and the absence of a stable elected government appeared to have a profound impact on public life. The most striking change concerned price hikes, which were reported by 21% of respondents in August 2024 and then jumped to 50% in October 2024, before falling sharply to just 9% in July 2025. The low reporting of price hikes in August 2024 was likely due to the massive flood at that time. The sharp decline in July 2025, on the other hand, can be attributed to reform efforts that were

somewhat successful in containing inflation,¹ though this may also reflect the country’s volatile political situation. Meanwhile, mentions of economic or business downturns, as well as political unrest and intolerance, remained fairly stable, cited by around 15–16% of respondents in both 2024 rounds and at similar levels in 2025.

Finally, “other” responses grew steadily over time, reaching 18% in July 2025, while “do not know” varied between 7% and 9%.

While there were no striking differences across locations, problems related to political unrest and deterioration of law and order were reported more frequently in urban areas (about three percentage points higher in both cases) compared to rural areas. A clear gender divide was also evident: economic problems, such as price hikes of essentials and business-related issues, were reported more frequently by women, whereas men were more likely to identify political unrest, intolerance, and weak law and order (Figure 4.7).

¹ <https://www.bb.org.bd/en/index.php/econdata/inflation>




Figure 4.6. What Is the Major Problem in the Country?




Figure 4.7. What Is the Major Problem in the Country? (By Gender)

5. Perceptions About the Interim Government

The survey results on opinions regarding the length of time the current leadership should remain in power reveal diverse perspectives. In total, about 35% of respondents stated that the interim government should remain in power for no more than six months, while 43% preferred a year or more. Disaggregating further, about 17% of respondents believed that power should be relinquished immediately, while smaller shares suggested shorter time frames such as less than three months (4%) or three to six months (14%). Another 11% supported one year, and 6% suggested two years. The largest proportion, 26%, supported a much longer period of three years or more. At the same time, 16% of respondents reported that they did not know, and 6% chose not to respond (Figure 5.1).

Overall, the data reflect a range of views, with significant variation among those demanding immediate change, those allowing for limited extensions, and those favouring prolonged continuation, alongside a notable group of undecided participants.

Figure 5.2 shows the change in opinion regarding the duration of the interim government across three periods: August 2024, October 2024, and July 2025. Overall, the results show a gradual decline in support for an extended interim government and a growing polarization between those favouring immediate exit and those still supporting a longer tenure.




Figure 5.1. From Now On, How Long Should the Interim Government Be in Power?




Figure 5.2. From Now On, How Long Should the Interim Government Be in Power? (By Time)

5.1. Evaluation of the Interim Government

The survey also assessed public evaluations of the interim government's performance across three time points. In July 2025, the interim government received an average score of 63, representing a five-percentage-point decline compared to October 2024 and a 12-percentage-point decline compared to August 2024. In August 2024, the average rating was 75, which declined to 68 by October 2024. These results indicate a downward trend in public evaluations, suggesting that while the interim government was initially rated highly, confidence in its performance gradually weakened in the following months (Figure 5.3).




Figure 5.3. How Would You Evaluate the Performance of the Interim Government Based on Its Performance So Far?

6. Election and Reform

6.1. Reform vs Election

In the context of the ongoing public debate among political parties regarding election timing and whether the interim government should prioritize reforms or elections, respondents were asked to share their views. Three statements were read to them: (a) “Extensive reforms should be prioritized before the national election,” (b) “Some necessary reforms should take place before the election,” and (c) “It is better to hold an election without reforms.” Respondents were asked to choose the statement closest to their opinion. The survey results indicate a strong preference for reforms before electoral processes. A majority of respondents (51%)

selected the statement that extensive reforms should take place prior to elections, while 17% favoured holding elections with at least some urgent reforms.

In contrast, only 14% preferred elections without reforms, and 13% stated that they did not understand or had no idea about the concept of reforms. A smaller proportion either did not answer (1%) or said they did not know (3%) (Figure 6.1). While support for reforms before elections was widespread across all age groups, the demand for extensive reforms was strongest among youth and declined steadily with age, suggesting generational differences in political priorities (Figure 6.2).




Figure 6.1. Among the Three Statements Given Below Concerning Reform and Election, Which Would Be Closer to Your Opinion?




Figure 6.2. Among the Three Statements Given Below Concerning Reform and Election, Which Would Be Closer to Your Opinion? (By Age)

When disaggregated by location, gender, and education, there was little variation in responses.

6.2. Reform Priorities

Respondents who indicated a preference for extensive or some necessary reforms were subsequently asked to identify their reform priorities. The results highlight a range of areas that align with the problems identified earlier in the survey. As the deterioration of law and order had been highlighted by a large proportion of respondents as a major problem, the strongest demand for reform also lay in this area. Within this domain, the most frequently mentioned priorities were improving law and order (30%), strengthening the law and justice system (16%), and ensuring security (11%). In the area of economic reform, respondents emphasized

addressing the economic and business downturn (16%), reducing the price of essentials (13%), and tackling unemployment (10%).

Regarding the electoral system and constitutional reform, 19% called for reform of the electoral system, while an equal share (19%) emphasized reducing political unrest and intolerance. Other reform priorities included reducing corruption through reforms of the Anti-Corruption Commission (17%) and improving the development of the education system (14%). These findings demonstrate that while law and order reforms are seen as the most pressing concerns, public opinion also prioritizes economic stability, governance, corruption, and education. When disaggregated by location, gender, age, and education, responses did not vary substantially.




Figure 6.3. What Are Your Priorities for Reform? (Multiple Response)

7. Election and Voting Behaviour

7.1. Election Timeline

There has been considerable discussion in the political sphere about election dates. In June 2025, the Chief Advisor stated that the election could be held in February.² The survey asked respondents whether they were aware of the election timeline. Just over half (50.85%) reported knowing the announced date, while 49% said they did not. A very small proportion (1%) either did not provide an answer or chose not to respond. These findings (Figure 7.1) indicate that nearly half of the population lacked awareness of the election timeline. There was little variation in responses by location, gender, age, or education.




Figure 7.1. Do You Know About the Election Timeline as Discussed by the Government?

The survey then asked a follow-up question to those who said they were aware of the election timeline: whether they considered the government’s announced timing to be acceptable. A majority (63%) agreed that the timing was appropriate, while 30% disagreed. Additionally, 5% stated that they did not know, and 2% either did not answer or preferred not to disclose (Figure 7.2).

Despite the government’s proposed dates, respondents were also asked when they would prefer the election to be held. The responses were largely polarized. About 44% wanted the election to be held within the stipulated date (i.e., February 2025), while another 25% favoured pushing it to the end

of the next year or later (Figure 18). Among those who supported the stipulated timeline, 32% favoured holding it before December 2025, while 12% suggested February 2026. Another 11% preferred mid-2026, and 25% indicated December 2026 or later. Smaller proportions selected other options (3%) or did not provide an answer (2%). Meanwhile, 16% stated that they did not know.




Figure 7.2. Is the Timeline Acceptable to You?

These results indicate that while preferences vary, a notable division exists between those favouring earlier elections and those supporting a later schedule, alongside a considerable group of uncertain respondents. Opinions did not vary significantly across gender, location, or age.




Figure 7.3. When Would You Want the National Election to Happen?

7.2. Voting Preference

In the survey, respondents were asked, “Which party will you vote for in the upcoming election?” The responses reveal highly fragmented political

² <https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/politics/bnp-satisfied-yunus-tarique-meeting-outcome-khasru-1164386>

preferences (Figure 7.4). A significant proportion (49%) reported that they had not yet decided whom to vote for, indicating widespread electoral uncertainty and fluidity in voter alignment.

By comparing responses from October 2024 and July 2025, the results suggest a decline in support for major parties over time, accompanied by an increase in undecided voters, reflecting widespread political uncertainty. In October 2024, 16% indicated support for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), but this declined by four percentage points to 12% in July 2025. Similarly, support for Jamaat-e-Islami fell marginally from 11% to 10%, while the Awami League declined from 9% to 7%. Other Islamic groups dropped from 3% to 1%, NCP from 2% to 3%, and support for 'I will not vote for any party' remained at 2%. Support for the Jatiya Party fell from 1% to 0%. The largest segment, 'Yet to take any decisions', grew from 38% to 49%. 'Others' fell from 6% to 2%, and 'No response' grew from 13% to 14%.

Smaller groups, such as other Islamic parties and the National Citizen Party (NCP), registered minor shifts, with other Islamic groups dropping from 3% to 1% and the NCP rising from 2% to 3%. A

consistent 2% reported that they would not vote for any party, while support for the Jatiya Party decreased from 1% to zero. Notably, the largest segment of respondents remained undecided, with 38% in October 2024 and an even higher 49% in July 2025. Responses categorized as "others" decreased from 6% to 2%, and non-responses remained relatively stable at 13% and 14%, respectively.

The July 2025 survey results reflect broad similarities between male and female respondents, though with nuanced differences (Figure 7.5). BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami attracted higher levels of male support (14% and 12%, respectively) compared to female support (9% and 8%, respectively). In contrast, support for the Awami League was equal across genders (7% each). The most significant gendered divide lies in indecision: 55% of females versus 43% of males reported being undecided.




Figure 7.4. Which Party Would You Vote for in the Next Parliamentary Election? (By Months)




Figure 7.5. Which Party Would You Vote for in the Next Parliamentary Election? (By Gender)

Patterns of partisan support remain relatively balanced across urban and rural areas (Figure 7.6). Support for the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami is virtually identical in both contexts (12% each for BNP; 10–11% for Jamaat-e-Islami). The Awami League garners slightly higher support among rural respondents (8%) compared to urban respondents (7%). However, both groups exhibit high levels of indecision, with 47% in urban areas and 49% in rural areas reporting no firm choice.

There is also a slight difference in opinion across age groups (Table 7.1). Support for the BNP increases with age, from 9% among those aged 18–27 to 16% among those aged 50 and above. Conversely, Jamaat-e-Islami has its strongest base among younger voters (12% among ages 18–27) but declines steadily with age (9% among ages 50 and above). The Awami League shows consistent support across all age categories (7–8%). The undecided share remains dominant across cohorts, fluctuating only slightly (48–50%). Although younger cohorts are more inclined towards Jamaat-e-Islami and older cohorts lean towards BNP, the overarching pattern is one of generational uncertainty.

Table 7.1. Whom Would You Vote for in the Next National Election? (By Age)

	18–27 (%)	28–35 (%)	36–50 (%)	50 and above (%)
BNP	9	11	13	16
Jamaat-e-Islami	12	11	10	9
NCP	4	2	2	4
Awami League	7	7	8	7
I haven't decided yet	48	50	47	49
No response	15	15	15	12
I will not vote	2	2	1	1
Other Islamic party	1	0	1	0
Other (please specify)	2	1	2	2

Similarly, opinion also varies with education (Table 7.2). BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami maintain steady levels of support across all educational groups (10–14%), indicating a broad-based appeal not confined to any one stratum. The NCP attracts minimal support among those with no or low education (2%) but slightly higher levels (4%) among respondents with secondary (SSC and HSC) or graduate-level education.




Figure 7.6. Which Party Would You Vote for in the Next Parliamentary Election? (By Location)

Table 7.2. Whom Would You Vote for in the Next National Election? (By Education)

	No formal education (%)	Up to primary (%)	Up to secondary (%)	SSC & HSC (%)	Graduate and above (%)
BNP	14	14	12	10	10
Jamaat-e-Islami	9	11	11	10	10
New party/NCP formed by students	2	2	2	4	4
Awami League	7	9	9	6	5
I haven't decided yet	53	50	48	48	45
I will not vote	1	1	1	2	3
Other Islamic party	0	1	0	1	1
No response	10	12	13	16	21
Other (please specify)	2	2	2	2	1

The Awami League exhibits a declining trend with educational attainment, from 9% among respondents with primary or secondary education to 5% among graduates and above. Non-response increases substantially with education, rising from 10% (no formal education) to 21% (graduates and above), suggesting either political caution or disengagement among the highly educated.

7.3. Prediction About Winning

Respondents were asked to identify the parties they thought would win in their area. The largest share, 38%, believed that the BNP would emerge victorious, followed by 13% who expected a Jamaat-e-Islami candidate to win. Smaller proportions anticipated success for the Awami League (7%) and the NCP (1%), while 3% mentioned other parties. Notably, 29% reported not knowing, and 9% preferred not to answer (Figure 7.7). There was little difference in opinion across gender, location, or age group.




Figure 7.7. Which Party Do You Think Will Win in Your Constituency in the Next National Election?

League (7%) and the NCP (1%), while 3% mentioned other parties. Notably, 29% reported not knowing, and 9% preferred not to answer (Figure 7.7). There was little difference in opinion across gender, location, or age group.




Figure 7.8. Do You Think the Upcoming National Election Will Be Free and Fair?

7.4. Election Environment

Respondents were asked whether they believed the upcoming national parliamentary election would be free and fair. A clear majority (70%) expressed confidence that the election would be free and fair, while 15% responded negatively. At the same time, 14% stated that they did not know, and less than 1% (0.86%) chose not to answer (Figure 7.8). These results suggest a strong sense of optimism among the public regarding the fairness of the upcoming election, though a significant minority expressed doubt or uncertainty.

8. Youth-Led Political Parties

8.1. Popularity of Youth-Led Political Parties

In the aftermath of the July Revolution, several new civil society organizations and political parties emerged, many of which were predominantly composed of young people. Among them, the NCP was particularly prominent. In this context, the survey asked respondents whether they had heard of, or were aware of, the youth-led party or parties formed after the July Uprising. A majority (63%) reported having heard about such parties, while 31% said they had not (Figure 8.1).




Figure 8.1. Have You Heard of the Youth-Led Political Party?

An additional 6% indicated that they did not know, and none chose to leave the question unanswered. These findings indicate that public awareness of the emergence of youth-led parties following the July events is relatively high, although nearly one-third of respondents remain unaware.

Awareness of youth-led political parties formed after the July Uprising varies considerably across socio-demographic categories, including gender, place of residence, education, and income. Differences are most pronounced across gender and place of residence. Among male respondents, 75% reported awareness compared to only 49% of female respondents (Figure 8.2). Women were more likely to state that they had not heard of such parties (43%) compared to men (20%). Uncertainty was

also slightly higher among women (8%) than men (4%).




Figure 8.2. Have You Heard of the Youth-Led Political Party? (By Gender and Location)

By location, awareness was higher among urban respondents (73%) compared to 59% in rural areas. Levels of uncertainty remained low in both contexts but were slightly higher in rural areas (7%) compared to urban areas (4%).

Awareness of youth-led political parties formed after the July Uprising is also strongly associated with education level and income. Among respondents with no formal education, only 48% reported awareness, whereas this proportion increased steadily with higher educational attainment. Seventy-two per cent of respondents with SSC and HSC qualifications, and 88% of those with graduate-level education or higher, reported awareness of the newly formed youth-led political parties. Lack of awareness declined from 41% among the least educated to just 10% among graduates. A small but consistent share across all education groups indicated that they “do not know.”

Income level shows a similar pattern. Among those earning below BDT 10,000, awareness was 55%, rising to 74% among respondents earning above BDT 25,000. Non-awareness fell from 38% in the lowest income group to 22% among the highest earners. Uncertainty (“do not know”) remained

consistently low (4–7%). These results suggest that both higher education and higher income are associated with greater political awareness, while less privileged groups tend to remain less informed.

8.2. Support and Survival Conditions of Youth-Led Political Parties

The survey on support for youth involvement in politics indicates a nearly even divide in public opinion.




Figure 8.3. Do You Support a Youth-Led Political Party?

A total of 45% of respondents expressed support for young people taking part in politics, while 46% opposed such involvement. In addition, 9% of participants either did not provide an answer or chose not to express their opinion (Figure 8.3). These findings indicate that attitudes towards youth engagement in politics are highly polarized, with support and opposition almost equally balanced, and only a small portion of the population remaining undecided.

Although there were not many differences in opinion among respondents across income levels, the findings show that support for youth participation in politics increases with education. Only 36% of respondents with no formal education supported youth involvement, compared to 55% among those with a graduate degree or higher (Table 8.1).

Urban-rural differences are less pronounced but still evident. In urban areas, 49% supported youth involvement, compared to 43% in rural areas, while non-response rates were higher in rural settings (10%) than in urban ones (6%) (Figure 8.4).




Figure 8.4. Do You Support a Youth-Led Political Party? (By Location)

The survey findings on the future of youth-led political parties reveal a balance between cautious optimism and scepticism. When asked whether such parties could survive in the country's politics, 38% of respondents expressed confidence in their survival, while 36% were doubtful. At the same time, 23% stated that they did not know, and 3% chose not to respond (Figure 8.5).

Table 8.2. Do You Support a Youth-Led Political Party? (By Education)

Do you support youth involvement in politics?	No formal education (%)	Up to primary (%)	Up to secondary (%)	SSC & HSC (%)	Graduate and above (%)
Yes	36	39	43	50	55
No	49	49	48	43	40
No answer/Don't want to say	15	12	9	7	5




Figure 8.5. Do You Think a Youth-Led Party Will Sustain in Bangladesh's Politics?

Respondents who expressed confidence in the survival of such parties and those who expressed doubts were further asked to provide reasons behind their views. These views highlight the perceived strengths and weaknesses of youth-led

parties. Respondents who believed in their survival pointed to qualities such as new thinking and innovative energy (27%), leadership demonstrated during the July Movement (25%), the desire for positive change (24%), courage (23%), and honesty (20%). Conversely, sceptics emphasized barriers such as a lack of experience (53%), a shortage of qualified leadership (18%), a lack of public support (15%), a culture of political intolerance (15%), and organizational weakness (13%) (Table 8.3).

Taken together, these results suggest that while youth-led parties are valued for their innovation, integrity, and reformist spirit, doubts about their organizational capacity, leadership experience, and resilience within a politically intolerant environment present significant challenges to their long-term survival.

Table 8.3. Reasons Why the Party Will Survive or Not Survive

If survives, why? (%)		If won't survive, why? (%)	
New thinking and innovative energy	27	Lack of experience	53
Leadership in the time of the July Movement	25	Lack of qualified leadership	18
Desire for positive change	24	Lack of public support	15
Courage	23	Culture of political intolerance	15
Honesty	20	Organizational weakness	13

9. Contemporary Issues

9.1. Public Perception on Safety and Social Conditions

There has been widespread discussion in the public sphere regarding the state of law and order in the country. Several serious incidents of violence—particularly against women—were reported in recent months, and it is widely perceived that both the frequency and severity of violence have increased. Against this backdrop, the survey sought to understand the extent to which people perceive this as a problem.

Respondents were asked to rate the country's conditions in terms of women's safety, nighttime travel safety, mob violence, and public harassment related to clothing choices. Responses were provided on a four-point scale, where 1 indicated "very bad" and 4 indicated "very good."

Figure 9.1 presents the findings. In all four areas, the majority of respondents considered the situation to be bad (combining very bad and bad). Specifically,

56% rated women's safety conditions as bad, with 34% rating them very bad and 22% rating them bad. Conversely, 30% thought conditions were good, and only 12% rated them very good. Regarding nighttime travel, 61% rated conditions as bad (combining very bad and bad), while 36% rated them as good. The highest share of negative ratings related to mob violence: among the 80% who viewed the situation as bad, 55% rated it very bad. Concerning public harassment linked to clothing choice, 38% rated the situation very bad and 29% bad. Overall, these findings suggest that public opinion is highly critical, particularly regarding mob violence and harassment, with smaller but still significant concern about women's safety and walking at night.

When disaggregated by gender, responses were generally similar; however, concerns about women's safety and public harassment related to clothing choice were more pronounced among women (Figure 9.2).




Figure 9.1. Opinion on Current Safety and Security Conditions




Figure 9.2. Opinion on Current Safety and Security Conditions (By Gender)

9.2. Perceptions on Gender Equality

During the interim government regime, several independent thematic reform commissions were formed to propose agendas for reform in different areas. One of these was the Women's Affairs Reform Commission, which put forward several important recommendations, including provisions on gender equality in inheritance, custody, and marriage rights. Some of these proposals challenged established principles in the country, and once the commission's report was made public, they sparked widespread debate and discussion in the media. Selected recommendations were included in this survey.

Respondents were asked whether they had heard of the Women's Affairs Reform Commission. Only 30% reported being aware of the commission, while a clear majority of 70% stated that they had not heard of it (Figure 9.3).




Figure 9.3. Awareness of the Women's Affairs Reform Commission

The Women's Affairs Reform Commission presented a comprehensive set of recommendations aimed at eliminating discrimination against women and promoting gender equality. The report, submitted to the interim government, included 433 proposals covering legal, social, and institutional reforms. To capture citizens' views, the survey included three of these proposed laws, regardless of respondents' prior awareness of the commission. Enumerators read each proposed law aloud and provided clarification if necessary, after which respondents indicated whether they agreed or disagreed. They could also choose not to answer.

The first proposal stated that both women and men would have equal rights to parental property. Currently, sons generally receive a larger share of property than daughters, who often receive no share or only a very small portion. The second proposal

concerned women’s guardianship of their children. Currently, a mother can obtain custody but not guardianship rights, meaning that even if a child resides with the mother, she lacks the legal authority to make decisions on the child’s behalf. The third proposal affirmed equal rights for women and men in marriage and divorce. It stipulated that women of any religion would have the right to choose whom to marry and divorce. If a divorce occurs, it must be registered to be legally valid and serve as proof in the future. The law also aims to ensure that women receive financial support for an extended period, not only during the iddat period after divorce.

equal rights to property by inheritance,” “Women will gain guardianship of their children,” and “In the Universal Marriage Law, women and men will have equal rights in matters of marriage and divorce.” Regarding inheritance, 60% of respondents agreed that men and women should have equal rights, while 39% disagreed and 1% did not respond. On the issue of custody, 82% supported granting women guardianship rights, 16% disagreed, and 2% did not answer. Concerning the Universal Marriage Law, 62% agreed it would ensure equal rights for men and women, while 36% disagreed and 2% did not answer. Overall, these findings demonstrate strong support for gender equality in custody and marriage, while opinions were more divided regarding equal inheritance rights (Figure 9.4).

Based on these three proposed laws, respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statements: “Men and women will have




Figure 9.4. Opinion on Inheritance, Custody, and Marriage Rights




Figure 9.5. Opinion on Inheritance, Custody, and Marriage Rights (By Gender)

* Respondents who agreed

Although there were no substantial differences in opinion based on education, income, or place of residence, the survey revealed notable gender differences in support for proposed reforms related to inheritance, custody, and marriage rights. A higher proportion of women than men supported equal inheritance rights (76% vs 45%), reflecting women's stronger demand for equality in property distribution. Women also expressed greater

support for gaining guardianship of their children (89% vs 75% of men). Similarly, more women than men supported the Universal Marriage Law (71% vs 54%). Taken together, the findings suggest that women consistently demonstrate stronger endorsement of gender-equal legal reforms across all three areas, while men's support, though present, remains comparatively lower (Figure 9.5).



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