

# Realpolitik: Democratic Embeddedness within Major Political Parties in Bangladesh

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
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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

|      |  |
|------|--|
| AL   | Bangladesh Awami League                      |
| ANC  | African National Congress                    |
| BIGD | BRAC Institute of Governance and Development |
| BNP  | Bangladesh Nationalist Party                 |
| CHT  | Chittagong Hill Tracts                       |
| INC  | Indian National Congress                     |
| JIB  | Jamaat-i-Islami Bangladesh                   |
| MP   | Member of Parliament                         |
| ODS  | Civic Democratic Party                       |
| PDI  | Party Democracy Index                        |

## Glossary

|                          |                                 |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------|
| zilla                    | District                        |
| <i>mahanagar</i>         | Large/often metropolitan City   |
| <i>mastaans</i>          | Thugs, gangsters, hired goons   |
| <i>mononoyan banijya</i> | Nomination trade                |
| upazila                  | Sub-district                    |
| Union Parishad           | Lowest tier of local government |



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## Abstract

The study examines the trend of problematic electoral politics in Bangladesh through the lens of *realpolitik* or 'real politics' at two corresponding levels. Firstly, it sheds light on the constitutions of two selected major parties - the Bangladesh Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Here we attempt to evaluate and score the degree of coherence and compliance of the constitutional provisions to internationally recognised standards of democratic party-governance. Secondly, it analyses the actual practice of the democracy as reported from selected districts' party offices and journalists, and other experts. Documentary analysis, field data and interviews suggest that party constitutions do not meet international standards and that the legal framework and principles of the main parties generally discourages democratic practices leaving scope for abuse of power in top leadership, particularly the party head; and find that important party decisions are taken centrally without adequate consultation of local level party leaders. We also develop an innovative indicator called the Party Democracy Index (PDI)- quantifying the responses from the surveyed districts in the study, with findings of low intra-party democracy. *Realpolitik*- the discrepancy between principles and practice- is assessed based on the two main themes of 'inclusiveness and decentralisation' as the pillar of intra-party democracy, and our concluding evaluation is democratic practices is far from present within the two major political parties in Bangladesh.

## Keywords

realpolitik; intra-party democracy; Bangladesh; party politics; Party Democracy Index.



# 1 Introduction

While referring to the increasingly apparent contradictions between democratic policy<sup>1</sup> and practice in political party behaviour in Bangladesh, here are some popular examples of the recent editorial headlines: 'a living paradox' (Choudhury 2014), 'party for all, power for one' (Hasan 2014), '(practice) turns a blind eye (to precepts)' (Bhattacharjee 2014), and 'democracy down the slippery slope' (Majumdar 2014). Recent academic literature has also noted the tendencies towards gradual but definitive concentration of power *within* the main political parties, especially the ruling regimes, despite the growing and high blown rhetoric of inclusiveness and democratic participation.

Jalal (1995), for example, chose to employ the term 'democratic authoritarianism' to describe the nature of political parties' rule in her comparative work on South Asian countries. Khan (2005) emphasises the persistence of patron-client mode of political operation, reducing the scope for realising the potential 'democratic deliverables' of the Bangladeshi democracy. This mode of organisation, he claims, reinforces institutionalised corruption, that in turn is detrimental for state legitimacy and democracy. Amundsen (2013) explores the dynastic character of leadership which has pervaded party politics since independence. His overall finding is that the degree of internal democracy is very limited in Bangladesh, and that leadership selection is largely "informal and handled by a restricted number of party elites" (ibid.: 2). Blair (2010) notes the persistent subjugation of the apparatus of state to the political parties, as a defining feature of the Bangladeshi political system.

Indeed the 'dual faces' syndrome of political party operations has long been a matter of social scientific scholarship. Starting from the classic treatment of Machiavelli's *The Prince*<sup>2</sup> (1987) through the philosophical traditions of 'realism' to the resurgence of the concept of '*Realpolitik*'<sup>3</sup> (Haslam 2002)—the study of the discrepancy between the public face of political parties and their actual intent—reflects persistence of 'the game of politics', the persistence of 'usurpation'<sup>4</sup> and the tensions that it produces within our contemporary societies.

This idea of *realpolitik* emanates from the philosophical tradition of political realism, which is considered as 'a realistic approach' that focuses on the real needs of leaders by following their own interests and avoiding any unrealistic aims. The 'realist position' is characterised by the importance on power, outcome, and the actual situation, as opposed to ideal axioms and expected social norms. The classic work of Niccolò Machiavelli—*The Prince*—provides the pioneering perspective on the modern study of

---

1 Here, we refer to 'policy' in the widest possible sense to include principles, law as well as specific derivative rules and administrative procedures.

2 *The Prince* was written in the sixteenth century, and this first great work of modern political and historical analysis examines the political career of Cesare Borgia, and the word 'machievellian' is commonly used in a derogatory manner to connote predominantly political treachery.

3 *Realpolitik* is a term coined by a German writer and politician, Ludwig von Rochau, in the 19th Century and has emerged with reference to the understanding of state formation and power politics.

4 Benjamin Constant is known to have forwarded the concept of 'usurpation', in the context of Napoleon's rise as Emperor of France, following the French Revolution, where the experience of dictatorship under Napoleon showed that modern forms of power and authority could be equally repressive as the *Ancien Régime*. A usurper, he maintained, was a leader whose claims to authority went beyond the legitimate constitutional and the traditional, and who lay personal claim to institutions, which are traditionally separated from central control.

*realpolitik*. If a leader- 'the Prince'- needs to expand political power, she must do whatever is necessary- whether moral or immoral- for the practical purpose of maintaining the political power. Politics may be guided by the laws or rules that are not the same as those governing morality<sup>5</sup>.

The basic arguments and strands of classical Machiavellian perspectives on political realism have continued into the discourses of the 20th century political thought. Hans Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace* (1948), for example, states that politics is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. Morgenthau (1985: 4) further states that the "operation of these laws being impervious to our preferences, people will challenge them only at the risk of failure". Although, Morgenthau comments on the state when Machiavelli considers the actor to be the 'prince', the statement illustrates the importance of operating within what one considers to be objective and essential for the survival of the self. Considering the increasing effect of party politics on the broader political arena of Bangladesh (Blair 2010, Hassan 2014), concentration of power in the hands of not only a party but a handful of leaders within the party, particularly the party-head, can lead to a position of the actor(s) that goes beyond 'survival'. Without proper democratic principles and safeguards or accountability mechanisms power can be usurped by the 'few' at the cost of the benefit of the state.

With this backdrop, our paper focuses on the nature and extent of democratic practices and representativeness within the two major political parties, namely the Bangladesh Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Thus, this paper looks, basically, at two related questions: *to what extent the major political parties of Bangladesh are practicing democracy within their institutions, and what are the implications of their practices for the overall democracy in the country?*

## 1.1 The Study context and relevance

An analysis of the prevalence of democratic ethos within political parties or intra-party democracy is important for several reasons. Although there has been a burgeoning literature globally, research on the subject in Bangladesh still remains strikingly limited. The existing literature varies widely in terms of depth, rigor of analysis and scope. While some of these documents are narrowly focused on certain limited aspects of party operations, without locating the findings within the 'big picture' (e.g. EWG 2013), other literatures present interesting hypotheses, without corresponding comprehensive field-based data or evidence-based recommendations (e.g. Rahman 2010). This study, within its modest means and limitations, attempts a reasonably comprehensive treatment of the subject, by combining conceptual and empirical analyses in light of the relative gap in the literature.

Although there is a general perception about limited democratic practices within the political parties in Bangladesh, systematic evidence and relevant data from multiple sources hardly exist. The study uses some 'original' analytical frameworks and tools- notably the Party Democracy Index (PDI)- which might pave way for future research in

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5 The prince should not worry about using cruelty as long as she keeps her subjects united and loyal. In order to do so, she must learn how not to be virtuous and make use of knowledge according to need. The prince should thus be judged by the 'successful outcome' where 'moral' and 'religious' considerations must take a secondary role.

the subject. The PDI, which is also a scoring exercise of intra-party democracy, is created by the authors; and this is the first time analysis of party constitutions of political parties in Bangladesh has been attempted, albeit drawing from an internationally accepted framework.

The findings from the study may also have important policy implications for Bangladesh and beyond. Intra-party democracy is receiving renewed focus and scrutiny (e.g. Bhattacharjee 2014) in the context of some recent incidents (including the selection of candidates and citizen participation), notably in the run up to the 10th parliamentary elections. This study is basically an attempt to gauge the inner workings of the political parties themselves, and provide indications as to how this impacts the practice of democracy as a whole.

Based on selected themes of enquiry and associated indicators, the study explores intra-party democracy within the studied parties, AL and BNP, at two levels; the stated principles and intentions, and the party working modalities and behaviour in the field. The stated principles are determined and examined by analysing the relevant party constitutional documents in order to assess the nature and scope of embedding and nurturing inclusiveness and representation in these key guiding documents; secondly, the study further looks at the actual practice of democracy (or lack of it) in the field, by focusing on the operations of the district level party offices.

## 1.2 Composition of the paper

After this general introduction and contextualisation, the next section provides the analytical framework and puts forward the methodological consideration. The third section explores the scruples as reflected in the studied constitutions of the two political parties. The subsequent section presents the major findings from an analysis of intra-party democratic practices and behaviour by focusing on the actual working of the district level party offices, and related views of journalists and other key informants. In a rather simplistic attempt to summarise the responses from the 40 districts, the fifth section develops an index of intra-party democracy and compares the responses between the party offices and district journalists using the indices created. The concluding section recapitulates the key observations of the study and provides clues for future research.

## 2 Analytical framework and methodological considerations

Realism is an idea that mainly refers to the study and understanding of international relations. Nonetheless, taking a realist approach towards politics or considering *realpolitik* in the assessment of political system(s) can provide us with an analytical lens to comprehend the inner workings of the major political parties emanating from the political culture existent in Bangladesh. In such assessments, the ethos and principles—mostly related to 'democracy'—of political parties may be considered as the basis of the party modalities or behaviour. However, in reality the practice may deviate from such principles and render to politics where power is distributed in an undesirable manner. The analytical framework will differentiate between the 'principle' and 'actual practice' and examine the extent of democratic embeddedness within political parties, or in other words, 'intra-party democracy'.

Approaching the study of intra-party democracy is a herculean task by any standards. It

is imperative for the purpose of this study to operationalise the concept of intra-party democracy and formulate an analytical framework. According to Croissant and Chambers (2010) who made an extensive review of key literature of the past one and half decades (Pennings and Hazan 2001, Caraway 2004, Norris 2004, Scarrow 2005, Bojinova 2007) intra-party democracy may be conceptualised as a characteristic of the distribution of decision-making power among members and leaders within a political party, along the two principal dimensions of inclusiveness and decentralisation. *Inclusiveness* here, as Chambers and Croissant (2010: 196) further elaborates:

... refers to how wide the circle of decision-makers in a party is. It captures the openness of political parties to inputs from both within and outside the body of *party members*. Centralisation refers to the extent to which decisions are made by a single group or decision body. It captures the extent to which members of different levels and functional background are included in party decision-making. In decentralised political parties, the national party organisation focuses on coordination and communication. In centralised parties, the national party committee has the decision-making authority.

The nature and extent of intra-party democracy scruples and practices are analysed in light of the two themes of *inclusiveness* and *decentralisation*. As stated previously, the study focuses on two aspects and mechanisms of political party operations; firstly, the spotlight is on the constitutions of two selected major parties (AL and BNP), which is based on a desk review. Some comparisons with other selected country constitutional documents are also attempted. For the convenience of the constitutional analysis with reference to the two themes by Croissant and Chambers (2010), a framework of checklist has been developed in line with the key themes of the study, drawing mainly on Berge, Poguntke et al. (2013). The checklist includes points organised under the following parameters: member rights (including woman and minority rights); organisational structure (including party congress, conflict-solving agencies, national executives, executive committee and party president); and decision-making (recruitment and candidate selection, election in the national executive and executive committee, voting procedures and programmatic issues). An attempt to evaluate and score the degree of coherence and compliance of the constitutional provisions to internationally recognised standard of democratic party governance is also made.


Secondly, the two themes are further examined by developing a set of five complementary indicators that allow for the analysis of party practice at the field-level. As such, the framework, involving two main themes and five central indicators, draws on three recent studies (Croissant and Chambers 2010, Berge, Poguntke et al. 2013, IDI 2013) that have an immediate relevance to this research. The indicators and their relationship with inclusiveness and decentralisation are as follows:

- Participation: to what extent party members and activists take part in the selection of its leaders and in any ideological issues; and this captures the inclusiveness with more decentralised decision-making.
- Representation: to what extent parties ensure proper representation from wider society, both from the perspective of women and minorities; and this captures the breadth of the decision-makers adding mainly to the theme of inclusiveness.
- Competition: whether an election mechanism exists and is practiced for leadership selection within the parties; and inclusive mechanisms can lead to decentralised decision-making through ensuring leaders of higher quality.

- Responsiveness: to what extent the broader circle of the party is included in the key decisions of party, like coalition formation; and such inclusion in decision-making makes the process decentralised.
- Transparency: to what extent transparency is ensured within the party in terms of the availability/accessibility of its by-laws, rules, procedures and other relevant information; and transparency mainly provides the members with relevant information to recognise procedures that allows for both inclusiveness and decentralisation.

As evident from the illustration of inclusiveness and decentralisation within the indicators, the two themes are broadly inter-linked. With that notion this paper looks, basically, at the two related questions with the concepts and exploratory design as outlined in the following schematic:

**Figure 2.1: Analytical framework for exploring democratic embeddedness within political parties in Bangladesh**



In line with the above analytical framework, the methodological approach of this study involved the following steps: i) development of a conceptual framework based on a survey of the key literature; ii) translating the major concepts into specific (and measurable) indicators; and iii) the eventual operationalisation of these concepts as indicators that were applied in the surveys designed to elicit relevant responses from a) district committee party officials, b) journalists, and c) a set of experts representative of citizens of Bangladesh. The justification of respondent selection may be understood as follows: an initial search of secondary sources and relevant official documents at the offices of the political parties revealed that there was very little organised information on the subject. We, therefore, decided to hold direct interviews with selected district party officials. Subsequently, notable district level journalists were approached with the idea of eliciting popular views of the 'recipient end', and also to cross check the information received from the party offices. Additionally, we selected national experts and analysts on the subject for consultation to widen our understanding of the broader trends and issues surrounding intra-party democracy.

The twin imperatives of a) *inclusion* and b) *decentralisation* remain embedded throughout the analysis to identify the effects of 'real politics'. These two central themes of democratic process are elaborated in the review of the constitution and the assessment of party modalities in 40 districts of Bangladesh. The study reviews and operationalises the five indicators across the following investigative tools:

- 1) Questionnaire survey of AL and BNP party district secretaries in 40 districts
- 2) Questionnaire survey of journalists in the same 40 districts
- 3) 30 in-depth qualitative interviews with experts, thinkers and advocates that study in the field of politics in Bangladesh.

The selection of the 40 districts surveyed<sup>6</sup> in our report reflects considerations of the districts that typically feature dominance by either AL or BNP, and those that feature the dominance of neither of the two main parties. Specifically, 15 AL electoral strongholds, 15 BNP electoral strongholds as well as 10 districts understood as to be electorally dominated by neither of the two parties. The concept of party stronghold was based on a time-series analysis of party dominance with regards to electoral seats as seen across the districts since the start of democracy in 1991 until the 9th parliamentary elections in 2008.

### 3 The extent of democratic embeddedness: An anatomy of party constitutions

This section of the paper looks into the party constitutions of the two major political parties of Bangladesh, AL and BNP. The analysis is performed under the three categories: a) member rights, b) organisational structure and c) decision-making. These sections also provide examples of best international practices that can allow for a comparative assessment of principles embedded within the AL and BNP party constitutions against the ones from other countries. The analysis, as stated in the previous section, will be elucidated under the twin imperatives of 'inclusiveness' and 'decentralisation'. In terms of the scoring exercise of party constitutions, the level of intra-party democracy ranges from -1 (lowest level of intra-party democracy) to +1 (highest level of intra-party democracy) and can be calculated for any statute of a political party<sup>7</sup>.

#### 3.1 Member rights

The category of members' rights includes *general member rights and woman/minority rights*. This reflects the provisions in party constitutions regarding the membership rights of, as evident, general members and women and minority groups. Member rights broadly and mainly refer to the theme of 'inclusiveness' to assess democratic embeddedness within party constitutions.

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6 The survey was initiated in March, 2014

7 See Appendix 1, Table 1-1 for the questions and associated calculations.

### 3.1.1 General member rights

The provisions of Swedish Social Democratic Party constitution is a prime example of how explicitly political parties give its general members rights without considering their position or function in the party. One may assert that equality of all party members in implementing the party's decision is one of the basic requirements of intra-party democracy, even though some members may differ from the majority within the party (Huber, Ragin et al. 1993, Swedish Social Democratic Party 1997: 4A, Clause 1). Such inclusiveness can provide diversity and add to the quality of decision-making. Berge, Poguntke et al. (2013) expands by stating that the rights of members to be informed about party activities, the right to express opinions within and outside the party, and the right to participate in intra-party decision-making as well as the right to form factions support diverse positions within the party. In stark contrast to the provisions of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, both the party constitutions of AL and BNP have no provisions regarding general member rights. In fact, none of the two constitutions even contain any such phrases or terms as 'member rights'.

### 3.1.2 Woman/Minority rights

Various literature (IDEA 2006, Suri 2007, Chowdhury 2013) show concerns with inclusion of women and minority rights in the party decision-making as an important aspect of political parties. In many countries where women and minorities lag behind, political party constitutions provide special provisions including quota system. For instance, the African National Congress (2012) includes a special provision in its constitution by stating:

[I]n an endeavour to ensure that women are adequately represented in all decision-making structures, the ANC [African National Congress] shall implement a programme of affirmative action, including the provision of a quota of at least one-third (1/3) in all its structures to enable such effective participation (African National Congress 2012: Rule 14.1).

This is a prime example of how political parties ensure inclusiveness in their party constitutions, which is mainly by incorporating ex officio membership of women in the party. In this regard, the Indian National Congress (INC) elaborates further and includes minority groups stating that "for the purpose of election of the Executive Committee [...] there shall be reservation of not less than 33% for women and not less than 20% for [minority groups]" (INC 2010: Rule under Article VI (A) (a) and (b)).

Both the constitutions of AL and BNP, include some provisions – to a varying degree – of the 'rights' or 'quota' for women and minorities. The AL constitution has a relatively more 'progressive outlook' by stating that the party requires having goals "to stop oppression against women; to protect women's rights as well as dignity and to empower them by ensuring female participation in all spheres of the state and social life" (AL: Preamble). BNP, on the other hand, includes quota for women in its National Council stating that they should include "[t]wo women members from every zilla and mahanagar nominated by every zilla and mahanagar executive committee" (BNP: Article 5). In addition to having quotas in the upper echelon of the organisation, BNP has 10 per cent quota for women in the National Executive Committee and states that the number of female members will have to be increased by 33 per cent by 2020.


Regarding minority rights, both party constitutions framed the issue in different ways. According to the constitution of BNP, 10 per cent of the total members shall be from labourer, freedom fighters, farmers and tribal groups, i.e. having clear provisions for inclusion of minorities (BNP: Article 11). AL, on the other hand, has no special quota system for the minorities, but in the commitment section it pledges:

To ensure the expansion of Bengali heritage, civilisation, language, arts, literature and culture; to prevent averse-to-life, vulgar, obscene entertainment and distorted culture and to preserve and promote the life style, language and culture of the aborigines, tribes and ethnic groups of the country (AL: Preamble).

**Table 3.1: Scoring of member rights within party constitutions**

| Member rights                        | AL    | BNP   |
|--------------------------------------|-------|-------|
| General member (average of 6 scores) | -0.83 | -0.83 |
| Minority (average of 6 scores)       | -0.50 | -0.17 |

**Figure 3.1: Member rights within party constitutions**



Based on the scoring exercise, developed by the Berge, Poguntke et al. (2013), under general member rights and minority rights (here women are also included in the minority category), we find (Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1) that BNP fares better in the scoring exercise than AL<sup>8</sup>. However, from the discussion, we find that the rights for minorities are at times mentioned but not well pronounced, when general members' rights are not even mentioned. When compared to international practices, the two parties of Bangladesh lags behind from the provided examples of Africa and India and one may assert that limitations in the provisions for inclusiveness, in addition to the provisions in the following sections, leaves power concentrated in the hands of the few, allowing for the application of realist measures.

8. See Appendix 1 for details.

## 3.2 Organisational structure

The category of organisational structure includes *party congress, conflict solving agencies, national executive, executive committee* and *party head*. This category mainly reflects on the availability of bodies, agencies and the 'prime actor'—the party head—that can provide as checks-and-balances to each other and increase the level of democratic embeddedness within the parties to reduce the scope of 'real politics' and usurpatory behaviour. Discussion on the provisions under each category highlights the mechanisms available to limit decentralisation and inclusiveness within the two major parties in Bangladesh.

### 3.2.1 Party congress

The constitution of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) from Czech Republic (cited in NDI 2011) is an apt example of how the party congress is a platform constituted by party members which is considered as the highest organ of a political party. The ODS platform (ibid.) decides the major decisions of the party including amendment of party constitution, financial management and electing the top leaders for party organs. The proficiency of such a party congress depends on the regularity of its sessions that indicates a high level of inclusion of the members in the party's decision-making processes. According to NDI (2011), the constitution of a political party should typically specify the frequency of holding congresses; procedures for holding extraordinary congresses; persons, responsible for presiding over congresses; the number and the process of selecting delegates from the various party structures; and the requirements for quorum and other voting procedures.

Both AL and BNP have the provision of holding party congress in their constitutions, and they also positioned it as the highest authority within their parties. The name of the AL party congress is Council of the Bangladesh Awami League and BNP's party congress is named as the National Council. AL discusses the council in greater detail compared to BNP. The AL explicitly mentions that the council should be organised every three years. BNP, on the other hand, does not mention the frequency of organising their congress, though in the provision of the election of party head, it states that the party head will be elected for three years by direct vote of the members of the National Council. In comparison, the regularity of congress as stated in the party constitution of ODS is every two years, but with greater detail in terms of the agenda and function of the congress as stated previously (cited in NDI 2011). The provisions in the two major parties of Bangladesh regarding party congress remain vague and leave scope for more centralised decision-making by the party leaders.

### 3.2.2 Conflict solving agencies

In a political party, conflicts may be common among different members or interest groups on various issues; the party constitutions should have provisions regarding these matters. Clear rules and regulations, acceptable to the members may prevent any dispute within the party. While some members may feel discriminated in areas like receiving a higher position or other offers, there should also be the option of sanctioning the members whose actions may be a threat to the party. Thus, parties might consider an option that solves the problem in such a way that the aggrieved members remain 'happy' while the party faces no loss. For this purpose, ideal party constitutions keep an independent, representative and neutral organ for dispute resolution, allowing for inclusiveness and more decentralised decision-making.

In the Labour Party rules of the UK (Labour Party 2013), for example, the Complaints Committee is responsible for any dispute resolution. Article 16 of Labour Party (2013) rules scope out clear and detailed guidelines for resolving disputes, both formally and informally, in addition to providing explicit grounds to cancel membership rights. Conversely, none of the constitutions of the two major parties of Bangladesh offer any dedicated, independent or representative dispute resolution body. The party constitution of the AL (AL: Article 46), however, mentions that the Executive Committee has the power to take any disciplinary action against any member with respect to a complaint. BNP, too, has no separate provision for this, except for the National Executive Committee's discretionary right to solve internal conflicts within the party.<sup>9</sup> The party constitution of BNP states that one of the powers of the National Executive would concern "resolving internal conflicts among committees on legitimacy" (BNP: Article 11). However, none of the provisions explicitly mention that the party court's decisions are equally binding for everybody, including the party executive and party president. This may provide sufficient grounds for taking unilateral decisions without proper checks and centralise the decision-making process.

### 3.2.3 National executive

The national executive committee is usually an extended leadership body consisting of 40-100 members, which is involved in fundamental political debates about party ideology (Berge, Poguntke et al. 2013). To ensure democracy within the party, the power and function of the body should be dispersed in such a way that reduces the possibility of any autocratic behaviour, i.e. decentralised decision-making is achieved through greater inclusiveness in the upper organisational structure of the party. For this purpose, the party constitution should have a clear definition of the national executive regarding its power and responsibilities. Besides, the constitution of the political party should also mention the accountability mechanism of the national executive body explicitly. The party congress, or a special neutral agency legitimised by the party congress, can be in the position to control the national executive.

In the constitutions of AL and BNP, such national executives are officially titled as the 'National Committee of Bangladesh Awami League' and the 'National Executive Committee', respectively. BNP has 351 committee members, while AL has 166. The party head of BNP has the power to change the number in certain situations, but it may not be increased by more than 10 per cent. Given the number provided by Berge, Poguntke et al. (2013) of the extended leadership body, the total number of members of the national executive as stated in the constitutions of the AL and BNP may show a high degree of inclusiveness. However, both the constitutions in delineating the responsibilities of the bodies emit centralised tendencies.

The national executive of AL, on the outset, looks moderately representative in the constitution, as it mentions that "one member from each Organisational district of the Bangladesh Awami League, shall be elected by the respective Triennial District Councils, in the National Committee" (AL: Article 17(a)). However, 21 out of 166 members in the committee shall be nominated by the party head, which is not an ideal example. BNP, on the other hand, prescribes "the president of every district executive

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9. The nature and roles of the executive committees (Executive Committee for AL and National Executive Committee for BNP) is predominantly discussed in section 3.2.4.

committee and municipal committee as member of the national executive committee by virtue of their post, whereas, at least one-third of the committee would be elected from and by the National Council" (BNP: Article 11). Thus, the formation of the national executive of BNP combines both nomination and election. None of the constitutions discusses about the voting procedure of the committee. The accountability mechanism for the national executives of AL and BNP is also completely absent in their constitutions. None of the bodies is accountable to the party members or to the party congress. Additionally, the constitutions do not provide for any explicit or independent mechanism to control the body of national executive-paving the way for the possibility of the national executives of both the parties to become autocratic in certain situations, and allow for real politics to pervade.

### **3.2.4 Executive committee**

Usually the senior leaders including the party head and secretary form the executive committee in a political party. As a result, in an ideal party constitution, there should be the mechanism to make the executive committee accountable to the party members or to the party congress. Besides, there should also be the existence of a special body or mechanism, explicitly mentioned in the constitution, which is specifically entitled to control the executive committee. The division between national executive and executive committee enables us to determine how power is distributed within the party and to discover differences between varying organisational layers of a party (Berge, Poguntke et al. 2013).

Both the party constitutions of AL and BNP provide for the formation and operation of executive committees. The name of the executive committee of BNP is the 'National Standing Committee' and the AL's is the 'Executive Committee'. The executive committee of the AL, to some extent, has the accountability mechanism through the 'National Committee of Bangladesh Awami League'. In the AL party constitution (AL: Article 17(d)), it is mentioned that "the National Committee shall have the right to review the decisions and functions of the Bangladesh Awami League Executive Committee". It also notes that "the National Committee shall consider an appeal against punitive measures against any member taken by the Bangladesh Awami League Executive Committee and take the final decision" (ibid.), which, to some extent ensure the accountability of the executive committee. But none of the provisions mention the existence of any accountability mechanisms of the bodies to the party members or to the party congress. Similarly, the BNP constitution gives discretionary power to the executive, including over the national executive (BNP: Article 11(g) & 12 (g)). However, it does not seem that there exist any accountability mechanisms that make the body more responsive, for both AL and BNP.

### **3.2.5 Party head**

Intra-party democracy is often challenged by the prerogative power given by the party constitution to its party head. Such powers can allow the party head to disregard the party members, engage in 'real politics' and can take unilateral decisions that may not only be detrimental to the party but also the constituency, and in essence the state. To ensure decentralisation and inclusiveness within the party, the rights of the party president should be limited, so that she cannot yield absolute power of the party. According to Berge, Poguntke et al. (2013), this kind of threat is often prominent in political parties of newly democratic countries, especially in the transition period—a

phenomenon known as leader-centred parties. It can be argued that the more prerogatives the party head has, the lower is the level of inclusiveness and decentralisation.

Both the party constitutions of AL and BNP allow party heads to enjoy substantial rights and exercise discretionary power. According to the AL party constitution, "if any members of the organisation fails to discharge the responsibilities, the president shall take necessary steps in the matter and mention it in the next meeting of the executive committee" (AL: Article 25(Ka)). Thus, the provision allows the 'president' to block decisions and other acts without any consultation or prior permission, and reports to the committee that is headed by her.


The party constitution of the BNP also allows its president to exercise a wide variety of power. According to the party constitution (BNP: Article 8), as the party's chief executive, the chairperson will control, supervise and coordinate all the activities of the party and, to that end, will wield authority over the national committee; committees for various topics and the other committees nominated by the chairperson and will control, supervise and coordinate all the activities of these committees. The chairperson, if needed, will also be able to take action against members of the above committee. Additionally, BNP gives its party head the power to act against the general provisions in certain cases (see BNP: Article 12). The AL party constitution, on the contrary, does not mention that the head can solely or singlehandedly act against the general provisions.

In terms of election of the party head, both AL and BNP constitutions mention provisions regarding the election of the party head. The party constitution of BNP notes that "the chairmen of party will be elected by direct vote of members of national council for three years" (BNP: Article 8(a)). Similarly, the party constitution of AL states that "the president, presidium members, general secretary, departmental secretaries and treasurer shall be elected in their respective posts by the triennial council from among the councillors" (AL: Article 21). Concerning the removal of the party head, the BNP constitution reads: "The chairman can be removed if the votes of three-fourths members of the national council called by two-third of its members are in favour of the chairman's removal" (BNP: Article 8(d)). However, in the AL constitution, there are no such provisions that allow the party president to be challenged in her position. Thus, it is evident that the (decision-making) power of both the parties is exceedingly high, and shows high resemblance to the assertion made by Berge, Poguntke et al. (2013) regarding newly democratic nations or nations in transition.

**Table 3.2: Scoring of organisational structure within party constitutions**

| <b>Organisational Structure</b>  | <b>AL</b> | <b>BNP</b> |
|--|-----------|------------|
| <b>National executive (average of three tools)</b>                                 | -1        | -1         |
| <b>Executive committee (average of three tools)</b>                                | -0.33     | -1         |
| <b>Party head (average of six tools)</b>   | 0         | -0.67      |
| <b>Relationship between national and subnational level (average of four tools)</b> | 0.25      | -0.5       |

**Figure 3.2: Organisational structure within party constitutions**



Based on the calculation against the tools under the category 'organisational structure', we find (Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2) that despite similar provisions with centralised decision-making mechanisms and lack of inclusiveness to include the wider body party members, AL does better than BNP in the scoring exercise. Additionally, the exercise includes scores on organisational linkages, which goes beyond the discussion on organisational structure, and it is evident that AL fares much better in relationships between national and sub-national levels<sup>10</sup>. The discussion has clearly revealed that the structure of the party organisations, through limiting decentralisation and inclusiveness, can deter effective decision-making in addition to the reduction of diversity and quality of decisions. Such limitations will be further exemplified in the following discussion and section 4 on the party practices will reveal the manifestations of the limitations

### 3.3 Decision-making

Here we refer to decision-making in *recruitment, election of the national executive, election of the executive committee, voting procedures and decision-making in programmatic issues*. This category mainly reflects on the election and selection criteria, in addition to a brief on provisions regarding decision-making in programmatic areas or ideological discussions of the party. These mainly depict the level of decentralisation. Greater democratic embeddedness through decentralised provisions of decision-making aids in the representation of a wider variety of groups and members and safeguard the party from autocratic behaviour.

<sup>10</sup>. See Appendix 1 for details.

### 3.3.1 Recruitment

#### *Candidate nomination*

Candidate nomination can be defined as the first step of the candidate election or selection. It means the delegation of power to the party members to nominate someone for a party position or any other position within the party. The process will be considered as inclusive, if the candidates are supported by party members or the congress (Berge, Poguntke et al. 2013). Neither of the constitutions of AL and BNP is clear or explicit about the nomination process of different candidates for different positions within the parties; rather, in most cases the party heads make such selection. For some of the national level committees, the party presidents and secretaries automatically (ex officio) occupy other leadership positions. This applies to both AL and BNP. In some committees including the national executive and executive committee, party head has the exclusive power to select a certain number of members. Neither of the constitutions elaborates on the nomination process for their sub national level positions. As evident, centralised decision-making provisions of the party head can reduce the width of the party circle and affect inclusiveness.

#### *Candidate selection: Leadership*

There are different ways of candidate selection for leadership within political parties that range from the closed primary<sup>11</sup> to direct selection by the party head. A closed primary method is considered as the most inclusive whereas the selection by party head is considered as the most centralised method. Party constitution, for this purpose, should clearly mention the rules for selection of party leaders and candidates for publicly-elected offices (NDI 2011). Both the party constitutions of AL and BNP mention provisions regarding candidate selection for different leadership positions in the national and sub-national levels. However, both the party constitutions vaguely and briefly mention that the national council will select the party head, but the documents do not give any further details or elaboration on the actual process of the selection. Additionally, as certain number of members in both the national councils of AL and BNP are drawn from the sub-national level, it may be argued that the views of the sub-national units are reflected to a certain degree in selecting party heads, the general secretaries, and other executive members.

#### *Candidate selection: Parliament*

Democratic candidate selection by the inclusion of all party members or at least by involving all relevant party committees contributes to intra-party democracy. It reduces the tendencies of partiality, nepotism and dynastic behaviour. Thus, it guarantees the opportunity and freedom of the party members to prove their ability to be elected as leaders. Concerning candidate selection for parliamentary election of AL and BNP, both the constitutions mention the rights of the members to nominate candidates for public offices. AL has a separate body called the Bangladesh Awami League Parliamentary Board for this purpose. Both the constitutions combine the choices of the members of national and sub-national units for the candidate selection in the parliamentary election. According to the AL constitution (AL: Article 27(a)), a parliamentary board will be formed to nominate candidates on behalf of the party for all national elections including

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11. A closed primary is a type of primary election where only registered members of the party vote to nominate a candidate.

the parliamentary polls. According to the party constitution of BNP (BNP: Article 13), there is a parliamentary board where the National Standing Committee members will be the members of the board. Requirement of such committees illustrates that decision-making is not highly centralised, but falls short of international standards which includes representation of multiple groups along with sub-national levels (e.g. Israel in Scarrow 2005). Although, the party constitutions do include sub-national representation and decision-making, the national executive of both the parties play the dominant role in matters of candidate selection.

### **3.3.2 Election of the national executive**

The central question regarding the election of national executive is who determines the composition of the party leadership. Both the national executives of AL and BNP look broadly decentralised in character. According to the constitution of BNP (BNP: Article 6), the president of every District Executive Committee and president of every Municipal Executive Committee will be members of the National Executive Committee, and at least one third of the committee will have to be elected by the national council for three tiers. On the other hand, the AL constitution mentions that

One member from each organisational district of the Bangladesh Awami League shall be elected by the respective Triennial District Councils, in the National Committee. The Bangladesh Awami League National Committee shall comprise of Office bearers of the Bangladesh Awami League, members of the Executive Committee and 21 members nominated by the President of the Bangladesh Awami League and members elected and nominated in the aforesaid manner (AL: Article 17(a)).

From the above description, both the parties provide sufficient inclusion provisions for election of the national executive making it moderately decentralised. However, it is worth mentioning that the BNP also gives its chairperson the power to change the number of the national executive members, which confirms the centralisation of power as well as destabilisation of competition within the party as discussed earlier.

### **3.3.3 Election of the executive committee**

To assess the specific level of inclusiveness for the executive committee, the involvement of the general members or the sub-national committees to elect the executive committee is essential. The constitution of AL states:

Executive Committee shall comprise a total of 73 members including the President, Presidium Members, General Secretaries, Secretions of the Executive Committee and Treasurer of the Bangladesh Awami League, and 26 members, nominated by the President in consultation with the Presidium Members (AL: Article 18).

The formation of the executive committee of BNP, the National Standing Committee, follows:

Chairman, senior vice chairman and secretary general of the party will be considered as member of the National Standing Committee. The total number of National Standing Committee including them will be 19. The chairman him/herself will be chief of this committee. The members of the National Standing Committee on the value of their positions will be treated as the member of the National Council (BNP: Article 12).

It is evident that the party members belonging to the upper echelon of both the parties form the executive committees. Although, AL is more centralised as the "President" nominates 26 members in consultation with "Presidium Members", the provisions clearly destabilise the competitive leadership selection in the highest executive body of the party concentrating power within a few.

### 3.3.4 Procedures: Voting procedures

A participatory election with credible voting procedure ensures that everybody has a chance to be elected. In the constitutions, neither of the major parties of Bangladesh includes any provision in their constitutions regarding secret ballot<sup>12</sup> method for electing their leaders. At the same time, the constitutions are found to be less than conspicuous about the voting procedures. Regarding the election of party president, BNP prescribes the direct voting procedure, which is the only provision they incorporated about voting procedure in the entire constitution. Alternatively, the AL constitution does not mention any provisions for voting.

To ensure decentralisation within the party, it is essential for the sub-national party units to be free from any interference of the central level to elect sub-national leaders. The BNP constitution (BNP: Article 6) as well as the AL constitution (AL: Article 30) show moderate levels of inclusion provisions at the sub-national levels from the lower tiers. On that notion, one may note that both the constitutions provide for a degree of autonomy with regard to electing their sub-national party positions, although the term 'autonomy' is not explicitly mentioned in the documents.

### 3.3.5 Programmatic issues: Party manifesto


Finally, for a political party, the election manifesto is an important document that reflects party's agenda and future plan for the country. An ideal party constitution ensures the right to the party members to decide upon the party manifesto. Additionally, it needs to mention who is in charge of the manifesto and who has the right to vote. Upon studying the constitutions, it is found that in the constitution of AL the parliamentary body is in charge of the manifesto (AL: Article 63), whereas BNP does not mention 'party manifesto' in its constitution. However, there is no room for the general members or sub-national units of AL to vote upon the manifesto.

**Table 3.3: Scoring of decision-making within party constitutions**

| Decision-making  | AL   | BNP   |
|--|------|-------|
| <b>Recruitment for national public office (average of four categories: 21 tools)</b> | 0.31 | -0.05 |
| <b>Recruitment for national party office (average of two categories: 10 tools)</b>   | 0.07 | -0.07 |
| <b>Procedure (average of three categories: 12 tools)</b>                             | 0.5  | 0.42  |
| <b>Programmatic issues (average of six tools)</b>                                    | 0.33 | -1    |

12. The secret ballot voting is a widely accepted method. From a theoretical point of view, secret voting is considered as being more democratic because the possibility of influencing the voters to comply through intimidation or bribery is smaller than by open voting procedures, where dissenters might be encouraged to conform to the official party line (Berge, Poguntke et al. 2013).

**Figure 3.3: Decision-making within party constitutions**




Based on the scoring exercise under the category 'decision-making', we find (Table 3.3 and Figure 3.3) that in terms of democratic principles within party constitutions AL is less centralised than BNP. Recruitment is a problematic issue for both the parties and provisions for representativeness of leaders within the party and for public office are concentrated at the hands of the party head and few influential leaders at the centre. Additionally, there are limited voting procedures to select the leaders, including the party head, in a democratic manner. With limited provisions for AL and non-existent provisions for BNP regarding ideological or programmatic issues, decentralised decision-making and party agenda leaves scope for the practice of 'real politics'. Such provisions do translate into practice and symptoms of concentration of power and a limitation of the circle of the party body will be evident in the next section on party working modalities and behaviour.

## **4 The extent of democratic embeddedness: A focus on party working modalities and behaviour**

According to a citizen's survey conducted by the BRAC Institute of Governance and Development (BIGD) in 2014 that covers 53 districts, the majority of the citizens perceive intra-party democracy to be the most serious political problem in Bangladesh (Figure 4.1).

**Figure 4.1: Drawbacks of the current democratic system in Bangladesh**



On the basis of five indicators of this study (participation, representation, competition, responsiveness and transparency), questions were formed relating to intra-party democracy to unearth the practice of political parties at the 'field' level. This section presents the findings from three independent sources of empirical investigation: a) survey of 40 district party officials, mainly district committee secretaries of the two major political parties b) 40 journalists from the respective districts and c) interviews with selected key informants including university professors, central political leaders, media professionals and entrepreneurs. Under each of the indicators, the discussion includes perspectives from the above three sources (in addition to the citizens' perception survey conducted by BIGD).

### 4.1 Participation

From the survey of party officials most respondents have claimed that the district committee is involved in the MP nomination process for both the parties. Regarding the regularity of meetings, the AL has held a greater number of meetings in both the years (2012 and 2013) compared to BNP, though there is a similar trend for both the parties. Also for both parties, evidence shows that there are more executive meetings held as opposed to general meetings. We find that no executive or general meetings are being held in over 20 per cent of the districts for BNP, whereas for the AL, these figures stand at 10 per cent for both years observed<sup>13</sup>. The party officials also perceive that

13. BNP districts with no General Meetings in both 2012 and 2013 (N=8 or 20%): Gopalganj, Joypurhat, Madaripur, Manikganj, Munshiganj, Noakhali, Panchagarh, Shariatpur  
 BNP districts with no Executive Meetings in both 2012 and 2013 (N=10 or 25%): Joypurhat, Manikganj, Munshiganj, Panchagarh, Shariatpur, Nilphamari, Magura, Chittagong, Jhenaidah  
 AL districts with no General Meetings in both 2012 and 2013 (N=4 or 10%): Bagerhat, Munshiganj, Noakhali, Panchagarh  
 AL districts with no Executive Meetings in both 2012 and 2013 (N=4 or 10%): Bagerhat, Noakhali, Panchagarh, Narail  
 Districts in which no Executive or General Meetings were held in any (2012 or 2013) year: Joypurhat, Manikganj, Munshiganj and Panchagarh for BNP; and Bagerhat and Noakhali for AL.

participatory policymaking by district committee members is performed either regularly or occasionally. However, AL is more 'participatory' as meetings are held more "regularly" than BNP in this category of party democracy. When we look at the 'participation' indicator from journalists' views, we find that majority of the respondents say that district committees are not involved with MP nomination as opposed to the claim made by party offices, depicting a perception of the practice of lower intra-party democracy within the political parties. Also, BNP is slightly less participatory than AL in MP nomination according to the journalists<sup>14</sup> (see section 4.3 for more detailed discussion on MP nomination).

Most key informants state that despite the major political parties having 'some' constitutional provisions of electing their party leaders in the different layers through council by engaging grassroots members, there is a huge discrepancy in practice. Also, there is a large gap between the party members' personal power and authority of the party chiefs. According to key informants, the real power and authority regarding all major decisions of the parties are centralised to the central party leaders, particularly to the party head. Additionally, a former parliamentarian points out that the members of the party do not demand a democratic platform. There is hardly any debate among the party members, and (political) decisions are not made in an open or public forum. Party members are more inclined to say what the party-leader would like to hear, as opposed to providing their own opinions. And these can hamper the quality of decision-making even if meetings are held, providing further evidence of the perception that sub-national inclusion of members is low. As mentioned by a prominent journalist, when participatory discussions are indeed held they are usually regarding activities related to elections, and increasing or retaining political power by tapping into the vote-bank. Nevertheless, experts have also reported that there is a general dissatisfaction among grassroots leaders regarding the lack of inclusiveness and participation and unilateral decision-making by the party head and/or the influential leaders of their respective parties (cf. Rahman 2010), illustrating that the party system is indeed hierarchical with severe implications on decision-making through minimal participation. This is highly suggestive of realist perspectives, if not an illustration of instrumental practice of 'power-politics' within political parties.

## 4.2 Representation

Comparing the two main parties at the district level and broadly looking at the inclusiveness of the political parties, the actual level of women representation is found to be extremely low. On average, about 5 per cent of the AL members in the district committees are women. For BNP, this figure stands at 6.74 per cent. In five districts (out of forty), there are relatively high rates (over 15 per cent) of women members for BNP. This compares to only two districts for AL. For AL, religious and ethnic minority

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14. In the constitutional review, we see that the AL parliamentary body is in charge of the manifesto and the general members in the sub-national units cannot vote upon the manifesto. Intuitively the inclusion of members of district committees is going to be low as seen from the journalists' perception. Although there is no mention of the involvement of district level units upon the party manifesto in the constitution of the BNP, the journalists perceive the inclusion and participation of district committees in decisions regarding the party manifesto to be equally low for the party, depicting low participation at the sub-national level. One of the reasons, but not limited to, of biased perception, which will be further evident in the following discussions and will be illustrated quantitatively in section 5, may be attributable to lack of formal provisions and specificities regarding democratic norms within political parties.

membership stands at 8.57 per cent on average. For BNP, the average stands at 3.31 per cent.<sup>15</sup> Simply considering religious minority, Bangladesh has a Muslim majority of around 90 per cent (89.52 per cent Muslim) (Ahmmed 2013) and both the parties have a minority representation (religious and ethnic combined) of below 10 per cent, which is not very representative of the national parameter. However, there are no legal bindings regarding reservation requirements for minorities (Amundsen 2013), and thus from a legal perspective, the main political parties are not obliged to encourage minority representation within their organisations.

The journalists from the survey confirmed the low numbers of female representation. The percentage values received from the journalists' perception stands at just over 5 per cent for both the parties, which is similar to the party offices data. Any difference can be attributed to minor or negligible perception bias<sup>16</sup>. Additionally, review of the constitution indicates that there is substantial ambiguity in the provisions with respect to minorities. The perception survey result is similar to that of the offices where there is a meagre 2.12 per cent minority for the BNP, even though BNP has clearer provisions of minorities when compared to AL<sup>17</sup>. On the other hand, AL, despite not having any explicit provisions on minorities, is doing better with a healthy percentage of 7.36 per cent, according to the district-level journalists<sup>18</sup>.

At the outset, the AL constitution has a more 'progressive' and 'secular' outlook and is perceived to lean more to the left compared to BNP, even though both the parties' orientation is near the centre: AL is commonly considered to be centre-left and BNP is considered to be centre-right (Khan, Islam et al. 2008). Despite their ideological preferences, political rhetoric and electoral alliances<sup>19</sup>, a journalist (non district-level) claimed that the number of women members within the BNP is increasing, which is consistent to a report of increasing popularity of women in the BNP camps during the upazila elections 2014 (The Daily Star 2014). There have been additional claims that the percentage of religious minority in the BNP camps is also increasing, and have attributed this to a change in affiliation of political activists and members between the parties. Moreover, in the discussions regarding 'representation', informants have often referred to the phenomena of *mastaans* and *mononoyan banijya* or 'nomination trade', and the characteristics of such trends in politics have also been documented in literature (Mahiuddin 2010, Rahman 2010). The study finds that not only broader sections of the society, including women and minorities are under-represented, but also representation within a party and overall inclusiveness is dependent on various other forces that are more closely related to 'politics' as opposed to following democratic ethos, as discussed in greater detail in the next section.

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15 Statistical inference (mean comparison tests) shows that the mean differences for both women and minority representation are statistically significant at 5 per cent (95 per cent confidence interval).

16 The BNP number, 6.48 per cent, stands lower than the AL value, 7.30 per cent. This is contrary to the findings of the party office data where the BNP value was greater and previously mean comparison tests provided statistically significant difference (BNP greater than AL in female representation) at 5 per cent. However, mean comparison tests do not show statistically significant at 5 per cent (p-value for mean of AL greater than mean of BNP, from journalists' responses, stands at 0.1694).

17 As a reminder, the BNP constitution mentions labourer, freedom fighters, farmers and tribal groups at 10 per cent but does not mention religious minorities explicitly.


18 Statistical inference (mean comparison tests) shows that the mean differences for minority representation of journalists' perception are statistically significant difference at or below 5 per cent.

19 BNP is 'popularly' known for its alliance with the ideological 'Islamic' party, Jamaat-i-Islami Bangladesh (JIB).

### 4.3 Competition

Having already scrutinised the respective party constitutions it can be concluded that a) guidelines for competition within parties are mostly absent (cf. Rahman 2010) and b) the constitutions themselves are not entirely democratic, when compared to international norms. However, there are some indications that both parties engage in fairly democratic practices when responses from party offices are considered. The district committees, for example, appear to have democratic mechanisms and procedures with a high percentage of party officials claiming that presidents and general secretaries are elected through local councils (over 75 per cent for both parties). As evident from Figure 4.2, according to data from party offices, where selection can also be made by party heads and influential leaders, party governance in Bangladesh with respect to AL and BNP can be procedurally authoritarian. Journalists' perception also indicates that president and general secretary positions are mostly appointed through the local councils. Even though the trend of majority appointments through local council voting is similar, the journalists seem to feel that there is greater chance of the pull or influence from the 'centre' or 'top'. Their perception indicates that over half of the party presidents or general secretaries are appointed by either the 'party head', 'one of the influential leaders' or 'few leaders from the centre'.


**Figure 4.2: Procedures/mechanisms for selecting leaders at district committees, party office**



But when we look at further findings from party offices for practicing internal competitive elections, we find that in the past five years about 65 per cent of AL district committees had no contestation for leadership at the district level whereas about 37.5 per cent of committees were not contested within BNP. Additionally, about three-fourths of the journalists responded with the opinion that there is poor internal contestation for both the parties. This is contrary to the findings from the district level party offices where BNP had fared significantly better. It may be important to note that there is an overall trend in perception among the district-level journalists who consider the *de facto* internal party democracy of BNP to be lower, and can add to understanding the overall comparative perception regarding the two major political parties.

Furthermore, about one-third of the respondents from both the party offices claim that there is no possibility of being nominated 'other than by an influential leader'. Despite having held comparatively lesser competitive elections, AL seems nominally more democratic, as 32.5 per cent has responded with 'high possibility' of being democratically nominated at district level, and for BNP only 17.5 per cent have done so, however, with a high value of 43.5 per cent with 'partly possible' response. Finally, perception of the party officials is that most of the decisions that control key committee positions are made by the party head for BNP, implying on very centralised decision-making processes. Comparatively, a considerable number of respondents have stated that for AL the party head does not normally take such decisions. Along with low internal contestation, the majority of the journalists felt that district committee position(s) depended on economic status and/or professional status. Thus, one may assert that competition is dependent on money or profession. The inferences regarding centralisation and lack of inclusiveness are complemented by the BIGD citizen survey: 88 per cent of the citizens perceive that MPs are nominated by the party leader as opposed to democratic voting within the party (see Figure 4.3).

**Figure 4.3: Member of Parliament nomination**




In relation to competition, one of the prominent left-wing political leaders in the country had the following to say:

AL and BNP hardly practice democracy within their party. No party, except for ornamental reasons, has held any effective party conference with a view to changing leaders following democratic procedures and this also prove that no party in essence practice democracy within their respective party. AL, for instance, camouflaged its true face in the name of democracy by enshrining some democratic principles in their constitution. In fact, its party leaders decide everything which can be academically termed as 'one man rule'. The same is true for BNP. It holds no election within their party for leadership change. After the assassination of Ziaur Rahman, the founder of BNP, his wife controls the party (interview March, 2014).

The comment complements the findings of the field level well and shows the blatant lack of democratic ethos embedded within the parties, and provides scope for 'real politics' to be exercised. The final statement shows that internal party democracy can and is affected by dynastic tendencies (cf. Amundsen 2013). Findings from the BIGD

citizen survey (Figure 4.4) show that dynastic or family relation plays a significant role in determining party nomination. According to Riaz (2010), Bangladesh has become a country where family members tend to occupy leadership positions in political parties, and hence, such relationships affect internal contestation.

**Figure 4.4: Determinants of party nomination for parliament election**



Also, a prominent academic claimed that politics is the only source that combines money and power (reinstating previous assertions made by district level journalists) and claimed that such characteristics attracts "redundant people". For instance, previously there were few central committee members and the number was not more than 12-14. However, the number has increased to 400-500, as stated by one of the critics of BNP. During an interview, a top political leader justified this practice by stating: "If moneyed person is nominated, s/he would not be greedy for money after being elected". We also find that in terms of MP nomination, most of the politicians buy their nominations; they spend money in the constituency and also provide money for the party fund. At this point, we do not discount the possibility of generation of 'productive rents' or informal rents<sup>20</sup> that can enhance net social benefits, as argued by Hassan (2014) and Khan (2013). However, excessive distribution of patronage with centralised party systems does concentrate power within the hands of a few, particularly the party heads, and can lead to decision-making characterising highly self-serving and detrimental outcomes.

In the discussions so far it has been revealed that not only have the two major political parties irregularly organised their council meetings, even if councils and conventions were held, election of party leaders do not take place. Both parties depend on the party chairpersons for 'leadership' and party decisions are in the hand of the party chiefs. It is evident that the internal organisational strength is weak and reliant upon one person, which ultimately undermines competition (cf. Rahman 2010). However, the following box (Box 1) shows a different picture of competitive nature at the local level.

20. Rents can be defined "as incomes higher than the minimum a person or organisation would have accepted, the minimum usually being defined as the income in the next-best opportunity available to that individual or organisation" (Khan 2013: 6). Informal rents can refer to corruptive practices such as bribery.


### Box 1: Competitive nature of local government

In both the parties, as argued by a journalist, two layers at the local level can practice democracy to some extent. These are the Union and the Ward levels. In these two levels, committees are formed through proper way of council. One of the reasons, as mentioned by a prominent journalist, is that, in the communities, leaders are more accountable to the party members and citizenry, as they face them every day. Therefore, it is not always possible for them to avoid someone who is supported by the party members. Also, the turn-over rate of the Union Parishad chairpersons and members is reported to be extremely high, which makes competitive inclusion to parties necessary at the local level. Responses from district journalist also verify that party members at the 'centre' prefer inclusion at the local level based on the 'strength' of relationship of the representatives with the people. The local level party members are preferred to know their locality well for political control and stability.

## 4.4 Responsiveness

We consider responsiveness here as the activities and processes concerning council meetings by the two major political parties. The regularity of such processes is a key feature of accountability since it offers the opportunity for the elected district members to inquire and question party leaders and thus holding them accountable to stated democratic obligations, making the party system decentralised. Figure 4.5 with data from party offices show that the AL is highly centralised as the council meetings are not at all held regularly. About three-fourths of respondents from AL party offices report that council meetings have not been held in the last 10 years. This seems to suggest that power is centralised at the top around the party leaders. BNP is more responsive with over 70 per cent of the districts reporting meetings between 3 and 5 years.

Figure 4.5: Number of council held in AL and BNP during the last 10 years, party office



With respect to opinion sharing in councils, over three-fourths of the respondents from both the parties claim that they can provide their opinion in the council. According to district journalists, the councils are not held regularly at the district level, and so democratic practices are suffering, which support the responses from the district offices to a great extent. Similarly, BNP does better in holding the councils, where 80 per cent of the councils are held between 2 and 5 years, and there are striking similarities considering the lack of inclusiveness and centralisation in the responses from both the offices and the journalists with respect to AL. We see from Figure 4.6 from the response of the journalists, that an astounding majority of the councils (66.7 per cent) were held 10 years back, where the value stood at over 70 per cent from the party leaders. Given that the constitution of AL states that any decision taken by the national council cannot be challenged, responsiveness with regards to AL is low.

**Figure 4.6: Journalists' perception of councils held in AL**





Figure 4.7, on the other hand, shows that the district level journalists feel that over three-fourths of the district leaders can voice their opinions in the national council. This perception may have 'some' positive implications if the voice of members is being heard at the national level, and can make the 'centre' more responsive. This is consistent with the findings from the district offices where there was a mention of three-fourths of the district members being able to give their opinion at the national council. We find that there is a high level of consistency with the findings from the district offices.

**Figure 4.7: Journalists' perception on the opinions of district leaders in the national council**



Nevertheless, in addition to local leaders having a tendency to voice opinions that the 'party chief' prefers to hear as discussed previously in section 4.1 on participation, most of the key informants provide substantive reasons for so and for not criticising any act of the leaders. Drastic actions (such as expelling, depriving of the possibility of nominations for major elections) are taken against members who criticise the party leaders or challenge decisions. It is relevant here to consider the local level implications of the Article 70 of Bangladesh Constitution (GoB), which reads, "if a member of parliament, (a) being present in Parliament abstains from voting, or, (b) absents himself from any sitting of Parliament, ignoring the direction of the party which nominated him at the election as a candidate not to do so, he shall be deemed to have voted against that party." According to Hasanuzzaman (2011), this "article governs the conscience of potential members since they have to praise and please their respective head of parties to come into their radar." According to two informants, these central restrictions create the culture of subservience at the local level. Thus, even if there may exist procedures to ensure responsiveness, party members and leaders tend to refrain from proactively making the 'centre' accountable.

#### 4.5 Transparency

We considered transparency as a function of six variables, which shows the availability of essential information at the district level, as follows: 1) party constitutions, 2) information about the party's history 3) election manifesto 4) profile of MPs and MP candidates 5) profile of the party-head and 6) list of party officials. Data from the party offices indicate that for both parties the availability of party constitutions is relatively high with about 75 per cent of party offices displaying the information to the general public. On the contrary, both parties score relatively low with regards to publicising a list of profiles of MP candidates, with less than 40 per cent of offices making such information available. BNP scores better than AL in the category of listing party officials' names, with such information made available in about 75 per cent of offices, compared to AL's 58 per cent.

A transparency index was created by standardising<sup>21</sup> the aggregate of the six 'transparency-availability' variables. A greater value indicates a higher availability of resources, making the party documentation procedures more transparent. Using the 'transparency-availability index' a positive correlation has been found between both the parties.<sup>22</sup> In other words, districts in which AL party district committees are more transparent, overlap closely with BNPs reporting in the same districts. Another transparency index is created with journalists' responses and it shows a high consistency in responses of the district offices and local journalists. A similar correlation<sup>23</sup> shows that the districts in which information is unavailable for AL, the same is true for BNP. We see that there exists some degree of effect of geography on the district offices, verified by the recurrence of the findings. We can also hypothesise that there may also exist a competitive nature among the parties at the district level as different respondents (respondents from AL offices and from BNP offices) have provided similar results on the availability of information.

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21 See Appendix 2 for standardising formula.

22 See Appendix 2 for 'transparency-availability index' formula and Appendix 4 for correlation results.

23 See Appendix 4 for correlation results.

Transparency and availability of information can have serious implications on governance of parties. For instance, party members can raise their voice to increase the representation of women within the party. Also, the constitution itself can be challenged by party members, with necessary grounds and within the limits of the provisions. This matter is exemplified by the observation of a senior media professional: "As there is little or no transparency within the party, very few members actually know the criterion on which members of the different committee in the top level are selected. Leaders of local party units know little about party policies" (interview April, 2014) (cf. Rahman 2010).

## 5 The extent of democratic embeddedness: 'Party Democracy Index' or PDI

After a comprehensive analysis of the five indicators, five standardised and equally weighted indices were constructed. This was achieved by scaling and quantifying the responses using the indicators from the theoretical framework; namely 1) participation, 2) representation, 3) competition, 4) responsiveness and 5) transparency. Finally, the average of the five indices (/sub-indices) was taken to create the Party Democracy Index (PDI) for the two parties. Two distinct and separate party democracy indices are created using responses from party offices and district level journalists for the two parties, AL and BNP. The 'Party Democracy Index' or PDI provides a (index) value (ranging between 0 and 1) where a higher value indicates that a party district office is more democratic with regards to intra-party governance.

Table 5.1: 'Party Democracy Index' values

|                          | Participation | Representation | Competition | Responsiveness | Transparency | PDI         |
|--------------------------|---------------|----------------|-------------|----------------|--------------|-------------|
| <b>AL, Party Office</b>  | 0.42          | 0.25           | 0.51        | 0.55           | 0.56         | <b>0.46</b> |
| <b>BNP, Party Office</b> | 0.24          | 0.18           | 0.59        | 0.74           | 0.54         | <b>0.46</b> |
| <b>AL, Journalist</b>    | 0.29          | 0.41           | 0.46        | 0.58           | 0.25         | <b>0.40</b> |
| <b>BNP, Journalist</b>   | 0.25          | 0.25           | 0.37        | 0.62           | 0.24         | <b>0.34</b> |

Table 5.1 shows the distribution of values across the five indices used in the analysis of the party practices and the PDI values, using responses from party offices as well as journalists. The 'PDI, Party Office' is considered to be the official and 'objective' data, while the 'PDI, Journalist' can be considered to be 'perception' data, which has been mainly collected to cross-check, verify and provide further insights to the 'official' data received from the party offices. We observe (from Table 5.1) that the PDI values for AL and BNP party offices do not show any significant difference (statistically verified by comparing mean values). Further statistical inference of the sub-indices (comparing party office results) we find that the differences are statistically significant for participation and responsiveness at 5 per cent. AL does better in participation (with p-

value of 0.0008) and BNP does better in responsiveness (with p-value of 0.0013). However, mean differences between AL and BNP in representation and competition are found to be significant at 10 per cent. AL performs better in representation (with p-value of 0.0673) and BNP performs better in competition (with p-value of 0.0962). For transparency, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the difference is statistically significant, i.e. there is no statistically significant difference<sup>24</sup>.

We also find (from Table 5.1) that the journalists' score for PDI, in general, does not fare well compared to the party office (official) score. Statistical inference through mean comparison tests provides conclusive results of a better perception of the journalists only in the category of representation and is significant at 5 per cent. Further inferences illustrate that there are no statistically significant differences where the journalists' PDI sub-indices have greater value: BNP score under the category of participation and AL score under the category of responsiveness is greater for the 'PDI, Journalist' sub-indices. In addition, AL score for competition with greater party office value also does not show any mean difference statistically. However, the remaining categories show significant<sup>25</sup> biased perception of journalists illustrating that they perceive intra-party governance to be suffering within the two major political parties when compared to the party office data. To repeat, it is only in the category of 'representation' that the perception, which can be considered to be informed, of the district journalists is conclusively better while the perception of journalists in the majority of the categories of intra-party governance is worse than the findings of the party offices.

Finally, Map 5.1 and Map 5.2 show the variation of party democracy corresponding to the party office data of AL and BNP, respectively, in the 40 districts surveyed to determine the extent of democratic embeddedness within political parties in Bangladesh<sup>26</sup>. The classification of the districts has been made taking a range between the minimum and maximum values and dividing them into four equal intervals. This allows the reader to assess whether districts are clustered at any particular level of democracy (low democracy or high democracy) when compared with each other<sup>27</sup>. The mapping exercise also enables policymakers to identify places of interest, taking the extent of democratic embeddedness within the two parties into account as an indicator of party-integrity over the geography of Bangladesh.

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
24 We obtain a p-value of 0.3503 to accept a mean difference for AL greater than BNP for transparency.

25 This is statistically significant at 5 per cent.

26 See Appendix 5 for maps that show the level or variation of internal party democracy for the PDIs of the two parties from journalist responses and for the ranking of districts according to the PDI from both party office and journalist responses.


27 We have noticed from the table that the average PDI values for the journalist indices are lower than the party office indices, and any cluster of districts towards the lower PDI values should be evident from the maps provided in the appendix (Map 5-1 & Map 5-2 in Appendix 5) and provide insights into the areas where journalists' perceptions are more biased.

**Map 5.1: Party Democracy Index, Party Office, AL**



Note: empty districts denote areas that have not been surveyed.

**Map 5.2: Party Democracy Index, Party Office, BNP**




Note: empty districts denote areas that have not been surveyed.

## 6 Conclusions and clues on future research

To the untrained eye, the party constitutions of both AL and BNP may seem to contain reasonable elements of democratic ethos. The issues of decentralisation of the sub-national (operational) units, and party congress, at times, come out quite well in the constitutions. Although when compared to international standards and good practices the performance on most counts lag behind as clearly evident from Figure 6.1. We see that the parties predominantly score negative points in the three categories of assessment of the party constitution. In fact, the weaknesses that are particularly poignant include candidate recruitment (nomination and selection)—both for public and party offices, inclusion of party members in the decision-making process and programmatic issues, lack of specificities of voting procedures, and (deliberate) ambiguity regarding the scope of power and functions of the party heads. All of which may be attributable to the exercise of *realpolitik*.


Figure 6.1: Constitutional review



Based on the scoring exercise performed to assess the level of '*de jure* democracy' within the parties we may conclude that a) minority rights seem inclusive, however, with the absence of specificities, when general member rights remain highly insecure; and b) AL scored higher than BNP on the counts of 'organisational structure' and 'decision-making'. This may be attributed to factors such as greater democratic relationship between central and sub-national units, relatively less concentration of power at the party head, and better constitutional provisions for candidate recruitment and programme formulation and implementation.

Moving from the '*de jure* analysis' into the actual practices, the PDI values in Figure 6.2, using 'official' data from party offices, provide useful insights pertaining to the lack of intra-party democracy within the major political parties in Bangladesh (as we obtained similar PDI scores of less than 0.5 out of 1 for both the parties). Additionally, if we delve deeper into the reasons using responses from the field level, we find that the

Figure 6.2: Intra-party democracy



respondents have noted that the influence of the top level within the organisation structure or the party-head is extremely high. As a matter of fact, most of the power is concentrated at the top. When inclusiveness and decentralisation are taken into consideration, we see that political parties lack the mentioned twin imperatives of democratic embeddedness, and *realpolitik* takes precedence over adhering to democratic ethos.

In some cases it has been found that although democratic selection procedures exist, e.g. voting through council, the party head takes the final decision in appointing the leader at the district level. The 'ability to lead', which, at times, is considered to be a prerequisite for nomination at the local level, becomes dependent on the relationship of a nominee with the party head and the centre, along with availability of resources to coordinate manpower and pose a challenge/threat to the opposition, illustrating confrontational politics. This points to the conclusion that politics has become such that competition between (major) parties in Bangladesh is largely dependent on 'muscle' and 'money', i.e. in many cases 'power-politics' or *realpolitik* becomes the sole favoured strategy.

Furthermore, coalition between parties depends on local politics and informal party relationships in relation to gaining or maintaining power as opposed to serving the constituencies. Internal politics, which generally serves to the benefit of the top-leader, allows for party-members to form groups at the local/district level. According to several (local level) respondents, a considerable degree of immorality prevails in the actions of the (potential) district leaders, which at times extract resources from the community and public, to serve individuals and groups. Such practices, not only affect committee formation at the district-level, but help maintain an illiberal culture of politics vis-à-vis democracy. Additionally, there hardly exists any internal conflict resolution or accountability mechanism in practice. In fact, groups or individuals who voice their personal opinions are generally ignored, and when and if they speak out against the party head or the centre their positions and even the existence of the committee falls in

jeopardy. The power within a party is concentrated unilaterally to the head of the organisation, and when lower level leaders are involved in decision-making they are found to resort to politics that is devoid of democratic principles. The effect of 'power-politics' remains prevalent within the party, its members and its structure.

The above key conclusions bring home the contradictions between policy and practice—scruples and actual behaviour of political parties in Bangladesh. Notwithstanding the lofty promises of inclusiveness and democratic participation, the tendencies towards autocratic leadership and concentration of power within the main political parties are clearly noticeable. We argue that this predicament can be explained and astounded by the philosophy and practice of *realpolitik*.

In Bangladesh, the 'game' of politics has taken an increasingly undemocratic and informal character. This represents a tragic turn of events since citizens need better representation to survive poverty, to grow economically and to ensure that common citizens' voices are heard at parliament, and across the nation. Political parties do perceive their operational area and modality in terms of a 'game'—where rhetoric, media spin and political theatre are essential strategies to win by any means.

In the 'winner captures all' or monopolistic culture of Bangladesh politics, indeed, major political parties have few options left but to play the game all out for remaining and clinging on the political power; they otherwise run the risk of obliteration. As a result, parties do whatever is needed to remain in power, and in the process, the *idealtolitik*—ethics and democratic practices within the parties—may recede to the background, or compromised altogether for the sake of the survival.

### *Some clues on future research*

The Party Democracy Index or PDI leaves considerable scope for quantitative research on the nature of democracy within political parties. With the risk of repetition, the PDI is an original tool created by the authors that provides a 'measurable' indicator of internal party democracy across regions. As it has been elucidated the PDI can also give an estimate of national aggregates of internal party democracy. Commenting on internal party democracy, Amundsen (2013: 2) quoted Scarrow (2005) stating that it has an 'apparent potential to promote a "virtuous circle" linking ordinary citizens to government, benefiting the parties that adopt it, and more generally contributing to the stability and legitimacy of the democracies in which these parties compete for power'. From a normative and theoretical perspective when practices within parties are democratic it can instil and strengthen the overall democratic culture. However, even from simply a pragmatic perspective, such practices can lead to the selection of appealing and charismatic leaders, lead to better policy selection and win more votes and achieve electoral gains.

Considering the positivistic implications of intra-party democracy, it can be assessed that an indicator of party democracy, to achieve such goals, must be perceived to be 'democratic'. Hence, aggregation of journalists' perception and party office index values with proper weights can provide an indicator that can not only be used to understand the nature of the parties and policy implications, but also a measure that parties can use to assess their position and their level of democracy. Additionally, there may also be over-estimation of data from party offices as evident through statistical testing (except in the case of representation of minorities including women) against the PDI developed

with the 'informed' perceptions of the journalists. One of the major reasons for selecting and cross-checking data with district level journalists is that they are more aware of their locality as opposed to 'national' informants. Thus, aggregation of data giving appropriate weights should ideally provide a better measure of internal party democracy, both from a theoretical and practical standpoint.

In terms of analysis, further inferences can be made on the 'perception' of representation, which is found to be greater for the journalists' responses compared to the data provided by the party offices, and the implications can be evaluated. Also, the three districts—Khagrachari, Bandarban and Rangamati—belonging to the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) region have not been surveyed (among the 40 districts) as the intention was to attain data with national representation as opposed to identify outliers. The political dynamics is (hypothesised to be) considerably different in the CHT area as the region mostly consists of ethnic minorities. Existing surveys, case studies and research on one of the most sensitive regions in the country where human rights violations have been found to be pervasive can provide important 'political' insights for the existing political parties, emerging ethnic parties and their constituencies in CHT (Stanislawski, Mannan et al. 2013, Mannan 2014).

Finally, recent research on political dynasties suggest unequal distribution of political power within political systems (Dal Bó, Dal Bó et al. 2009, Rahman 2013) and show that political power is self-perpetuating in nature with respect to political dynasties (Dal Bó, Dal Bó et al. 2009). They also indicate that politicians who hold offices for longer tenures are more likely to have relatives in office (Rossi 2009, Querubin 2011), and that party organisation, independent civil society associations to mobilise party support and centralised financing of elections are some important missing ingredients that have led to sustenance of dynastic parties that makes the political system less representative (Chhibber 2013). Considering the extensiveness of the issues that political dynasties can impinge on a polity, there is very little research on the subject in Bangladesh. While Amundsen (2013) has provided valuable insights on intra-party democracy and centralisation of power among dynastic elites in Bangladesh and Riaz (2010) has explicated the importance of heredity for accession to power in Bangladesh, there has been no serious attempt of mapping political dynasties in the country. We acknowledge that the impact of political dynasties on political parties in Bangladesh can be tremendous and hence have kept the subject out of our research scope. Nevertheless, we did not completely refrain from making comments with empirical findings regarding effects of heredity.

Further research - mapping political dynasties existing within the political parties—can be ventured to unearth some of the effects of dynasties on the political culture of Bangladesh. The mapping can consist of political leaderships coming from within families of the (major) political parties at both the national and regional levels. The research can map the networks of relationships among the leaders of various political parties and identify the distribution or balance of power among the families within the parties. In the process concentration of power within the dynastic leaders can be assessed. Possible effects of political dynasties can also be considered to be positive, insomuch that it has brought a certain degree of stability within the major parties of Bangladesh. For instance, it is heredity that has resulted to the sustenance of the two major political parties in Bangladesh in the early 1980s (Chowdhury 2013). The paper has indicated the existence of 'real politics' or *realpolitik* drawing from the 'classics', mainly Machiavelli, and one of the objectives have been to illustrate and iterate the

'primitive' nature of national politics in Bangladesh, which is driven by 'survival' and 'capture'. This can provide insights to the persistent lack of policy direction or programmatic issues within political parties for the betterment of the state since the inception of electoral democracy in 1991 (cf. Khan, Islam et al. 2008, Chowdhury 2013). Research with historical (including contemporary) and discourse analysis, evolution of the state including exogenous factors affecting party policy and orientation, political dynasties and intra- as well as inter-party dynamics can shed invaluable light into the nature of illiberal politics and democracy in Bangladesh.

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## Appendixes

### Appendix 1: Constitutional review

**Table 1-1: Scoring of party constitutions**

Members' rights: General members' rights

|   | AL           | BNP          |
|---|--------------|--------------|
| Are the principles of intra-party democracy explicitly mentioned in the statute?  | -1           | -1           |
| Are party members' rights explicitly mentioned in the statute?                    | -1           | -1           |
| According to the statute, do party members explicitly have the following rights:- |              |              |
| To be informed about party activities?  | -1           | -1           |
| To express a divergent opinion within the party and/or in public?                 | -1           | -1           |
| To participate in party decision-making?  | 0            | 0            |
| To form factions within the party?  | -1           | -1           |
| <b>TOTAL</b>  | <b>-5</b>    | <b>-5</b>    |
| <b>Average</b>  | <b>-0.83</b> | <b>-0.83</b> |

Members' rights: Minority rights

|   | AL          | BNP          |
|---|-------------|--------------|
| Is there an explicit reference to minorities in the statute?  | 1           | 1            |
| Are there any quotas explicitly mentioned in the statute with respect to minorities?                                  | -1          | 1            |
| Is it explicitly mentioned, that the quotas are binding?  | 0           | 0            |
| Does the statute explicitly mention minority quotas in party organs?  | -1          | -1           |
| Does the statute explicitly mention minority quotas in the party lists for public office?                             | -1          | -1           |
| Do certain members (i.e. representatives) of the minority groups automatically become members of the party executive? | -1          | -1           |
| <b>TOTAL</b>  | <b>-3</b>   | <b>-1</b>    |
| <b>Average</b>  | <b>-0.5</b> | <b>-0.17</b> |

Organisational structure: National executive

|   | AL        | BNP       |
|---|-----------|-----------|
| Does the statute mention the responsibilities and accountabilities of the national executive?                             | -1        | -1        |
| Does the statute mention that the national executive is accountable to the party members or to the party congress?        | -1        | -1        |
| Is there any party body/mechanism explicitly mentioned, which is specifically entitled to control the national executive? | -1        | -1        |
| <b>Total</b>  | <b>-3</b> | <b>-3</b> |
| <b>Average</b>  | <b>-1</b> | <b>-1</b> |

## Executive committee

|  | AL    | BNP |
|--|-------|-----|
| Does the statute mention the responsibilities and accountabilities of the executive committee?                             | 1     | -1  |
| Does the statute mention that the executive committee is accountable to the party members or to the party congress?        | -1    | -1  |
| Is there any party body/mechanism explicitly mentioned, which is specifically entitled to control the executive committee? | -1    | -1  |
| TOTAL  | -1    | -3  |
| Average  | -0.33 | -1  |

## Party president

|  | AL | BNP   |
|--|----|-------|
| Does the statute mention that the party president can be challenged in his position? | -1 | 1     |
| Does the statute mention the following rights (obligations) of the party president:  |    |       |
| To block the execution of decisions and other acts of the executive?                 | 0  | -1    |
| To exclude a party member?   | 0  | -1    |
| To dismiss a member of the party executive?  | 0  | -1    |
| To act against the general provisions of the statute in certain cases?               | 0  | -1    |
| To form or to close sub-national party units?  | 1  | -1    |
| TOTAL  | 0  | -4    |
| Average  | 0  | -0.67 |

## Relationship between the national level and sub-national levels:

|   | AL   | BNP  |
|---|------|------|
| Does the statute mention sub-national party units?                                    | 1    | 1    |
| Does the statute mention any rights of sub-national party units?                      | 1    | -1   |
| Does the statute mention that sub-national units influence entities at higher levels? | 0    | -1   |
| Is it explicitly mentioned that sub-national units have autonomy?                     | -1   | -1   |
| TOTAL   | 1    | -2   |
| Average   | 0.25 | -0.5 |

## Decision-making: Recruitment

### Public office-national: candidate nomination

|  | AL   | BNP   |
|--|------|-------|
| Does the statute mention the rights to suggest/nominate candidates for public office?  | 1    | 1     |
| Do nominations for candidates come from the executive committee or a nomination committee chosen by the executive committee? | 1    | 0     |
| Do nominations for candidates come from the national executive or a nomination committee chosen by the national executive?   | 0    | -1    |
| Do nominations for candidates come from the party congress (or individual members)?  | 0    | -1    |
| Do nominations for candidates come from sub-national units?  | 1    | 1     |
| May each candidate suggest him-or herself for at least some public offices?  | -1   | -1    |
| TOTAL  | 2    | -1    |
| Average  | 0.33 | -0.17 |

### Candidate selection-parliament

|  | AL  | BNP  |
|--|-----|------|
| Does the statute mention who has the right to select candidates for parliament?            | 1   | 1    |
| Do registered party members select candidates by election ("closed primary")?              | -1  | -1   |
| Do delegates select candidates by election?  | 1   | -1   |
| Does the national executive or a committee chosen by it select candidates?                 | 1   | 1    |
| Does the executive committee, president or a committee designed by them select candidates? | 0   | -1   |
| TOTAL  | 2   | -1   |
| Average  | 0.4 | -0.2 |

### Relationship between the national level and sub-national levels (national public)

|  | AL  | BNP |
|--|-----|-----|
| Do national party units completely control the selection of candidates?  | 1   | 1   |
| Do sub-national party units propose candidates, but the national party organs make the final decision?                 | 1   | 1   |
| Do national party units provide a list of names from which the sub-national party organs can select the final list?    | 1   | 1   |
| Do sub-national party units have suspensive veto rights regarding candidate selection for public office?               | -1  | -1  |
| Do sub-national party units completely control the process and make the final decision about public office candidates? | -1  | -1  |
| TOTAL  | 1   | 1   |
| Average  | 0.2 | 0.2 |

### Intra-party office-National level: election of the national executive:

|   | AL  | BNP  |
|---|-----|------|
| Are there any rules regarding the election of the national executive explicitly mentioned in the statute?   | 1   | 1    |
| Are individual party members directly involved in electing the national executive?  | -1  | -1   |
| Are delegates in the party congress or a central committee directly elected by the congress directly involved in electing the national executive? | 1   | -1   |
| Is the executive committee directly involved in the election of the national executive?   | 1   | 1    |
| Is the party president directly involved in electing the party executive?   | -1  | -1   |
| TOTAL   | 1   | 1    |
| Average   | 0.2 | -0.2 |

#### Election of the executive committee:

|   | AL  | BNP  |
|---|-----|------|
| Are there any rules regarding the election of the executive committee explicitly mentioned in the statute?                                | 1   | 1    |
| Are individual party members directly involved in electing the executive committee?   | -1  | -1   |
| Are delegates in the party congress or a central committee directly elected by the congress involved in electing the executive committee? | 1   | -1   |
| Is the national executive directly involved in the election of the executive committee?   | 1   | 1    |
| Is the party president directly involved in electing the executive committee?   | -1  | -1   |
| TOTAL   | 1   | -1   |
| Average   | 0.2 | -0.2 |

#### Election of the party president:

|  | AL    | BNP  |
|--|-------|------|
| Are there any rules to the election of the party president mentioned in the statute?   | 0     | 0    |
| Are all party members directly involved in electing the party president?               | -1    | -1   |
| Are delegates of the party congress directly involved in electing the party president? | 1     | 1    |
| Is the national executive directly involved in electing the party president?           | -1    | 1    |
| Is the executive committee directly involved in electing the party president?          | 0     | 0    |
| TOTAL  | -1    | 1    |
| Average  | -0.33 | 0.33 |

#### Procedure: Voting procedure

|   | AL   | BNP   |
|---|------|-------|
| Do the statutes contain any information about the manner of voting for intraparty or public positions?  | 1    | 0     |
| Is a secret method used when electing candidates for either intra-party or public positions?  | -1   | -1    |
| Is a secret method always used when electing candidates for both intra-party and public office?   | -1   | -1    |
| Is it explicitly mentioned that the voting results are presented to all party members within the party to justify and legitimise the candidacy? | -1   | -1    |
| TOTAL   | -2   | -3    |
| Average   | -0.5 | -0.75 |

Relationship between national and sub-national units-sub-national public office:

|   | AL | BNP |
|---|----|-----|
| Is it specified how sub-national units elect their public office candidates?  | 1  | 1   |
| Do sub-national units enjoy regional autonomy when electing their public office candidates?   | 1  | 1   |
| Is it explicitly mentioned that the sub-national units cooperate with national branches when electing their public office candidates? | 1  | 1   |
| Do the national units completely control the election of the sub-national public office candidates?                                   | 1  | 1   |
| TOTAL   | 4  | 4   |
| Average   | 1  | 1   |

Relationship between national and sub-national units-sub-national intra-party office:

|   | AL | BNP |
|---|----|-----|
| Is it explicitly specified how sub-national units elect their leadership?                   | 1  | 1   |
| Do sub-national units enjoy regional autonomy when electing their leadership?               | 1  | 1   |
| Do sub-national units cooperate with national branches when electing their leadership?      | 1  | 1   |
| Do the national units completely control the election of the sub-national party leadership? | 1  | 1   |
| TOTAL   | 4  | 4   |
| Average   | 1  | 1   |

Programmatic Issue:

|  | AL   | BNP |
|--|------|-----|
| Does the statute explicitly specify who is in charge of the manifesto? | 1    | -1  |
| May individual party members vote upon the manifesto?                  | -1   | -1  |
| May the party congress vote upon the manifesto?                        | 1    | -1  |
| May the party executive vote upon the manifesto?                       | 1    | -1  |
| May the party president vote upon the manifesto?                       | 1    | -1  |
| May sub-national party units have a separate vote on a manifesto?      | -1   | -1  |
| TOTAL  | 2    | -6  |
| Average  | 0.33 | -1  |

## Appendix 2: Relevant formulae

$$\text{Standardisation} = \frac{X_i - \text{Min } X_i}{\text{Max } X_i - \text{Min } X_i}$$

$$\text{Transparency Index} = \frac{\sum \text{'transparency' or 'availability of information' variables}}{\text{Total number of 'transparency' variables}}$$

$$\text{Party Democracy Index, PDI} = \frac{\sum \text{equally weighted standardised values of five party democracy (sub)indices}}{\text{Total number of party democracy (sub)indices}}$$

## Appendix 3: Correlations Matrices

**Table 3-1: Correlation between AL and BNP transparency indices (party office)**

| <b>Transparency Index Correlation</b> (between AL & BNP) |                     | <i>Transparency Index Score (BNP)</i> |
|--|---------------------|---------------------------------------|
| <i>Transparency Index Score (AL)</i>                     | Pearson Correlation | <b>.452**</b>                         |
|  | Sig. (2-tailed)     | .003                                  |
|  | N                   | 40                                    |

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

**Table 3-2: Correlation between AL and BNP transparency indices (journalist)**

| <b>Transparency Index<sub>journalist</sub> Correlation</b> (between AL & BNP) |                     | <i>Transparency Index<sub>journalist</sub> Score (BNP)</i> |
|---|---------------------|--|
| <i>Transparency Index<sub>journalist</sub> Score (AL)</i>                     | Pearson Correlation | <b>.873**</b>  |
|   | Sig. (2-tailed)     | .000   |
|   | N                   | 40   |

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

## Appendix 4: Party Democracy Index (PDI)

Figure 4-1: PDI (Party Office) district ranking of AL




Figure 4-2: PDI (Party Office) district ranking of BNP




Figure 4-3: PDI (Journalist) district ranking of AL





Figure 4-4: PDI (Journalist) district ranking of BNP



**Table 4-1: Party democracy indices for AL (Party Office) by district**

| District Name | Representation | Competition | Participation | Responsiveness | Transparency | PDI, AL |
|---------------|----------------|-------------|---------------|----------------|--------------|---------|
| Bagerhat      | 0.32           | 0.41        | 1.00          | 0.57           | 0.00         | 0.46    |
| Bogra         | 0.21           | 0.41        | 0.49          | 0.57           | 0.00         | 0.34    |
| Barguna       | 0.45           | 0.29        | 0.30          | 0.57           | 0.00         | 0.32    |
| Brahmanbaria  | 0.65           | 0.76        | 0.39          | 0.57           | 0.00         | 0.48    |
| Chandpur      | 0.00           | 1.00        | 0.79          | 0.57           | 0.33         | 0.54    |
| Nawabganj     | 0.29           | 0.29        | 0.18          | 0.57           | 0.33         | 0.33    |
| Chittagong    | 0.00           | 0.12        | 0.52          | 0.57           | 0.17         | 0.27    |
| Comilla       | 0.06           | 0.06        | 0.75          | 0.86           | 0.33         | 0.41    |
| Cox's Bazaar  | 0.13           | 0.76        | 0.66          | 0.00           | 0.00         | 0.31    |
| Dinajpur      | 0.26           | 0.29        | 0.18          | 0.43           | 0.67         | 0.37    |
| Feni          | 0.23           | 0.76        | 0.36          | 1.00           | 0.50         | 0.57    |
| Gaibandha     | 0.03           | 0.76        | 0.88          | 0.00           | 0.50         | 0.43    |
| Gazipur       | 0.13           | 0.53        | 0.32          | 0.57           | 0.33         | 0.38    |
| Gopalganj     | 0.39           | 0.41        | 0.33          | 0.86           | 0.83         | 0.56    |
| Habiganj      | 0.23           | 0.65        | 0.52          | 1.00           | 0.83         | 0.65    |
| Jamalpur      | 0.10           | 0.06        | 0.47          | 0.57           | 0.33         | 0.31    |
| Jessore       | 0.13           | 0.53        | 0.23          | 0.57           | 1.00         | 0.49    |
| Jhenaidah     | 0.26           | 0.88        | 0.09          | 0.86           | 0.17         | 0.45    |
| Joypurhat     | 0.19           | 0.76        | 0.03          | 0.57           | 0.67         | 0.44    |
| Kurigram      | 0.45           | 0.65        | 0.46          | 1.00           | 0.67         | 0.65    |
| Kushtia       | 0.10           | 0.63        | 0.36          | 0.57           | 0.50         | 0.43    |
| Lalmonirhat   | 0.45           | 0.29        | 0.57          | 0.43           | 0.50         | 0.45    |
| Laksmipur     | 0.03           | 0.00        | 0.34          | 0.57           | 0.50         | 0.29    |
| Madaripur     | 0.10           | 0.65        | 0.62          | 0.57           | 0.50         | 0.49    |
| Magura        | 0.10           | 0.65        | 0.44          | 0.57           | 0.50         | 0.45    |
| Manikganj     | 0.29           | 0.65        | 0.16          | 0.57           | 0.83         | 0.50    |
| Munshiganj    | 0.16           | 0.29        | 0.72          | 0.57           | 0.67         | 0.48    |
| Narail        | 0.19           | 0.63        | 0.01          | 0.00           | 0.17         | 0.20    |
| Nilphamari    | 1.00           | 0.53        | 0.15          | 0.57           | 0.67         | 0.58    |
| Noakhali      | 0.35           | 0.65        | 0.60          | 0.57           | 0.83         | 0.60    |
| Panchagarh    | 0.11           | 0.41        | 0.00          | 0.00           | 0.83         | 0.27    |
| Patuakhali    | 0.24           | 0.53        | 0.53          | 0.57           | 0.83         | 0.54    |
| Pirojpur      | 0.52           | 0.24        | 0.32          | 0.57           | 0.83         | 0.49    |
| Rajshahi      | 0.24           | 0.41        | 0.07          | 0.29           | 0.83         | 0.37    |
| Rangpur       | 0.71           | 0.76        | 0.62          | 1.00           | 0.83         | 0.79    |
| Satkhira      | 0.10           | 1.00        | 0.40          | 0.57           | 1.00         | 0.61    |
| Shariatpur    | 0.16           | 0.76        | 0.43          | 0.57           | 0.83         | 0.55    |
| Sherpur       | 0.19           | 0.29        | 0.63          | 0.57           | 1.00         | 0.54    |
| Sylhet        | 0.03           | 0.59        | 0.66          | 0.57           | 1.00         | 0.57    |
| Thakurgaon    | 0.42           | 0.12        | 0.27          | 0.00           | 1.00         | 0.36    |
| Sum           | 10.00          | 20.49       | 16.86         | 22.00          | 22.33        | 18.34   |
| Average       | 0.25           | 0.51        | 0.42          | 0.55           | 0.56         | 0.46    |

**Table 4-2: Party democracy indices for BNP (Party Office) by district**

| District Name | Representation | Competition | Participation | Responsiveness | Transparency | PDI, AL |
|---------------|----------------|-------------|---------------|----------------|--------------|---------|
| Bagerhat      | 0.15           | 0.60        | 0.04          | 1.00           | 0.00         | 0.36    |
| Bogra         | 0.04           | 0.70        | 0.16          | 1.00           | 0.00         | 0.38    |
| Barguna       | 0.20           | 0.90        | 0.21          | 1.00           | 0.00         | 0.46    |
| Brahmanbaria  | 0.10           | 0.80        | 0.33          | 1.00           | 0.33         | 0.51    |
| Chandpur      | 0.16           | 0.80        | 0.19          | 1.00           | 0.00         | 0.43    |
| Nawabganj     | 0.10           | 0.60        | 0.41          | 0.75           | 0.17         | 0.40    |
| Chittagong    | 0.00           | 0.00        | 0.14          | 0.75           | 0.33         | 0.24    |
| Comilla       | 0.32           | 0.70        | 0.12          | 0.75           | 0.33         | 0.45    |
| Cox's Bazaar  | 0.12           | 0.80        | 0.12          | 0.75           | 0.67         | 0.49    |
| Dinajpur      | 0.19           | 0.90        | 0.25          | 1.00           | 0.17         | 0.50    |
| Feni          | 0.32           | 0.60        | 0.11          | 0.75           | 0.33         | 0.42    |
| Gaibandha     | 0.07           | 0.70        | 0.06          | 0.75           | 0.33         | 0.38    |
| Gazipur       | 0.06           | 0.47        | 0.08          | 0.75           | 0.50         | 0.37    |
| Gopalganj     | 0.43           | 1.00        | 0.09          | 1.00           | 0.00         | 0.50    |
| Habiganj      | 0.27           | 0.70        | 0.14          | 0.25           | 0.17         | 0.31    |
| Jamalpur      | 0.08           | 0.40        | 0.40          | 1.00           | 0.67         | 0.51    |
| Jessore       | 0.16           | 0.70        | 0.31          | 1.00           | 0.00         | 0.43    |
| Jhenaidah     | 0.00           | 0.60        | 0.13          | 0.75           | 0.83         | 0.46    |
| Joypurhat     | 0.00           | 0.10        | 0.15          | 1.00           | 0.50         | 0.35    |
| Kurigram      | 0.19           | 0.80        | 0.22          | 1.00           | 0.50         | 0.54    |
| Kushtia       | 0.11           | 1.00        | 0.11          | 1.00           | 0.67         | 0.58    |
| Lalmonirhat   | 0.26           | 0.40        | 0.31          | 0.75           | 0.67         | 0.48    |
| Laksmipur     | 0.04           | 0.60        | 1.00          | 0.75           | 0.83         | 0.64    |
| Madaripur     | 0.17           | 0.90        | 0.36          | 1.00           | 0.83         | 0.65    |
| Magura        | 0.13           | 0.80        | 0.36          | 0.75           | 0.83         | 0.57    |
| Manikganj     | 0.09           | 0.30        | 0.11          | 0.25           | 0.50         | 0.25    |
| Munshiganj    | 0.00           | 0.60        | 0.23          | 1.00           | 0.83         | 0.53    |
| Narail        | 0.06           | 0.80        | 0.21          | 0.00           | 0.33         | 0.28    |
| Nilphamari    | 0.00           | 0.80        | 0.58          | 0.75           | 0.83         | 0.59    |
| Noakhali      | 1.00           | 0.70        | 0.20          | 0.25           | 0.67         | 0.56    |
| Panchagarh    | 0.88           | 0.13        | 0.19          | 0.75           | 0.83         | 0.56    |
| Patuakhali    | 0.11           | 0.57        | 0.38          | 0.75           | 0.83         | 0.53    |
| Pirojpur      | 0.10           | 0.70        | 0.33          | 0.25           | 0.83         | 0.44    |
| Rajshahi      | 0.34           | 0.70        | 0.37          | 0.25           | 0.83         | 0.50    |
| Rangpur       | 0.12           | 0.00        | 0.18          | 0.25           | 0.83         | 0.28    |
| Satkhira      | 0.11           | 0.00        | 0.35          | 0.75           | 0.83         | 0.41    |
| Shariatpur    | 0.06           | 0.10        | 0.00          | 0.25           | 1.00         | 0.28    |
| Sherpur       | 0.31           | 0.70        | 0.11          | 0.75           | 0.83         | 0.54    |
| Sylhet        | 0.16           | 0.50        | 0.15          | 1.00           | 0.83         | 0.53    |
| Thakurgaon    | 0.18           | 0.60        | 0.40          | 0.75           | 1.00         | 0.59    |
| Sum           | 7.18           | 23.77       | 9.60          | 29.55          | 21.50        | 18.32   |
| Average       | 0.18           | 0.59        | 0.24          | 0.74           | 0.54         | 0.46    |


**Table 4-3: Party democracy indices for AL (Journalist) by district**

| District Name | Representation | Competition | Participation | Responsiveness | Transparency | PDI, AL |
|---------------|----------------|-------------|---------------|----------------|--------------|---------|
| Bagerhat      | 0.42           | 0.42        | 0.56          | 0.67           | 0.17         | 0.45    |
| Barguna       | 0.65           | 0.00        | 0.00          | 0.50           | 0.33         | 0.30    |
| Bogra         | 0.12           | 0.25        | 0.00          | 0.50           | 0.17         | 0.21    |
| Brahmanbaria  | 0.00           | 0.33        | 0.39          | 0.50           | 0.00         | 0.24    |
| Chandpur      | 0.31           | 0.42        | 0.33          | 0.50           | 0.33         | 0.38    |
| Chittagong    | 0.23           | 0.92        | 0.33          | 0.50           | 0.00         | 0.40    |
| Comilla       | 0.12           | 0.00        | 0.00          | 0.50           | 0.17         | 0.16    |
| Cox's Bazaar  | 0.35           | 0.17        | 0.44          | 0.67           | 1.00         | 0.52    |
| Dinajpur      | 0.42           | 0.50        | 0.44          | 1.00           | 0.33         | 0.54    |
| Feni          | 0.73           | 0.42        | 0.44          | 1.00           | 0.50         | 0.62    |
| Gaibandha     | 0.31           | 0.46        | 0.00          | 0.25           | 0.50         | 0.30    |
| Gazipur       | 0.46           | 0.50        | 0.00          | 0.67           | 0.00         | 0.33    |
| Gopalganj     | 0.04           | 1.00        | 0.56          | 0.50           | 0.50         | 0.52    |
| Habiganj      | 0.00           | 0.25        | 0.56          | 0.50           | 0.00         | 0.26    |
| Jamalpur      | 0.23           | 0.33        | 0.00          | 0.50           | 0.17         | 0.25    |
| Jessore       | 0.23           | 0.63        | 0.00          | 0.25           | 0.83         | 0.39    |
| Jhenaidah     | 0.69           | 0.83        | 0.44          | 0.50           | 0.33         | 0.56    |
| Joypurhat     | 0.92           | 0.75        | 0.67          | 0.50           | 0.83         | 0.73    |
| Kurigram      | 0.69           | 0.75        | 0.78          | 1.00           | 0.67         | 0.78    |
| Kushtia       | 1.00           | 0.33        | 0.00          | 0.50           | 0.33         | 0.43    |
| Laksmipur     | 0.69           | 0.75        | 0.33          | 0.25           | 0.33         | 0.47    |
| Lalmonirhat   | 0.81           | 0.50        | 0.61          | 1.00           | 0.17         | 0.62    |
| Madaripur     | 0.85           | 0.25        | 0.44          | 0.50           | 0.00         | 0.41    |
| Magura        | 0.96           | 0.33        | 0.09          | 0.58           | 0.00         | 0.39    |
| Manikganj     | 0.35           | 1.00        | 0.00          | 0.50           | 0.00         | 0.37    |
| Munshiganj    | 0.19           | 0.50        | 0.22          | 1.00           | 0.00         | 0.38    |
| Narail        | 0.62           | 0.33        | 0.33          | 0.50           | 0.00         | 0.36    |
| Nawabganj     | 0.41           | 0.50        | 0.00          | 0.00           | 0.50         | 0.28    |
| Nilphamari    | 0.58           | 0.50        | 0.22          | 0.67           | 0.17         | 0.43    |
| Noakhali      | 0.00           | 0.00        | 0.56          | 1.00           | 0.00         | 0.31    |
| Panchagarh    | 0.27           | 0.50        | 0.00          | 0.50           | 0.00         | 0.25    |
| Patuakhali    | 0.00           | 0.17        | 0.00          | 0.50           | 0.00         | 0.13    |
| Pirojpur      | 0.31           | 0.17        | 0.00          | 0.50           | 0.50         | 0.29    |
| Rajshahi      | 0.38           | 0.75        | 0.00          | 0.25           | 0.50         | 0.38    |
| Rangpur       | 0.54           | 0.50        | 1.00          | 0.67           | 0.17         | 0.57    |
| Satkhira      | 0.19           | 0.75        | 0.33          | 0.50           | 0.50         | 0.46    |
| Shariatpur    | 0.19           | 0.50        | 0.50          | 0.46           | 0.00         | 0.33    |
| Sherpur       | 0.31           | 0.33        | 0.67          | 0.67           | 0.00         | 0.39    |
| Sylhet        | 0.38           | 1.00        | 0.44          | 1.00           | 0.00         | 0.57    |
| Thakurgaon    | 0.38           | 0.00        | 0.00          | 0.50           | 0.17         | 0.21    |
| Sum           | 16.33          | 18.58       | 11.70         | 23.04          | 10.17        | 15.96   |
| Average       | 0.41           | 0.46        | 0.29          | 0.58           | 0.25         | 0.40    |

**Table 4-4: Party democracy indices for BNP (Journalist) by district**


| District Name | Representation | Competition | Participation | Responsiveness | Transparency | PDI, AL |
|---------------|----------------|-------------|---------------|----------------|--------------|---------|
| Bagerhat      | 0.33           | 0.50        | 0.00          | 0.60           | 0.33         | 0.35    |
| Barguna       | 0.19           | 0.00        | 0.11          | 1.00           | 0.33         | 0.33    |
| Bogra         | 0.08           | 0.00        | 0.11          | 0.40           | 0.17         | 0.15    |
| Brahmanbaria  | 0.00           | 0.17        | 0.39          | 1.00           | 0.00         | 0.31    |
| Chandpur      | 0.31           | 0.92        | 0.67          | 1.00           | 0.33         | 0.65    |
| Chittagong    | 0.06           | 0.17        | 0.33          | 0.60           | 0.33         | 0.30    |
| Comilla       | 0.06           | 0.17        | 0.00          | 0.60           | 0.17         | 0.20    |
| Cox's Bazaar  | 0.00           | 0.00        | 0.33          | 0.60           | 0.67         | 0.32    |
| Dinajpur      | 0.33           | 0.50        | 0.33          | 0.60           | 0.33         | 0.42    |
| Feni          | 0.38           | 0.42        | 0.56          | 0.60           | 0.50         | 0.49    |
| Gaibandha     | 0.17           | 0.50        | 0.11          | 0.30           | 0.33         | 0.28    |
| Gazipur       | 0.08           | 0.33        | 0.00          | 0.60           | 0.00         | 0.20    |
| Gopalganj     | 0.13           | 1.00        | 0.33          | 1.00           | 0.00         | 0.49    |
| Habiganj      | 0.00           | 0.00        | 0.00          | 0.60           | 0.00         | 0.12    |
| Jamalpur      | 0.08           | 0.33        | 0.00          | 0.40           | 0.17         | 0.20    |
| Jessore       | 0.21           | 0.29        | 0.00          | 0.70           | 0.83         | 0.41    |
| Jhenaidah     | 1.00           | 0.67        | 0.44          | 0.60           | 0.33         | 0.61    |
| Joypurhat     | 0.38           | 0.67        | 1.00          | 1.00           | 0.83         | 0.78    |
| Kurigram      | 0.46           | 0.75        | 0.67          | 0.60           | 0.50         | 0.59    |
| Kushtia       | 1.00           | 0.33        | 0.00          | 0.60           | 0.33         | 0.45    |
| Laksmipur     | 0.52           | 0.75        | 0.56          | 0.10           | 0.33         | 0.45    |
| Lalmonirhat   | 0.94           | 0.50        | 0.50          | 1.00           | 0.17         | 0.62    |
| Madaripur     | 0.38           | 0.42        | 0.22          | 0.66           | 0.00         | 0.34    |
| Magura        | 0.35           | 0.33        | 0.08          | 0.39           | 0.00         | 0.23    |
| Manikganj     | 0.08           | 0.33        | 0.00          | 0.40           | 0.00         | 0.16    |
| Munshiganj    | 0.23           | 0.50        | 0.00          | 0.60           | 0.00         | 0.27    |
| Narail        | 0.23           | 0.33        | 0.00          | 0.40           | 0.00         | 0.19    |
| Nawabganj     | 0.25           | 0.50        | 0.22          | 0.00           | 0.50         | 0.29    |
| Nilphamari    | 0.10           | 0.38        | 0.00          | 0.60           | 0.17         | 0.25    |
| Noakhali      | 0.00           | 0.75        | 0.33          | 0.60           | 0.00         | 0.34    |
| Panchagarh    | 0.10           | 0.25        | 0.00          | 1.00           | 0.00         | 0.27    |
| Patuakhali    | 0.00           | 0.25        | 0.00          | 0.40           | 0.00         | 0.13    |
| Pirojpur      | 0.06           | 0.17        | 0.22          | 1.00           | 0.50         | 0.39    |
| Rajshahi      | 0.19           | 0.75        | 0.22          | 0.30           | 0.50         | 0.39    |
| Rangpur       | 0.31           | 0.25        | 1.00          | 0.60           | 0.17         | 0.47    |
| Satkhira      | 0.13           | 0.00        | 0.00          | 0.60           | 0.33         | 0.21    |
| Shariatpur    | 0.17           | 0.00        | 0.58          | 0.61           | 0.00         | 0.27    |
| Sherpur       | 0.13           | 0.33        | 0.33          | 0.40           | 0.00         | 0.24    |
| Sylhet        | 0.31           | 0.17        | 0.33          | 1.00           | 0.00         | 0.36    |
| Thakurgaon    | 0.08           | 0.00        | 0.11          | 0.60           | 0.50         | 0.26    |
| Sum           | 9.81           | 14.67       | 10.11         | 24.61          | 9.67         | 13.77   |
| Average       | 0.25           | 0.37        | 0.25          | 0.62           | 0.24         | 0.34    |

**Map 4-1: Party Democracy Index, Journalist, AL**



Note: empty districts denote areas that have not been surveyed.

**Map 4-2: Party Democracy Index, Journalist, BNP**



Note: empty districts denote areas that have not been surveyed.





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