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Monograph Series

WHO GETS WHAT
AND WHY

Resource Allocation in a
Bangladesh Village

Research and Evaluation Division, BRAC

rural study series

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AND WHY**

**Resource Allocation in a
Bangladesh Village**

BANGLADESH RURAL ADVANCEMENT COMMITTEE



rural study series: 01

WHO GETS WHAT AND WHY

Resource Allocation in a Bangladesh village

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FOREWORD

Studies carried out by our Research Division on contemporary rural scene is normally published in cyclostyled form and a limited number is distributed to development planners and administrators. In the Rural Study Series, we plan to bring out those of our studies which have a wider appeal. 'WHO GETS WHAT AND WHY' is the first publication in the series.

Dhaka
August, 1983

Publisher

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PREFACE

Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) is a Bangladeshi voluntary organization dedicated to the social and economic development of rural Bangladesh. BRAC operates a number of integrated rural development programmes in different parts of Bangladesh. The activities include organisation of landless and marginal farmers, agriculture, fisheries development, youth organisation, training, health, family planning, nutrition, education, rural credit and employment generation.

In the course of its activities over the last seven years BRAC has developed certain capacities within the organisation and gained some perceptions of the rural scene through experience at the grassroots. It was, however, felt that more systematic investigation and analysis of the structure and dynamics of society was essential for formulating appropriate development strategies. Moreover, insights gained through experience needed to be analysed and documented if they were to be of use to others. With these ends in view, BRAC decided to develop research capabilities within the organisation. This study is the first of the series of micro-studies which was undertaken in the process of training a group of BRAC staff on the basic principles of observational research.

The framework of these studies was designed by Dr. S. P. P. Senaratne of Sri Lanka, who has also provided the training to our research staff and has been involved in the analysis of data in all phases of this study. BRAC is most grateful to this remarkable teacher and guide for his contribution.

Marty Chen, as leader of this team, has been primarily responsible for producing this study. She has given innumerable hours in supervising the processing of the data, personally

conducting the analysis, and writing up the report. Without her efforts and guidance this report would not have seen the light of day. Mohammed Alamgir conducted the field investigation and has contributed significantly together with Ferdausur Rahman in the processing and analysis of data. Both of these young researchers have provided in-valuable support to this team effort. BRAC is grateful to all the members of the team for producing this study which we hope will serve to enlarge our knowledge and understanding of rural Bangladesh.

Dhaka
July, 1979

Fazle Hasan Abed
Executive Director
BRAC

PART I

INTRODUCTION

THE PROBLEM

Land has traditionally been valued as the ultimate security in the subsistence agricultural economy of Bangladesh. But what happens as land becomes scarce to an increasing percentage of the people indeed, perhaps, the majority of the people? How do the people who live in Bangladesh's villages go about maximising available resources? What happens in the unending search for economic security? Are attempts made to diversify available resources? Is the resource base of the rural economy in Bangladesh shifting and expanding in response to the need? How effective are current policies to intensify, if not diversify, the village resource base?

We have in this study attempted to ask these questions in the context of a single village in Bangladesh. We have investigated the complex of resources available to that village: which resources have been added to the resource base and which resources have either dwindled or increased in value over time. We have also explored the factors which affect and regulate the distribution and continuing redistribution of the resources available to and availed of by the people of the village. And we have attempted to understand who in the village maximised which resources for what reasons and under what circumstances.

Why have we looked at resource structure and behaviour in the context of a single village? We believe that from a better understanding of the basic processes that govern the resource allocation and behaviour in individual village communities implications can be drawn for policies designed to intensify, diversify, and more equitably distribute resources throughout all the villages of Bangladesh.

THE METHODOLOGY

Let us define what we mean by resource and resource behaviour. We define resources as income and factors which either increase income or reduce expenditure. Resource may be actual—what is enjoyed at present—or potential in that there are efforts to obtain control of them. The interaction of various resources in any one village community is what we call the complex of resources. The complex of resources has a dynamic quality in that some resources are dwindling while others are expanding.

Individuals make a section from the village complex of resources. Most of the individual's relationships derive from the resources he or she chooses or is able to exploit; that is, they are implied by occupational role or economic activity. Other relationships derive from different areas of life and activity, kinship, family, religion, faction, and so forth. Relationships are the framework within which behaviour takes place; that is, behaviour is the operation of existing relationships and the establishing of new ones. This is done in terms of the specific goals of the individual. Thus resource behaviour is the handling of relationship in terms of those resources over which the individual maintains or wishes to obtain control.

In Part II of this study we examine the complex of resources available to one village community. In Part III, we examine the areas of relationships—family, faction, kinship, and politics—which most affect resource behaviour and classify resource behaviour into ten broad categories of strategy. Two other elements of the theoretical framework of this study are discussed in Part III: Power and Ideology. Power is measured in this study in terms of the degree a person offers patronage to others and

determines the flow of resources. Behaviour is governed by certain norms. These norms derive from values which are grounded in belief. This complex of norms, values and belief is referred to as ideology.

The dialectic of any community, according to the frame-work used, is thus based on four fundamental elements: the Complex of resources, the Pattern of Relationships, the Distribution of Power, and the System of Ideology. In any one socio-economic context these four elements operate. To bring about change in the context a change must take place between these four. To understand resource behaviour, one must observe and understand these four forces. To attempt to influence resource behaviour, one must recognise that one's interventions in any of these factors will affect the other three. This study is, basically, the disciplined observation of the interaction of these four forces in one village.

The field work for this study was conducted by one member of the team during two periods in 1977. The first period (2 months) was essentially a "getting to know" exercise during which a village-wide census and survey of household heads was conducted. The survey was designed to give information on land ownership so that households could be classified into land-holding categories from which sample households could be chosen. Genealogies were drawn from the survey data. A preliminary report on the village was prepared in which the critical issues and indicators for the village surfaced. The central problems to be investigated were then formulated and a field plan prepared for the second field period

The second period in the field (3 months) generated the in depth information on which the study is based. Key informants were interviewed to gain knowledge about the village. In depth interviews of sample household heads (60 out of 146 household heads) were conducted¹. Case studies were taken on the critical

¹ Because only household heads were interviewed, women figure marginally (only 2 sample household heads were female, both widows) and children not at all.

institutions of the village: kinship, family, faction, religion, *shalish*². In depth observations on sample interviews and key institutions were recorded in note form throughout the field period. The data was analysed by a team of three during 1978. An additional field visit (1 month) was made in 1978 to gather missing data.

Let us explain our choice of land-holding categories as the classes or divisions in terms of which the study has been undertaken. We felt the obvious need to keep something fixed throughout the analysis. Our options included fixed income categories or fixed landholding categories. We opted in this study for fixed life-styles in the form of five land-holding classes. We presume that over the past 30 years period the average size of holdings may have changed, but that the life styles of each land-holding category remained broadly constant. That is, what has remained constant in these land-holding categories is not the size of land-holding, but a style of life. It should be kept in mind that land-holding is not codeterminant with income. In fact the differences between size of land-holding and income will be explained and highlighted at various points in the study.

Let us also at this point, explain the source of the figures used throughout this study. Some of these figures are taken from the village-wide household survey: for example, the trade, employment, and service incomes from non-sample households. Other figures have come from village records, informants or other sources of what relates to common knowledge. The bulk is information from the sample interviews; these sample figures were then extrapolated to obtain village figures. The data varies in its accuracy as is usual in any exercise. Income data can only be checked through assets owned, employment enjoyed, and consumption indulged in. Cross checks on income data were made whenever possible. Land ownership has been cross-checked through inheritance, co-owner's and land transaction data. Employment incomes present little difficulty as they can and have been checked. Trade figures have special problems but

² The *shalish* is the village-level judicial bench; the *shalish* are those chosen to adjudicate.

sample checks have been made in respect of goods bought and sold and incomes derived from this. All in all, it has not been thought necessary to spend scarce research time in pursuing accuracy for accuracy's sake. The attempt, rather, has been to check thoroughly the consistency of the figures obtained even if there is some margin of error.

THE VILLAGE

Let us now turn to the village. In selecting a village for this study the notion of applicability inevitably presented itself. Our main intent was to select a village which provided the widest coverage of elements of village life so that the findings would be widely applicable. The village selected should be of average size and representative in ethnic composition of the 64,000 villages of Bangladesh. The village chosen should also have access to markets and towns, education facilities, employment opportunities and reflect diversified patterns of land ownership and utilisation. And the village should be near or within a BRAC project area. The village finally chosen was Dhankura, near the market town of Manikganj, and on the periphery of Manikganj (where BRAC operates).

There are at least five definitions or delineations of Dhankura village, Saturia thana, Manikganj Sub-division, Dhaka district. People in the region speak of two Dhankuras: the greater (a unit of 8 *paras* or neighbourhoods) and the lesser (the smallest of these 8 *paras*). The Census of 1974 sub-divided the 8 *paras* of greater Dhankura into 15 *paras* and treated each as a separate voting village. The *mouza* map shows the cultivable and residential land of greater Dhankura with clear delineation of each *para*. We have chosen the two *paras* in the southeastern corner of greater Dhankura as our unit of study.

If we look at our map of Dhankura, we see the homesteads of Dhankura clustered along two dirt roads running roughly east-west through the village. There is some arable land between the two strips of homesteads. And the village is bounded on the north and south by larger blocks of arable land common to Dhankura and neighbouring villages. Most buildings and institutions of the village are located in the south-west corner of the village adjacent


to the Union headquarters. The mosque and *madrasha*¹ are located in Guaria *para*, and the *mandir*² in Shahapara. Originally, Shahapara was all Hindu and Guaria all Muslim. But some Muslims have infiltrated Shahapara in the wake of Hindu immigration from Dhankura to India. Neighbourhood clusters within these larger neighbourhoods (*paras*) generally follow kinship lines.

The block of crop land to the north-east of Dhankura is the most fertile as it is comparatively low land replenished each year by flood waters which leave behind a layer of silt. Mostly *aus-aman*³ and some jute are grown in this block. The block of crop and to the south-east of Dhankura is comparatively less fertile as only a portion of the fields go under water during the floods. Most of the crop land of the village lies in this south-eastern block. It is here that most of the jute is grown. The land in the western section of Dhankura is least fertile as it is high land from which the rain water siphons off the fertile top soil. Mostly a single *aus* crop and some jute is grown in this block. It should also be noted that 20 Dhankura households own roughly 12 acres of land in Khaliaghury, Mymensingh district, an area that supports one bumper *boro* crop of paddy per year.

¹ Islamic religious school.

² Temple.

³ *Aus*, *aman* and *boro* are the three major rice crops of Bangladesh. *Aus* is an early monsoon crop, *Aman*, a monsoon crop, constitutes about 2/3 of annual rice production. *Boro* is a winter crop often requiring irrigation.



The total population of Dhankura (885) is distributed between 146 households: an average size of 6.06. There are 473 males and 412 females in Dhankura. Thirty percent of the population is under 15 years of age. Nineteen percent of the population is literate: males-30% and females -6%. Hindus comprise -17% of the population distributed between 25 households.

The history of Dhankura prior to 1947 is largely the history of the local zamindari family which came into prominence with the Permanent Settlement Act of 1793. A sizeable Hindu population concentrated around this Hindu zamindari. Most of the Hindus were educated and prospered in hereditary lines of business; some lower caste Hindus cultivated land.

The first event to affect the Hindu dominance of the area was the partition of India and the formation of Pakistan in 1947. Much of the Hindu population decided to migrate to India. We have calculated that roughly 30 Hindu households migrated from Dhankura to India during Partition and subsequent waves of Hindu migration (Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 and Bangladesh Liberation war of 1971). The land these households owned, the businesses they operated, the business patronage and links they received and maintained were, in part, transferred to the Muslim residents of the area.

The second event which diminished the Hindu dominance of the area altogether was the migration of the zamindari family of Dhankura to India in 1950 in anticipation of the Abolition of the Zamindari in 1952. The zamindari family held tax rights over extensive amounts of land in the region. The tenants on this land held what were called "possession rights". With the abolition of the zamindari, tenants generally claimed "ownership rights" of land over which previously they held only "possession rights". The zamindari family also possessed freehold a 16-acre estate within Dhankura proper: including a house, 2 ponds, and 8 cultivable acres. These properties were handed over to the government as *khas* properties to be leased out by the Government.

Muslim leadership surfaced by the mid-fifties. Jan-e-Alam, a Muslim Leaguer, was elected the first Muslim Union Council Chairman for the region in 1954. With the Muslim resurgence, regional leadership shifted from Dhankura to other villages of the region. The first strong challenge to Jan-e-Alam's group, by then referred to as the "traditional" leaders, came with the Liberation War of 1971 which brought in its wake a new leadership from the youth of the area. The youth finally won the Union election in 1977. Dhankura residents did not feature prominently in Union-level politics from 1954 until the election of the youth-Chairman, Abdul Alim in 1977.

We have calculated that the population of Dhankura in 1947 was about half what it is now. Sixty households occupied an area where now there are 146 households. Pressures on the land were far less in 1947. And the inflow of cash incomes into Dhankura was higher than other villages and perhaps as high or higher than now because most of the Hindu population followed hereditary lines of business while others earned employment incomes.

In tracing the history of Dhankura over the past thirty years' three factors seem to be of particular significance to the Dhankura economy: the business vacuum left by the waves of Hindu migration, the business patronage and linkages inherited by some Muslims and the Hindus who remained in Dhankura, and the increased transport facilities offered by the building of the Dhaka-Aricha road in the 1960's. It is difficult to quantify the relative importance of these factors. But it can be said that given the one-time Hindu dominance in the area the economy of Dhankura has never been a fully land-based economy.

Today the pressures on the land are very acute. The landless and nearly landless comprised 33% of total households in 1947 but 53% of total households in 1977. Given the social and demographic changes over the past 30 years some 10 households have lost land and slipped into the landless position whereas only 3 landless or nearly landless families have been able to purchase land. Hindu migration has also contributed to the rate of landlessness. Only 4 landless Hindu families migrated out

whereas 26 landed Hindu families migrated out. And of those who immigrated into Dhankura 15 were able to purchase little or no land and only 4 purchased substantial amounts of land. We have calculated that roughly 50 acres of Dhankura land owned by Hindus was sold to Muslims outside Dhankura.

Although the Dhankura economy is dominated by land, occupations and avenues of incomes are many and varied. Most households derive income from several sources. Some residents work outside the villages. There are six teachers, including two headmasters of schools. All but one resides outside, and the one who teaches at the Dhankura school commutes daily to regional schools. Four policemen reside outside the village. Two from Dhankura serve as clerks in government departments, one commutes daily to the sub-divisional headquarters in Manikganj and the other resides in Dhaka. Three salesboys and one shop manager also reside outside Dhankura. Two mail runners one peon, a boat labourer, and female construction workers reside in the village but work outside.

Those in trade vary considerably in the incomes they derive: while a few reach the highest levels of income, others just about pay their way through small scale trading. Most trading opportunities are of low-status in that the trader must himself move from place to place buying and/or selling. Only four operate permanent shops. None exploit trading opportunities outside the region, and most share the regional markets with other traders of the same type. Only one-the oil dealer holds a monopoly.

Certain households engage in the production of crafts, handloom, and other local products. This production follows hereditary caste and class occupations. The skills of the few carpenters and blacksmiths are also caste specialities. They engage in village-level production for sale but also contract their services to neighbouring villages. Associated with powers handed down by religious leaders are several types of ritual and religious practitioners.

There are three broad types of markets in the region: the wholesale permanent centres, specialised weekly *hats*¹, and daily bazars. Dhankura is the seat of a small daily bazar. There are two specialised *hats* within a mile radius of Dhankura. Coitta *hat* specialises in winter crops and poultry. Barobhuiya *hat* specialises in vegetables, rice, and bamboo. Kalampur *hat*, five miles away, specialises in cattle and is the site for a government jute procurement centre. Saturia (6 miles away) was historically, the wholesale centre for the region. Currently a wholesale market in grocery and stationery is held once a week at Saturia. Saturia otherwise has been by-passed in importance by Manikganj town with the introduction of the Dhaka-Aricha road. Several itinerant traders and permanent shop proprietors from Dhankura buy their stock wholesale on credit from Manikganj. Only a few traders from Dhankura go further than Manikganj or Saturia, one to sell bamboo craft at a weekly *hat* in Savar (28 miles) and some to purchase rice from Nayerhat (20 miles) and fruit from Aricha (19 miles) to sell in the region.

Several village-level institutions operate as determinants of resource behaviour in Dhankura. Each of these is discussed at length at various points in Part II and Part III. so we will do no more than introduce the institutions at this point.

Kinship groups are comprised of those regarded as having been descended from a common ancestor and as being blood relations. There is little doubt or vagueness about a kinship group ; its composition is easily determined and an individual can belong to only one such group.

Each group has its formal leader or leaders. There are certain social sanctions and norms which generally hold true for all kinship group behaviour. But not all kinship groups in Dhankura are equally strong and cohesive nor do they all follow the norms to an equal degree.

¹ *Hats* are temporary market sites which operate once or twice a week.

There are seven major kinship groups in Dhankura. The two strongest kinship groups are Behala and Furia. Their respective leaders are the two faction leaders of Dhankura. Two other groups, Bepari and Munshi, remain fairly neutral in factional politics as the kin leaders are themselves neutral but respected figures in the village. Another kinship group, Muda, is divided as the two co-leaders support the rival faction leaders. One comparatively poor kinship group, Paramanik, linked to Furia through marriage seeks economic and social security from the Furia group. The group with the least dependable clients and the most shifting loyalties is Mal.

There are two factions in Dhankura: that of Shafiqur Rahman and that of Kashem Ali. These two faction leaders are the leaders of the two strongest kinship groups and maintain Union and Thana level political and administrative links. Membership in and loyalties to particular factions are subject to change. Followers group around faction leaders to safeguard their interests, and the faction leader gathers followers to gain power.

Link to the Union (lowest-level political unit) and the Thana (lowest-level administrative unit) are perceived to be of the utmost importance. The faction leaders and certain individual residents try to establish and maintain strong links with the elected and appointed officials. These officials are perceived to be not only the distributors of public sector benefits but also the guarantors of private sector resources. These officials can guarantee whether one's land documents are legal and upheld, whether one gets the employment one seeks, whether one can avail institutional sources of credit whether one's life and property are secure, whether one's rights under law are upheld and much more.

And, finally, mention should be made of Hindu-Muslim interactions in Dhankura. The two large *paras* (neighbour-hoods) of Dhankura are divided along religious lines: Guaria is Muslim, Shahapara is predominantly Hindu. The Hindus who have remained in Dhankura are mostly Shahas, some Karmakars, and a few Sudras. The Shahas have, by caste tradition, been engaged in low-status trading. They are, as a caste, educated to the degree

book-keeping requires. The Karmakars are engaged in the caste occupation of black-smithy. Hindu-Muslim interactions have continued to operate rather smoothly over the past thirty years with the exceptional act of injustice. But inevitably the Hindus as a minority, feel insecure and unitedly seek security from the Union leaders. Most are investing their savings in moveable assets with the thought of eventual migration.

PART II

THE RESOURCE STRUCTURE

OWNERSHIP OF LAND

1. Total Area

The village in Bangladesh is a somewhat elusive unit. Any one definition of the village proves arbitrary to a degree. There are, for example, at least five definitions or delineations of Dhankura village, Saturia thana, Manikganj sub-division, Dhaka district. People in the region speak of two Dhankuras: the greater (a unit of 8 *Paras* or neighbourhoods) and the lesser (the smallest of these 8 *Paras*). The Census of 1974 sub-divided the 8 *Paras* of greater Dhankura into 15 *Paras* and treated each as a separate village. The mouza map shows the cultivable and residential map of greater Dhankura with clear delineation of each *para*.

We have chosen the two *paras* in the south-eastern corner of greater Dhankura as our unit of study: hereafter, in this study, Dhankura refers to these two *paras* and their cultivable land.

These two *paras*, spatially and geographically, fit the broad definition of a village in Bangladesh: units of raised residential land surrounded by low fields of arable land. If we look at the map of Dhankura in the Introduction, we see the homesteads of Dhankura clustered along two dirt roads running roughly east-west through the village. There is some arable land between the two strips of home-steads. And the village is bounded on the north and south by larger blocks of arable land common to Dhankura and neighbouring villages (or *paras* depending on one's definition).

The history of the region contributed to the extent of land area falling within Dhankura. Dhankura was the seat of a local Hindu zamindari. A sizeable Hindu population concentrated around this centre. With migration of the Hindus to India during partition and after, roughly 50 acres of land owned by Hindu residents of Dhankura were lost to Muslim residents of adjacent villages¹. And the 16 acres estate owned freehold by the zamindar (2 ponds, 1 house, and 8 arable acres) became public property under government control.

The current total land area of Dhankura village is 257.65 acres:

| | | |
|------------------|---|--------|
| privately owned | : | 229.65 |
| roads | : | 10 |
| public buildings | : | 18 |

II. Present Distribution of Ownership

The total population of Dhankura (885) is distributed between 146 households. The study had to be undertaken in terms of the division of these households. Our options included, division according to income categories or land-holding categories. We opted for five broad land-holding categories. The total land area owned by these 146 households is 229.65 acres. 192.14 of which are cultivable and 37.51 residential. The five broad land-holding categories into which the households have been divided are: surplus (above 6 acres); medium (2.5-6 acres); small (1-2.5 acres); marginal (below 1 acre); and landless (no cultivable lands but usually small residential plots). The following table presents the current ownership pattern of these land-holding categories:

¹ This is discussed more fully below.

Table 1: Current Ownership

| L-H Category | Households | | Holdings | | | |
|--------------|------------|---------|----------|---------|---------|------------|
| | Number | Percent | Total | Percent | Average | Cultivable |
| Surplus | 6 | 4% | 53.41 | 23% | 8.90 | 48.91 |
| Medium | 14 | 10% | 55.94 | 24% | 4.00 | 48.94 |
| Small | 48 | 33% | 100.92 | 45% | 2.10 | 86.04 |
| Marginal | 21 | 14% | 11.40 | 5% | .54 | 8.25 |
| Landless | 57 | 39% | 7.98 | 3% | .14 | — |
| Total | 146 | 100% | 229.65 | 100% | — | 192.14 |

At the present time¹, 14% (surplus and medium) of the households own 48% of the land, whereas 53% (marginal and landless) of the households own 8% of the land. But the distribution of total land owned has not been static over the past thirty years. Land has passed from household to household between and within land-holding categories resulting in a continual redistribution of households between categories.

III. Pattern of Change

Internal mobility between and within categories does not provide the full explanation of land redistribution in Dhankura village. There was a significant Hindu migration which affected not only the distribution of and but also the total quantum of land available to the village. Accurate figures on numbers of households and land owned by each category in 1947 are not available. But we have looked at the movement of land over the past 30 years from several angles and have reconstructed the ownership distribution of 1947 into three broad categories of households: upper (surplus), middle (medium and small) and lower (marginal and landless).

¹ The field work for this study was conducted in 1977. When the present tense is used in this study. It is used to refer to 1977.

Reconstruction from present households plus a calculation backwards by national growth figures leads us to think there were about 60 households in Dhankura village in 1947. Of these, the richest and strongest were 5 surplus Hindu households. The middle broad category (35 medium and small households) were fairly evenly divided with the Hindu having an edge: 10 Hindu medium, 10 Muslim medium, plus 15 small. The balance 20 households, marginal and landless were largely Muslim.

Dhankura was the residence of the Hindu zamindar of Manikganj region. There was, therefore a concentration of Hindu households in Dhankura around this residence. And the upper group of households in terms of wealth and power were almost totally Hindu. The surrounding villages acted as "client" villages to Dhankura, supplying a fair number of the sharecroppers of the land owned but not managed or worked by the Hindus. Between the extensive private ownership and zamindari freehold and tax-right ownership, the Hindus monopolised the land of the area.

At the time of Partition, about two-fifths (100 acres) of the total cultivable land owned by the village together with the residential land (40 acres) formed the recognizable village unit. The balance three-fifths (150 acres) of total cultivable land owned by residents of Dhankura was located in the block of low-lying fields common to Dhankura and several neighbouring villages. About two-third (100 acres) of Dhankura's share of the cultivable land in this outside block was owned by the Hindus. Of this about 50 acres was sharecropped by small marginal and landless Muslims in the village, while the other 50 acres was sharecropped by Muslim "clients" from adjoining villages.

With partition and subsequent waves of Hindu migration (Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 and Bangladesh Liberation war of 1971). roughly 26 Hindu households migrated from Dhankura to India, Some Hindu land, mostly that internal to the village, was sold at prices well below those current at the time of migration. Another portion of Hindu land was "handed over" for a nominal fee to Muslim "clients" to be worked until such a time as arrangement for final disposal could be made. These "clients" were able to occupy

and use this land for varying lengths of time. Eventually, notice of this unattested use of land was given to the government (usually by parties interested in owning the land themselves). The government's Tahsildar (tax collector) would then appropriate the land and auction it off. Roughly 50 acres of Hindu land has since 1947 been lost from the village to outsiders either by direct sale or through this process.

One Hindu patron "handed over" his land to Dilfar Ullah for a nominal fee. Dilfar was able to retain and work this land from 1947 to 1956. But in 1956 the Union Parishad Chairman took interest in the land. The Chairman notified the Tahsildar that Dilfar did not have full legal rights to the land. The Tahsildar immediately appropriated the land and auctioned it off to the Chairman. Dilfar did not have political strength to challenge the Chairman to regain his land.

Some Muslim "clients" migrated into Dhankura when Hindus migrated out. The migration prices on Hindu land were sufficiently low so that with the profit from sale at market rates of a parcel of land outside Dhankura they could buy a larger parcel of land inside Dhankura. Tahshin Ali, for one, is known to have migrated into Dhankura with the purchase of Hindu property. He sold .66 acres in his original village and purchased 1.16 acres in Dhankura for the same amount of money. At least 11 Muslim migrated into Dhankura from neighbouring villages in the wake of Hindu migrations with the purchase of Hindu land.

The zamindar family migrated to India in 1950, shortly before the abolition of the zamindari in 1952. The zamindar held tax rights over extensive amounts of land in the region, the tenants on this land held what were called "possession rights". With the abolition of the zamindari, tenants generally claimed "ownership rights" of land over which previously they held only "possession rights". The zamindar family also possessed freehold a 16-acre estate within Dhankura proper: including a house, 2 ponds and 8 cultivable acres. These properties were handed over to the government and are known as *khas* properties to be leased out by the Tahsildar. The Tahsil office is housed in part of the zamindar's

house. The rest of the zamindar estate is leased out through the Tahsildar under supervision by the Rent Officer in Manikganj¹.

What trends in ownership over the past thirty years have we identified in Dhankura? The original surplus (5 Hindu) household all moved out. Two Muslim households classified as medium in 1947 fit into the surplus category of 1977. Four other households have moved up since 1947 to the surplus category through purchase of land: two from the small and two from the marginal and landless. The surplus in 1947 were richer (i.e. owned more land on the average) than the surplus of 1977. More significantly, the surplus of 1947 only managed and never worked their lands, whereas all surplus of 1977 contribute some family labour to the working of their lands.

From the middle (medium and small) category, roughly 21 migrated out (Hindus) and only 4 migrated in. There was some internal movement from this category: two households moved up, and roughly 10 dropped out. For those who remained in this broad category, internal multiplication has led to a drop in the average land-holding from roughly 4.9 acres in 1947 to 2.6 acres in 1977.

From the lower (marginal and landless) category, roughly 4 migrated out whereas 15 migrated in. Two moved up to surplus, and one to small and medium. The majority remained. Internal multiplication has led to a drop in the average holding from 1.00 acre in 1947 to roughly 0.3 acre in 1977.

In short, the lower (marginal and landless) category has expanded from 33% of total households in 1947 to 53% of total households in 1977 at the expense of the middle (medium and small) category. Internal movement explains some of this downward trend: roughly 10 dropped down to marginal and landless, whereas only three moved up from marginal and landless. But migration explains the larger part of the downward trend. Migration led to a net decrease in the medium and small

¹ The leasing out of *khas* properties is discussed in the chapter on Public Resources.

category (21 out and 4 in). Yet migration led to a net increase in marginal and landless (4 out and 15 in).

The waves of Hindu migration have been discussed above. Eleven migrated in the wake of these migrations. Five others migrated in, as Dhankura is their wife's village. Another three migrated in after the Liberation War of 1971, when local and national "myth" had it that all *khas* land held by the government would be redistributed among the landless.

We have not found in Dhankura a situation where dramatic changes in income have led to dramatic changes in land-holding rendering large numbers of people suddenly landless. The expenditures of some households have gradually won out over income and savings leading to sale of land. But sources of income other than land have given other households a small economic "cushion" against the need to sell land or a small surplus to invest in land. We have found a situation of gradual diversification of income in all categories and gradual circulation of land between categories.

IV. Sale Purchase

The bulk of sale to all land-holding categories over the thirty year period has been from Hindus, both those who have migrated and those who intend to migrate. As we noted, all outsiders immigrated to Dhankura upon purchase of Hindu property and 50 acres were lost from Dhankura by sale of Hindu property to outsiders. There has been very little sale of non-Hindu land to outsiders, as the quality of land in Dhankura is low, the price is high, and kinship constraints on sale to outsiders operate¹. A notable exception to external purchase is the business patron of Zafar Ali (surplus): a fuel dealer in Mirpur who took refuge with Zafar Ali during the Liberation War and consequently bought land in Dhankura which Zafar Ali leases.

¹ These will be discussed later.

Why, if the quality of land is low, has the price remained high? Somehow the demand for and supply of land in Dhankura has balanced off at a high price. There are several factors which explain the demand for land by all categories: power can be extended through labour "patronage": status is invested in ownership: land remains the ultimate "security": and income from diversified avenues of income support purchase. However, supply of land from the lower categories is not high. Diversified avenues of income help the marginal and small weather financial storms.

Certain normative restrictions complicate the supply-demand equation. There is a marked trend of sale by poorer kin to richer kin. This trend has both legal backing (Islamic preemption laws) and social sanction (kinship norms)². One is by the preemption laws, forbidden to sell inherited land outside the kinship group so long as some kin can offer the market price. Such a legal proviso would be difficult to enforce without social sanction. The preemption laws are evoked with sale both of land internal to the village and in the outside block. Non-Hindu land, therefore, generally does not go outside the village but stays with the richer residents.

This normative element argues against the sale of land generally. Given an option, a landholder would prefer not to sell land, especially that belonging to his father or kin. Indeed, rather than sell kin's land some mortgage it out with the hope of redeeming it. However, most who mortgage out their land cannot redeem it. Foreclosure follows and sale at a price far below market price. An exception to this process is Hafizuddin (a medium farmer) who has mortgaged out 1.32 acres of his own land to buy the land of a kin in order to prevent the sale to a non-kin. Hafizuddin is fully confident of redeeming his own land, as he derives a substantial supplementary income (Tk. 4000 per annum) from the cultivation and sale of lemons.

² Kinship norms are discussed more fully in Part III

V. Exercise of Rights

Ownership is not a guarantee of maximum utilization of one's land. The exercise of rights over land correlate with the mode of acquisition: whether by inheritance, purchase, dowry, or gift. Inheritance offers the most problems. One may inherit jointly or individually. In either instance, one cannot exercise full ownership rights without mutation documents. Only a legal owner of land can sell or mortgage his land and avail institutional loans; without mutation documents, one is not the legal owner.

The capital *level* of land is adversely affected, when the owner does not have mutation documents. An owner can usually command a better price if he does not have to seek consent of other shareholders on jointly inherited land. The income level of the land is also adversely affected by lack of mutation documents. One may need, but not be able to get, institution credit for agricultural inputs. But the costs of mutation proceeding are beyond average means. The legal fee is set at Tk. 1.40 per shareholder and Tk. 1 court fee, but the actual costs range from Tk. 200-500. Usually, a land owner does not have enough reserve funds to go for mutation. Moreover only a sizeable holding makes the expenditure worthwhile. So very few actually obtain mutation documents.

VI. Quality of Land

The quality of land, to the degree it also affects the capital and income level of the land, modifies the ownership pattern. A flood in 1946 is said to have substantially altered the topography of the village. Crop lands were raised by as much as 5 feet by mud; three canals and a *beel* (lake) were obliterated. Over the years, and with a massive flood in 1946, the land has silted over to a height that annual floods cannot replenish the soil nor be trapped to allow for the cultivation of transplant *aman*, which requires standing water at sowing. Paddy yields are low, and the Manikganj region is known as a rice deficit area.

The block of crop land to the north-east of Dhankura is the most fertile, as it is comparatively low land replenished each year by flood waters which leave behind a layer of silt. Two crops of paddy, jute, and *rabi* crops can be grown on this land. If the flood waters are particularly high, transplant *aman* can also be grown (but this has not been the case in recent years). Mostly *aus/aman* and some jute are grown in this block.

The block of crop land to the south-east of Dhankura is comparatively less fertile, as only a portion of the fields go under water during the floods. Most of the crop land of the village lies in this south-eastern block. It is here that most of the jute is grown. The land in the western section of Dhankura is least fertile, as it is high land from which the rain water siphons off the fertile top soil. Mostly a single *aus* crop and some jute is grown in this block. These broad types of land have been differentiated by their relative access to flood waters. With the silting in of the canals in 1946, they have all suffered from the same lack of access to irrigated sources of water. And, only since 1978, have some portions of each block benefited from access to deep tubewells¹.

VII. Land as a Resource

What then can we say about land as a resource to Dhankura? How can we measure the value of cultivable land? One way to measure land as a resource is to calculate the net return from the land. We have calculated the net return per crop per acre: that is, gross profit (average yield x average price per maund) less cost (wages and inputs)². Let us use the net returns in our current discussion :

| | | |
|-----------------|---|----------|
| <i>aus</i> | — | Tk. 538 |
| <i>aus/aman</i> | — | Tk. 1046 |

¹ The deep tubewell schemes are discussed in the chapter on Public Resources.

² The unit figures (yield, price, wages, and inputs) are presented in Table 7 of the next chapter.

| | | |
|--------|---|----------|
| jute | — | Tk. 1076 |
| winter | — | Tk. 1417 |

A few points on crop options are in order. *Rabi* (winter) crops cannot be grown on those fields where *aman* is cultivated. Some land (the high contours of the western block) sustain only *aus*. The best cropping pattern in terms of returns then would be a combination of *aus*, *jute*, and *rabi*. The worst cropping pattern would be *aus*, *aus/aman* and *rabi*. The actual cropping is *aus*, *aus/aman*, *jute*, and *rabi*. If we take the technologies and water supply as fixed the best, worst, and actual cropping patterns for Dhankura's cultivable land offer the following net profits:

Table 2: Net Return per Crop by Best, Worst, and Actual Cropping Patterns

| Crops | Best | Worst | Actual |
|----------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Aus | Tk. 9,710.90 | Tk. 9,710.90 | Tk. 9,366.58 |
| Aus/Aman | — | 192,181.58 | 157,506.68 |
| Jute | 197,326.02 | — | 34,174.68 |
| Winter | 88,349.95 | 25,576.85 | 63,056.5 |
| Total | 295,386.87 | 227,469.33 | 264,104.44 |

Our calculation of the distribution of owner's net return between the land-holding categories and our analysis of why the return on land is not maximised comes after our discussion of cropping patterns in the next chapter.

VIII. External Land Ownership

Land is owned by four kinship groups of Dhankura at Khaliyahury in Mymensingh district. In the mid-1800's Khaliyahury fell under the Dhankura zamindari. The Zamindar established 22 tax collection offices, *Kachari*, at Khaliyahury; most of the tax

collectors were from Dhankura. The Zamindar also posted some *lathial* (guards), mostly Munshi kins from Guaria ("ferocious") *para*, who were known for their "physical fitness and bravery". These *lathial* were awarded land in their names. And the grandfather of the current Furia kin leader was authorized to purchase land in Khaliajhury by the Zamindar.

Those from Dhankura who own land in Khaliajhury are mostly descendants from the *lathial* posted to Khaliajhury or from the former Furia kinship leader. The Furia kins as a group own the most land in Khaliajhury: roughly 40% of the land owned by Dhankura residents. The remaining 60% is owned by households from Munshi, Bepari, and Behala Kinship groups.

The total acreage owned by 20 village households is 12.19 acres :

Table 3: External Land Ownership

| L-H Category | Households | Holdings | Returns | |
|--------------|------------|----------|---------|-------|
| | | | Maunds | Taka |
| Surplus | 1 | 2.33 | 18 | 1800 |
| Medium | 2 | 2.50 | 19 | 1900 |
| Small | 5 | 3.26 | 69 | 6900 |
| Marginal | 11 | 3.60 | 27 | 2700 |
| Landless | 1 | .50 | 4 | 400 |
| Total | 20 | 12.19 | 137 | 13700 |

Most households sharecrop this land out to resident kins, and go to Khaliajhury every year at harvest to collect their share of the crop. The sharecropping terms in Khaliajhury are inputs for .50 the return or .25 return. The average yield of *boro* rice, the one crop grown in Khaliajhury, is 30 maunds per acre. Those who

sharecrop out their land collect on the average 7.5 maund (25) per acre, and the price per maund of *boro* averages out at Tk. 100. Two farmers from the small category, brothers, are themselves the ownercultivators of the 2 acres they own in Khaliaghury. They migrate to Khaliaghury at sowing and at harvest; their kin caretake the land between those seasons.

But why have these households not disinvested these small holdings? There are many advantages from this income to those who receive it. The *boro* yield is fairly high and secure plus the harvest comes at a lean time. No investments are required and they sharecrop out the land to resident kins. Moreover land prices in Khaliaghury are half than those elsewhere in Bangladesh because the land sustains only the one *boro* crop. And the owners of land in Khaliaghury derive some status from their role as "absentee landlords".

IX. Summary

Before we leave land ownership to discuss other sources of income, let us recapitulate what we have said about the *pushes* and constraints on sales and purchases of lands. The *pushes* and constraints which operate in the situation are economic, political and social. The quality of land in Dhankura and Manikganj is poor relative to other regions. Return from the land is low : *aus* yield has been known to have dropped to as low as 1 maund per acre in a year of low flood water. So land is not considered the surest economic investment, although it is considered the ultimate economic "Security". Those who can purchase land as a security to the level needed to sustain their subsistence needs.

Land is considered a political investment. One can earn a political following through labour patronage off one's land. Moreover, there is a certain status invested in and ownership. Yet there are certain social constraints to land purchase operating as well. The Islamic preemption laws, support by kinship norms, curb the instinct to sell. Sales are not made if they can be avoided for

obvious economic as well as social reasons. Whenever sale of land is unavoidable, sales are made most often to richer kins.

Dhankura's agricultural economy is supplemented by incomes from other sources: trade, services, employment. These diversified sources of income support the demand side for and curb the supply side of land in Dhankura. It is the income from these other sources which enables certain people to buy land. But it is also these other incomes which enable certain other people not to sell land. Let us turn then to the avenues of income other than land ownership.

UTILISATION OF LAND

1. Systems of Cultivation

Each cultivator, no matter from which land-holding category, makes an individual choice as to how to utilise his land. He must select a system of cultivation, a cropping pattern, and labour. Each choice carries certain advantages and disadvantages. Given his particular options and circumstances, each cultivator weighs these advantages and disadvantages before making his choice. We have examined the factors weighed by individuals in the different landholding categories.

What are the different systems of cultivation between which a cultivator must choose ? The first choice he faces is how much of his cultivable land to operate himself and how much to lease, mortgage, and sharecrop out or in. The only fixed holding is his cultivable land owned. He can alter his cultivable holding into an operational holding according to the following formula :

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Cultivable land owned} \\ & + \text{land sharecropped in} \\ & - \text{land sharecropped out} \\ & + \text{land leased in} \\ & - \text{land leased out} \\ & + \text{land mortgaged in} \\ & - \text{land mortgaged out} \\ & = \text{operational holding} \end{aligned}$$

Or he can alter the operational holding into a return holding according to this formula:

cultivable land owned
+ land sharecropped in
– .50 land sharecropped out
+ land leased in
– land leased out
+ land mortgaged in
– land mortgaged out
= return holding

Each system of cultivation has its advantages and disadvantages. Individual circumstances determine the choice. The landowner who leases out his land is assured an income however low, whatever the fate of the crop. One marginal farmer chooses to lease out his land for this reason; a marginal farmer who invests the cash in cow-rearing and money-lending with the hope of purchasing more land from the income. Two Hindus lease out their land because as Hindus they are engaged in business and not land. If a landowner sharecrops out his land, he maintains little control over the production, but is not expected to contribute any inputs and is able to derive one half of the gross return. The mortgaging of land brings the most cash, although most owners, especially those of the lower categories, stand the risk of not being able to redeem and, ultimately, losing the land.

The particular choice of system has obvious implications on the return from the land. One acre of land affords a landowner the following options : lease at the rate of Tk. 450-600 per acre per year; mortgage for Tk. 2000-6000 (roughly 2/3 of the market price range) ; or sharecropping for .50 of the gross return from the land. The owner's net return per crop per acre has been shown in chapter 1. Under the actual cropping pattern, the average net return per acre per year comes to Tk. 1322. The average gross return per acre per year comes to Tk. 2010; .50 of this amount, the sharecropping return, is Tk. 1005. The landowner stands to lose some value from the land if he does not work or manage the land himself. If he mortgages out his land, he stands the risk of

losing possession of the land. If he sharecrops or leases out his land, he will lose what we have called the "management share" per acre. The management share is calculated as the difference between the economic rent and the owner's average net return per acre. The following table presents the actual calculation of the management share by system of cultivation:

Table: 1 Management Share by System of Cultivation

| System | Owner's Average Net Return | Economic Rent | Management Share |
|---------------|----------------------------|---------------|--|
| Leasing | 1322 | 450-600 | 872-1022 |
| Sharecropping | 1322 | 1005 | 317 |
| Mortgaging | 1322 | 2000-6000 | 4678-1678+ potential-ownership of land |

What systems of cultivation do Dhankura residents choose? The following table¹ shows the choice by land-holding categories :

The landless, by definition, operate and earn a return from more land than they own. The marginal do as well. The small as a category sharecrop and mortgage out the most, to the extent that they operate and earn a return from substantially less land than they own. The medium operate and earn a return from fractionally less land than they own. The surplus operate less than they own: that is, they share-crop out 2 acres more than they lease and mortgage in. But the surplus earn a return from substantially more than they own : that is, they earn a return from .50 of the land they sharecrop out plus what they lease and mortgage in.

¹ All tables not incorporated in the text follow the page in which they are referred to.

Table 2: System of Cultivation

| Land Holding Category | House-holds | Cultivable Holding | Lease | | Mortgage | | Share-cropping | | Operational Holding | Return Holding |
|-----------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------|------|----------|------|----------------|-------|---------------------|----------------|
| | | | in | out | in | out | in | Out | | |
| Surplus | 6 | 48.91 | 6.66 | - | .33 | - | - | 9 | 46.90 | 51.40 |
| Medium | 14 | 48.94 | .66 | - | - | 2.66 | .66 | - | 47.60 | 47.27 |
| Small | 48 | 86.04 | - | - | - | 3.96 | 9.28 | 13.32 | 78.04 | 80.03 |
| Marginal | 21 | 8.25 | 5.38 | 1.60 | - | 1.60 | 2.19 | 1.07 | 11.51 | 10.98 |
| Landless | 57 | - | 8.84 | - | 1.45 | - | 3.65 | - | 13.94 | 12.10 |
| Total | 146 | 192.25 | 21.54 | 1.60 | 1.38 | 8.22 | 15.74 | 23.39 | 198.00 | 201.78 |

* This return holding total (201.78 acres) was arrived at from land-history data. Another return holding total (199.81 acres) was deduced from income and cropping data. The later total (199.81 acres) is used throughout our discussions on land utilisation.

The second major choice the cultivator faces is how much of his own and his family labour to contribute and how much labour to hire in the cultivation of his operational holding. A cultivator must first decide whether he is an owner-manager or an owner-worker of his land. Then he must choose how much family, reciprocal, daily or permanent labour is required to cultivate his land. An owner-manager manages other workers but does not work directly on his land. An owner-worker works his own land. Only the three new surplus are owner-managers of their land. All others who cultivate land are owner-workers. All farmers, including the owner-manager, engage some family members in cultivation. In the lowest categories (below 1 acre) only family labour is utilized, supplemented as necessary by reciprocal labour. The marginal and small farmers with more than 1 acre supplement family labour with daily labour as needed. The upper categories supplement family labour with daily and some permanent labour. Some medium hire minor boys as permanent labour. Some surplus hire adult permanent labour.

But how many mandays, paid and unpaid, are actually required by Dhankura given its total cultivable land and current cropping pattern? We have calculated the average number of mandays required per crop per acre for the tilling, sowing, weeding, and harvesting stages of cultivation. The days required for processing jute (i.e. steeping and stripping) and *rabi* crops (i. e. drying and curing) were added for these crops because they are not sold unprocessed. The days required for paddy processing are discussed in chapter 3 on Disposal of Crops because paddy can be sold either processed or unprocessed. The total mandays required by crop are shown in table 3.

And the distribution of return holding and required mandays per crop by land-holding categories is shown in the following table 4.

The surplus cultivators generate 3954 mandays of labour: the medium 3458; the small 5892; the marginal 818; and the landless

1030. As we discussed briefly above, each category has the choice of what percentage of these mandays required they

Table 3: Mandays Per Crop

| Crop | Acreage* | M/D Per Acre | Total Mandays |
|----------|----------|--------------|---------------|
| Aus | 17.41 | 51 | 888 |
| Aus/Aman | 150.58 | 72 | 10,842 |
| Jute | 31.82 | 74 | 2,354 |
| Winter | 44.50 | 24 | 1,068 |
| Total | — | — | 15,152 |

* Acreage based on return holding: 199.81

provide by themselves and their family labour pool as unpaid labour and what percentage they hire labour to provide. In the lowest category (below 1 acre) only family labour is provided. When needed, reciprocal, unpaid labour is arranged. In the next category, (marginal and small holding more than 1 acre) when required to supplement the family pool, labour is hired on a daily basis. In the top categories (medium and surplus), family labour is supplemented by daily labour and some amount of permanent labour. A few medium hire minor boys as permanent labour, and some surplus hire adult permanent labour. The normal movement is from family to reciprocal to hired to permanent labour. This movement is heavily weighted for unpaid family labour with lower categories, and a fair balance between paid and unpaid in the top categories. The following table 5 presents the distribution of paid and unpaid mandays by land-holding category.

We have seen so far that a fixed amount of arable land, cultivated under different systems gives differential returns to the landowners and generates differential mandays of labour. We must investigate a bit further the implications for man-days by the different systems. What are the implications for mandays of giving more land to sharecropping? Certainly if land is sharecropped out of the village, there is a loss to the total number of mandays

Table 4: Acreage (Return Holding) and Mandays Per Crop

| Crops | Rich | | Medium | | Small | | Marginal | | Landless | | Total | |
|---------------|-------|------|--------|------|-------|------|----------|-----|----------|------|--------|-------|
| | Acres | M/D | Acres | M/D | Acres | M/D | Acres | M/D | Acres | M/D | Acres | M/D |
| Aus | 5.41 | 275 | 2.02 | 103 | 7.56 | 386 | 0.79 | 40 | 1.63 | 83 | 17.41 | 888 |
| Aus/Aman | 40.07 | 2885 | 30.06 | 2164 | 60.12 | 4329 | 9.01 | 649 | 11.32 | 815 | 150.58 | 10842 |
| Jute | 7.33 | 524 | 12.18 | 901 | 10.72 | 793 | 0.92 | 68 | 0.67 | 50 | 31.82 | 2354 |
| Total Acreage | 52.81 | - | 44.26 | - | 78.40 | - | 10.72 | - | 13.62 | - | 199.11 | - |
| Winter | 10.76 | 251 | 12.08 | 290 | 16.00 | 384 | 2.54 | 61 | 3.42 | 82 | 44.50 | 1068 |
| Total Mandays | - | 3954 | - | 3548 | - | 5892 | - | 818 | - | 1030 | - | 15152 |

Table 5: Paid and Unpaid Mandays

| L-H Category | Mandays | | |
|--------------|---------|--------|-------|
| | PAID | Unpaid | Total |
| Surplus | 2044 | 1910 | 3954 |
| Medium | 1971 | 1487 | 3458 |
| Small | 1404 | 4488 | 5892 |
| Marginal | 166 | 652 | 818 |
| Landless | 221 | 809 | 1030 |
| Total | 5806 | 9346 | 15152 |

required by the village. If land is sharecropped by the upper categories to the lower, there is a loss in paid mandays and perhaps in total mandays.

Similarly, if surplus farmers were to lease or mortgage out their land to smaller farmers the paid mandays will reduce. In Dhankura, only a few marginal farmers lease out some land (1.60 acres) to small farmers resulting in no significant effect on paid or total mandays. Far more land is leased into the village from absentee landlords and government (21.54 acres) resulting in a net increase in total mandays. However, more land is mortgaged out than in : from the three middle categories to outsiders (2.32 acres), surplus (.33) and a small farmer (.60). —N.B. sample figures. Two farmers mortgage out their land (for the immediate cash return) only to turn around and sharecrop this same land back in. One to an absentee landlord, the other to his wife who intends to buy the land for her own sons to deprive his son by first marriage.

If the surplus category were all owner-managers, and not owner-workers, presumably there would be an extra quantum of paid mandays. But even the three who are owner-managers

contribute family labour to the labour pool. Two of the other three are themselves owner-workers, and one sharecrops out his land resulting in a loss of paid mandays. Indeed the surplus category is the only category which earns a return from substantially more land than they operate, which means that the paid labour which might have been demanded by the 5,91 acres not operated by them is lost to unpaid or reciprocal labour. Although the top categories hire more than the lower, they supply nearly as many unpaid mandays as they demand paid mandays.

What then is the net effect on mandays of the different systems of cultivation chosen in Dhankura? Return holdings are more extensive by a fraction than operational holdings. The balance in favour of return holdings is tipped by the upper categories. Since the upper categories earn a return from a larger holding than they operate, there is presumably a net loss of total and paid mandays to the village. That is, since the upper categories hire more labour than other categories if they were to operate more there would be a net gain in paid mandays.

How can we explain why the quantum of total, paid and unpaid mandays are at the level we find in Dhankura? We have shown that with the leasing and sharecropping out of one's land, the owner stands to lose the management share for that land. This share was calculated at Tk. 872-1022 for leasing out and Tk. 317 for sharecropping. There is a distinct advantage in terms of return to cultivating one's own land. Indeed only one category chose to earn a return from substantially more than they operate. There is of course an additional savings to the family if one works the land oneself: only a few in Dhankura choose to remain owner-managers.

Why then do some surplus manage but not work their land? It should be remembered at this point that unlike surplus owner-managers in 1947 (all Hindus) surplus owner-managers in 1977 contribute some family labour to the working of the farm. But why do some choose not to work themselves alongside other members of the family? All three owner-managers cannot combine cultivation with the demands, in terms of time, of their

other occupations or businesses. In part, that is, reasons of occupation operate to keep them away from the fields. Some notions of status operate for people at this level of income; that is people in such and such occupations earning a top level of income should refrain if possible from working the land.

Why then, if status sanctions against working the land operate in the upper categories is sharecropping of the land so limited? These sanctions are no longer strong in Dhankura; all households contribute some family labour. Only three households have preserved the labour of the household head. With sharecropping, the owner has no control over production so yields often drop, moreover he loses the management share; Tk. 317 per acre per year. Certainly sharecropping has dropped markedly since Partition. The explanation for this decrease lies both in these economic arguments against share-cropping, and in the simple historical fact that the larger landowners in 1947 were Hindus who traditionally associate more with business than with land. Interestingly, the largest single extent of land given out to sharecroppers in 1977 belongs to a surplus Hindu.

There is, however, more sharecropping out than leasing out by Dhankura residents. As shown above the loss to the owner is far greater if he leases out his land (Tk. 872-1022) than if he sharecrops it out (Tk. 317). The only advantage in leasing is that one is guaranteed an income no matter what the fate of the crop and one need not worry about the production of the land. There is a substantial amount of land leased in from absentee landlords who chose to lease their land for this reason. But village residents prefer other systems which bring more economic rent as they can manage the problems of supervision and monitoring.

We have seen then that the same quantum of cultivable land worked under different systems of cultivation will give differential total mandays of labour to the village. In addition, the same quantum of mandays supplied either by family, reciprocal, daily, or permanent labour will give differential paid and unpaid mandays. The trend is to supply mandays by family labour and sometimes, reciprocal labour at the lowest category. As we go higher up the

categories, daily and some permanent labour is found. Even at the higher level we find a certain amount of family labour supplement by hired and permanent.

Why do some hire daily and others permanent labour? Some people seem willing to pay for labourers on a permanent basis as they get some household work done by the permanent labourers and they are guaranteed secure labour supply at peak times. We calculated that the cash cost to the medium farmers of hiring minor boys as permanent labourers is more or less equal to the cost of daily labour hired for cultivation. For an additional cost in kind (food, clothing, and housing) these farmers receive year-round labour. However, the economic arguments for permanent labourers are not the full explanation of why those who do hire permanent labour in Dhankura.

All who hire permanent labour in Dhankura are involved in factional politics. They weigh the additional cost of permanent-labour patronage. This point will be further developed in our discussion of the patron-client relationship below and factions in Part III.

Selection of Labour

The situation of land ownership in the village is one in which 14% of the households own 48% of the land. At the other end are the landless (39%) and the virtually landless (14%). Some landless, as we have seen, operate and earn a return from land. And the marginal operate and earn more return from the land that they own. But for these lower categories employment from the land becomes as critical a resource as return from the land. Certainly some seek supplementary or alternative sources of income to agricultural return. But other avenues are not easy to enter or to maximise. Non-agricultural employment, service, and trade options in Dhankura will be discussed later. But the critical issue for the vast majority in Dhankura is how much employment those who own substantial land provide for those who own little or no land? And to whom do they actually provide this employment?

We have investigated above the quantum of paid labour generated by the systems of cultivation chosen by Dhankura cultivators. We must now see whom they select to employ under what circumstances.

As we have said before, the normal movement in providing labour is from all family labour supplemented by reciprocal to family labour supplemented by daily labour to family labour supplemented by daily and permanent labour. The demand side for paid labour is affected by the choice in system of cultivation. And the supply side of paid labour is affected by the actual selection of labour.

To whom then are the paid mandays generated in Dhankura provided? Some paid labour is hired on a daily basis during peak agricultural activities: tilling and sowing, weeding, and harvesting. The non-political cultivator follows certain criteria in the selection of seasonal labour, the political cultivator certain other criteria. The non-political cultivator normally hires kin. If his kin pool of labour is sufficient, he might consider skill. If the kin pool of labour is insufficient, he might hire neighbours. The political cultivator favours "political" supporters. Whenever possible, he will hire kin who give him factional support. Next he will turn to factional supporters from other kinship groups. Only when such "factional" labour is not available will he turn to less actively-loyal kin or neighbours.

In Dhankura, all employers of permanent labourers, *rakhal*, have a political orientation. Indeed all the employers of permanent labour belong to one major faction: that faction which is currently in less favour than the other faction of Dhankura with the current Union Parishad Chairman. These employers appear to seek political loyalty through permanent labour patronage. Employment from land is a very significant resource it would seem not only to those who receive the employment, but also to those who dispense it. The following table indicates who dispenses and who receives permanent agricultural employment in Dhankura:

Table 6: Permanent Labour

| L-H Category | No. of Labourers | Labour by Land-Holding Category | | | | Labour by Kin or Faction | | |
|--------------|------------------|---------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|--------------------------|---------|----------|
| | | Small | Marginal | Landless | Outsider | Kin | Faction | Outsider |
| Surplus | 5 | 2 | – | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| Medium | 2 | – | 2 | – | – | – | 2 | – |
| Marginal | 1 | – | – | – | 1 | 1 | – | – |

Certainly if employment from the land is so central a resource to both the political patron and his client, the nature of this patron-client relationship must be understood. A political patron in the employment-from-land context is one who dispenses more than employment and receives more than labour. Benefits given to a client by a political patron include remuneration of labour (sometimes in advance payments), assistance (e. g. an Eid Fitra donation or an invitation to a festival), social security or links to public resources. The client, in return, will give his patron labour, quasi-political support, and certain services gratis (daily labour of his wife, produce from his land). All employers of permanent labourers are patrons in these terms. Some others, also involved in factional politics, establish a strong-patron client relationship with daily labour. And one small farmer, a factional leader (Shafiqur Rahman), although he sharecrops out his land, employs female labour for processing and certain household tasks from his kins to whom he offers some share in public resources in return for their factional support.

In these political patron-client relationships, labour becomes a larger resource than the wages received, and land becomes a larger resource than the return earned. The distribution of employment from land carries a large significance for both the receiver and the dispenser of the employment. Some explanation for the selection process of labour must be reached.

Why, for example, is skill more or less overlooked by kinship considerations? The degrees of skill in agricultural activities do not differ markedly. A ready supply rather than the skill of labours is more important, especially at harvest when more land-holding categories are forced to hire labour as a timely harvest of crops is critical. Because of the clustering of residence along kinship lines in Dhankura, kins provide the most readily available labour supply.

But why, if we accept that politically-oriented cultivators seek factional support through labour patronage, does kinship feature as strongly, or more so, than faction as a criteria in the selection of labour? It is not enough simply to say that kinship is the basis of faction in Dhankura; that is, that at the core of each faction is a major kinship group. These statements must be explored at some length. Nor is it enough simply to say kinship ideology is strong in Dhankura. We must explain why, as this is not always the case in Bangladesh villages.

Let us recapitulate in brief what we have said about the kinship groups and factions of Dhankura in our Introduction. The two factions within the village are led by the leaders of two major kinship groups : Shafiqur Rahman, Master of Behala kinship group, and Kashem Ali of Furia. Both are school teachers, hence the title "master". Each commands the full support (with occasional, minor challenges) of his own kin group in his factional politicking. Muda's kin group is divided as the two co-leaders support rival faction leaders. Most of the Mal kin group, led by a deputy faction leader of Kashem Ali, back Kashem Ali Master. But there are challenges to the deputy leader, and hence Kashem, from within Mal. And the Paramanik group also back Kashem Ali Master politically as their kin leader is married, rather conveniently to Kashem Ali's sister. Paramanik kin are grateful to seek patronage from Kashem Ali because they are as a whole, a weak kin group. Two other kin groups, Bepari and Munshi, remain neutral as a group in the factional politics. Individual members may seek patronage for factional support. Khaleque Mia from Munshi kins, for one, supports Kashem Ali in return for employment.

But why have kinship loyalties remained so strong in Dhankura? Perhaps this question is best explored the other way round. When is it that kinship ties break down? And why haven't they so broken down in Dhankura? Kinship ties do not break down simply when kinship ideology breaks down or kin norms no longer operate. Rather kinship ties begin to break down when other ties, essentially economic ties, become strong. Then as kinship ties break down the norms may begin to wear thin. As diversified avenues of income become increasingly significant to a community, traditional avenues may become less significant. If a landless labourer goes in successfully for small trade, he will be less dependent on a kin patron for labour opportunities. If the sons of a marginal farmer have all received external employment, the marginal farmer may no longer require the patronage of his richer kin. If a small farmer goes into business, he will rely more heavily on the business patron who gives him goods on credit than on his kin who gave him small amounts of credit and some seasonal employment. Simply put, when through diversified avenues of income external links become important to a community, kinship ties can begin to break down. So far in Dhankura not enough resources flow through other avenues to challenge those resources that flow through kinship channels. Employment from the land, for example, as we said above is still a major resource to Dhankura.¹

And however valuable land is as a resource to the residents of Dhankura, it does not appear significantly valuable to outsiders so there is little purchase by outsiders. Indeed, as we explained above, given the Islamic laws and kin norm backing, kinship regulate most land transactions. Moreover, the quality of Dhankura land is low and the price high. So kin, not outsiders, are buying up land that is sold. And however much Hindu land was sold off, most of it come from the external land owned by Dhankura (i. e., from the block of fields common to Dhankura and neighbouring villages) and was sold to outsiders. All of which has allowed for a situation in Dhankura where the kinship clustering prevails in the residential pattern.

¹ This will be developed more fully in Part III.

Kinship units then, by virtue of their residential and economic solidarity, become the basic political units in Dhankura. Factions develop around the core of a major kinship group. Smaller, weaker kinship groups align with the larger kinship groups in an effort to derive some economic gain. The resources which flow through the faction further strengthen this alliance.

But why then does faction sometimes win out over kinship considerations in the selection of labour ? Political patrons cannot afford to neglect other groups. If a factional leader spots a possible contender to his rival's kinship leadership, he will try to get that contender's loyalty on his side through employment and other forms of patronage.

III. Selection of Crops and Technology

In the chapter on Ownership we discussed land as a resource, and how this resource can be measured in terms of the net return from the land. And we have examined above how the distribution of these returns depends upon the systems of cultivation and labour chosen by the different land-holding categories. But let us return to the more central issue, what it is that is being distributed : the net return per acre. We have seen that if one takes the quantity, quality and access to water of Dhankura land as fixed, different cropping patterns yield differential returns to the owners.

Let us turn now to the actual measurement of the owner's average net return per crop per acre. The following figures' were based on the average yields, prices, and costs experienced by farmers in Dhankura in 1977. The average yield for *aus* when grown alone is 12 maunds per acre, when broadcast together with *aman* 9 maunds. Broadcast *aman* in, a field with *aus* yields 11 maunds. We have taken Tk. 85 as a standard average price for paddy. We have calculated the average number of mandays per crop per acre for the tilling, sowing, weeding, and harvesting stages of cultivation. *Aus* requires 51 mandays per acre, *aus/aman* 72. The days required for processing jute (i.e., steeping and stripping) and *rabi* crops (i.e. drying and curing) were added

for these crops as they are not sold unprocessed: jute then requires 74 mandays per acre, and *rabi* crops, on the average, 24 mandays. We have taken Tk. 7 as the average rate for daily labour. Here is the breakdown from gross to net returns per crop per acre:

Table 7: Owner's net return per crop per acre

| Crop | Gross Return* Per Acre | Cost Per Acre | | Owner's net return per acre |
|--------------|---------------------------|---------------|---------|-----------------------------|
| | | Wages** | Inputs | |
| Aus | Tk. 1020 | Tk. 357 | Tk. 125 | Tk. 538 |
| Aus/Aman | Tk. 1700 | Tk. 504 | Tk. 150 | Tk. 1046 |
| Jute | Tk. 1692 | Tk. 518 | Tk. 100 | Tk. 1074 |
| Winter crops | Tk. 1665 | Tk. 168 | Tk. 80 | Tk. 1417 |

Winter crops require the lowest inputs yet yield nearly as high a return as jute. Both jute and *rabi* crops are more lucrative per acre than even the double yield of broadcast *aus* and *aman*. We will examine why all cultivators do not grow more jute. But first we should mention the constraints on cropping choice in Dhankura: quality, height, and access to water. On the higher contours only *aus*, and perhaps a little jute, plus some mustard in the *rabi* season can be cultivated. No transplant *aman* has been grown in years because the flood waters have been too low. Moreover any land given to broadcast *aman* will not grow winter crops, as the harvesting time for *aman* is too late to allow for the proper sowing of *rabi* crops.

Given these constraints, the best cropping pattern in terms of returns would be a combination of *aus*, jute, and *rabi*. The worst cropping pattern would be *aus*, *aus/aman*, and *rabi*. The actual cropping *aus*, *aus/aman*, jute and *rabi* :

* The gross return is yield in maunds \times Tk. 85.

** The wages are calculated at an average rate of Tk. 7 per manday.

Table 8 : Net return per crop by best worst and actual cropping patterns

| Crops | Best | Worst | Actual |
|----------|------------|------------|------------|
| Aus | 9,710.90 | 9,710.90 | 9,366.58 |
| Aus/aman | – | 192,181.58 | 157,506.68 |
| Jute | 197,326.02 | – | 34,174.68 |
| Winter | 88,349.95 | 25,576.85 | 63,056.50 |
| Total | 295,386.87 | 227,469.33 | 264,104.44 |

Since we have agreed to measure land as a resource in terms of the owner's net return, let us see exactly how many acres are given to and what net return is received per crop in Dhankura:

Table 9: Cropping Pattern

| Crop | Acreage* | Net Return |
|----------|----------|------------|
| Aus | 17.41 | 9,366.58 |
| Aus/Aman | 150.58 | 157,506.68 |
| Jute | 31.82 | 34,174.68 |
| Winter | 44.50 | 63,056.50 |
| Total | – | 264,104.44 |

* Acreage based on return holding: 199.81

All cultivators in Dhankura grow broadcast *aus/aman*, plus *rabi* crops (i.e. the worst cropping pattern). Those owning or operating more than 1.5 acres cultivate jute (better cropping pattern). None forsake cultivation of paddy for the maximum return of growing more jute. The following table 10 shows how many acres are given to and what net return is earned from each crop by the land-holding categories.

The rich represent 4% of the population. They own 25% of cultivable land and earn returns from 26% of the return holdings.

Their returns come to 26% of total returns. The medium farmers represent 10% of the population. They own 25% of the cultivable land but earn returns from only 22% of the return holdings. Their net returns total 24% of the total returns. The medium earn higher returns from jute and *rabi* crops than the surplus. Because the medium operate more than they earn a return from, a larger percentage can go by choice to jute and *rabi* crops. But the surplus operate less than they own a return from, and the balance acres (5.9) probably go to the subsistence cultivation of paddy by those to whom they sharecrop this land.

Table 10: Cropping Distribution

| L-H Category | Aus/Aman | | Aus | | Jute | | Winter | | Total Returns |
|--------------|----------|-----------------|---------|-----------------|---------|-----------------|---------|-----------------|---------------|
| | Acreage | Return @Tk.1046 | Acreage | Return @Tk.1046 | Acreage | Return @Tk.1046 | Acreage | Return @Tk.1046 | |
| Surplus | 40.07 | 41,913.22 | 5.41 | 2,910.58 | 7.33 | 7,872.42 | 10.46 | 14,821.82 | 67,518.0 |
| Medium | 30.06 | 31,442.76 | 2.02 | 1,086.76 | 12.18 | 13,081.32 | 12.08 | 17,117.36 | 62,728.2 |
| Small | 60.12 | 62,885.52 | 7.56 | 4,067.28 | 10.72 | 11,513.28 | 16.00 | 22,672.0 | 101,138.1 |
| Marginal | 9.01 | 9,424.46 | 0.79 | 425.02 | 0.92 | 988.08 | 2.54 | 3,599.18 | 14,436.7 |
| Landless | 11.32 | 11,840.72 | 1.63 | 876.94 | 0.67 | 719.58 | 3.42 | 4,846.14 | 18,283.4 |
| Total | 150.58 | 157,506.68 | 17.41 | 9,366.58 | 31.82 | 34,174.68 | 44.50 | 63,056.5 | 264,104.4 |

What factors go into a decision on which crops to cultivate? Jute is grown, as we have seen, by only those holding more than 1.5 acres- The cost of inputs are nearly offset by the yield. But storage capacity is required, and the prices fluctuate with the international market rates. But more basic economics operate in the choice not to cultivate jute by those owning or operating less than 1.5 acres.

The average family of 6 in Bangladesh require roughly 20 maunds of paddy to subsist half the year. One and .5 acres of land given to broadcast *aus/aman* barely guarantee paddy subsistence. When grown together, *aus* yields are 9 maunds per acre and *aman* 11. 1.5 acres of land will yield 13.5 maunds of *aus*, in August when the *aus* is harvested, which should last the family until late November. The same 1.5 acres will again yield 16.5 maunds of *aman* in early December, which may last the family into April. To the lower category farmer land as a resource is measured very much in terms of whether one's holding guarantees paddy subsistence for the family. That lower category farmer can-not afford to take the risk or uncertainty of cultivating jute until his paddy needs are met.

Until recently, farmers in Dhankura fell into two broad groups in their use of technology. The division was more in terms of possession of technology than expenditure on technology. The technologies one might possess include: cowdung, bullocks or cows, plough, and paddy surplus for storage as seed for the next sowing. The two broad groups were those who possessed limited traditional technologies, and those who possessed comprehensive traditional technology. Table 11 shows this breakdown.

Small, medium, and surplus farmers own their own cows or bullock plus ploughs. Only 46% marginal and landless do, the others must share their animals and equipment at the time of tilling. Only the medium and surplus use all their cowdung and ashes as fertilizer. Others use cowdung increasingly as fuel. They buy urea (10 seers per acre) for fertilizer, as urea is cheaper than fuel. Upper categories utilize more cowdung for fertilizer, as they

posses more and use less for fuel. Lower categories are able to use less cowdung. as they possess fewer cows and use more cowdung for fuel. All cultivators use some fertilizer for all crops, jute, paddy, and some *rabi* (mustard seed and wheat). Only the surplus, medium, and those who earn a return from more than 3.5 acres are able to stock paddy as seen.

Table 11: Traditional Technology

| L-H Category | Bullock Plough | | Non-chemical Fertilizer | | Seeds | |
|--------------|----------------|---------|-------------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| | % Own | % Share | % Own | % Buy | % Own | % Buy |
| Surplus | 100 | – | 100 | – | 100 | – |
| Medium | 100 | – | 100 | – | 100 | – |
| Small | 96 | – | 35 | – | 17 | 83 |
| Marginal | 46 | 23 | 8 | – | 31 | 69 |
| Landless | 9 | 14 | 9 | – | 5 | 95 |

By 1978, this picture has changed significantly with the inauguration of several deep tube-well and power pump schemes in the Dhankura area, (see discussion of these schemes in the chapter on Public Resources)- A third division of technology use has entered by 1978 ; some from the traditional and comprehensive block are expanding the most on deep tubewell, power pumps, and chemical fertilizer.

VI. Summary

Let us recapitulate in summary form what we have said about land utilisation in Dhankura. The surplus operate less than they own, but earn a return from substantially more than they own. The medium operate and earn a return from fractionally less land than they own. The small sharecrop and mortgage out the most to the extent that they operate and earn a return from substantially less

land than they own. The lower two categories operate and earn a return from more than they own.

The top two categories hire daily and permanent labour to the degree they contribute family labour. But as we go down the land-holding categories, the rate of family labour increases; the small provide nearly three times as much family labour as they hire in daily labour; the marginal and landless four times.

The medium grow more jute and follow a better crop-ping pattern than the rich, presumably because they themselves operate more of their own land. The small, probably because of and in spite of the fact that they have no significant returns from other avenues of income to invest and because they sharecrop and mortgage out substantially, follow the worst cropping pattern. The landless and marginal aim for subsistence in paddy, and, although they cannot afford the inputs or uncertainty of jute cultivation, try to maximise on winter crops.

The surplus and medium are self-sufficient and comprehensive in their use of traditional technologies. The small own their own bullocks or cows but are forced to buy seed and use cowdung more for fuel than fertilizer. The marginal and landless are forced to buy seeds, and share bullocks and cows, and use cowdung more for fuel than fertilizer.

DISPOSITION OF CROPS

1. Processing

In Chapter 1 and 2, we have tried to measure land as a resource in several ways. We have looked at land as a resource in terms of employment: that is, the number of mandays paid or unpaid, generated by the land. Variables in this calculation included the farmer's choice of system of cultivation, cropping pattern and labour. We have also looked at land as a resource in terms of return; that is, the owner's net return per crop per acre. Variables in the return calculation include the farmer's choice in system of cultivation, labour, cropping and technology.

An additional set of values can be added to the owner's net return per crop. The farmer has the option whether to sell paddy processed or unprocessed, whether to sell all crops at harvest or after storage for a higher price, and whether to sell produce at specialized *hats*, local bazars, or within the village. We will, in this chapter, try to quantify the value added with processing and storage, establish the pattern of who is able to maximise this value added, and understand the *pushes* and constraints which operate upon the individual farmer's options in processing, storage, and marketing.

The value added by processing jute and winter crops has been calculated into the owner's net return per acre for these crops as the farmer has no option to sell them without processing. But he does have the option to sell his *aus* and *aman* crops as paddy and/or rice. We must calculate the value added of

processing paddy into rice in order to understand the options chosen by the different land-holding categories:

price per maund of paddy (after threshing) : Tk. 85 (harvest price)

output of rice per maund of paddy: 27 seers

price per seer of paddy : Tk, 4.00

output of bran, polish, and husk: roughly 10 seers

price for bran, polish, and husk: Tk. 2.50 (consumed)

| | |
|--|---------------|
| price of total output: 27 seers rice xTk. 4.00 | =108.00 |
| bran, polish, husk | = <u>2.50</u> |
| | 110.50 |

average gross profit per maund of paddy processed:

Tk- 25.50 (i.e. Tk. 110.50-85.00).

In all the categories there is a marked preference for sale as rice. In the upper categories (i.e. above 3.5 acres), 80% of sale is as rice. In the lower categories, 95% of sale is as rice. Not only do the lower categories process more into rice, they do so at harvest and they contribute more unpaid family labour to processing than do the upper categories. The lower categories, that is, maximise the gross value added of processing paddy into rice. The following tables present the figures which lead to the calculation of the gross and net value added by processing *aus* (table 1) and *aus/aman* (table 2) by the different land-holding categories.

If we compare net return to processing value-added for the *aus* and *aman* crops grown, we see as in table 3 that the upper categories add another 31% value by processing their *aus* and *aman* yields whereas the lower categories add another 45% value.

Given the overall clear preference for sale as rice, under what circumstances is some *aus* and *aman* sold as paddy? Small amounts of paddy go into barter transactions with travelling salesmen who sell utensils and other household items. But poorest quality paddy, known as *cheeta* (damaged or dead grain) is used in barter. Sometimes for ready cash a quick sale of paddy is made. And those in the top

Table 1: Aus Processing

| Category | Acreage | Yield* in Maunds | Maunds Processed into rice | Woman days per Maund | Paid | Unpaid | Wages of paid Labour | Gross Value added per Maund | Total Gross Value Added | Net Value Added |
|----------|---------|------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|------|--------|----------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|
| Surplus | 5.41 | 65 | 52 | 1.5 | 53 | 25 | 265 | 25.50 | 1,326.00 | 1,061.00 |
| Medium | 2.02 | 24 | 19 | 1.5 | 17 | 12 | 85 | 25.50 | 484.50 | 399.50 |
| Small | 7.56 | 91 | 86 | 1.5 | 21 | 108 | 105 | 25.50 | 2,193.00 | 2,088.00 |
| Marginal | 0.79 | 10 | 9 | 1.5 | - | 14 | - | 25.50 | 229.50 | 229.50 |
| Landless | 1.63 | 20 | 19 | 1.5 | 6 | 23 | 30 | 25.50 | 510.00 | 480.00 |
| Total | 17.41 | 210 | 185 | - | 97 | 182 | 485 | - | 4,743.00 | 4,258.00 |

* Aus yield averaged at 12 maunds per acre.

Table 2: Aus/Aman Processing

| Category | Acreage | Yield* in Maunds | Maunds Processed into rice | Woman days per Maund | Paid | Unpaid | Wages** of paid Labour | Gross Value added per Maund | Total Gross Value Added | Net Value Added |
|----------|---------|------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|------|--------|------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|
| Surplus | 40.07 | 801 | 641 | 1.5 | 707 | 255 | 3,535 | 25,50 | 16,345.00 | 12,810.50 |
| Medium | 30.06 | 602 | 481 | 1.5 | 452 | 271 | 2,260 | 25,50 | 12,291.50 | 10,031.00 |
| Small | 60.12 | 1202 | 1142 | 1.5 | 455 | 1348 | 2,275 | 25,50 | 29,121.00 | 26,846.00 |
| Marginal | 9.01 | 180 | 171 | 1.5 | – | 270 | – | 25,50 | 4,361.00 | 4,361.00 |
| Landless | 11.32 | 226 | 215 | 1.5 | 40 | 282 | 200 | 25,50 | 5,483.00 | 5,283.00 |
| Total | 150.58 | 3011 | 2651 | – | 1654 | 2426 | 8,270 | – | 67,601.50 | 59,331.50 |

* Aus/Aman: Yields averaged at 20 maunds per acre.

** Wages for processing averaged to Tk. 5 per woman day.

Table 3: Net Return and Processing Value-Added

| L-H Category | Net Return | Processing Value-Added | Percentage Added |
|--------------|------------|------------------------|------------------|
| Surplus | 44,824 | 13,872 | 31% |
| Medium | 32,530 | 10,431 | 32% |
| Small | 66,953 | 28,934 | 43% |
| Marginal | 9,850 | 4,591 | 47% |
| Landless | 12,718 | 5,763 | 45% |
| Total | 166,875 | 63,591 | – |

categoriges are known to sell some paddy to paddy-husking businessmen of the village. The price for paddy is tallied with the weakly index of the specialised market of the area and some paddy is sold to deficit households for seed. Seed-paddy is better quality and receives better care in storage, etc. and hence commands a better price than other paddy. So those who sell paddy within the village do not get a low rate for paddy.

II. Storage

In addition to a value-added for processing, there is value-added beyond net return for storing produce for sale at non-harvest prices (whether processed or unprocessed). Some farmers exercise an option whether to sell after storage for a higher price rather than for the lower price at harvest. We will examine here who is able to maximise this value added and the *pushes* and constraints which operate upon the individual farmer's options.

We have calculated the value-added for storage as the average price difference between harvest sale price and the higher sale prices after storage. We have arrived at the following value-added rates for storage of crops grown in Dhankura: Tk. 15 per maund for *aus* and *aman*, Tk. 25 for *rabi* crops, and Tk. 20 for jute. What then is the total worth of storage as a resource to Dhankura? If one takes the number of maunds stored and the value added per crop for storage the total worth of storage is Tk. 14,805.

| | | | | |
|----------|----------|-----|--------|----------------|
| Aus/Aman | Tk. 15 x | 283 | maunds | = 4,245 |
| Jute | Tk. 20 x | 328 | maunds | = 6,560 |
| Winter | Tk. 25 x | 160 | maunds | = <u>4,000</u> |
| | | | | 14,805 |

To calculate *the* number of *aus* and *aman* that are stored we have taken 95% of the total yield less the *maunds* processed into rice. Roughly 5% of the yield not processed into rice is sold within the village at the harvest price (Tk. 85) for paddy. The post-harvest price for paddy averages out at Tk. 100: a value-added of Tk. 15.

| | Maunds not Processed | Maunds Stored | Value- Added |
|---------|-------------------------|------------------|-----------------|
| Surplus | 173 | 164 | 2,460 |
| Medium | 125 | 119 | 1,785 |
| Total | 298 | 283 | 4,245 |

The following table presents the distribution of value added storage between the land-holding categories (table 4).

All farmers who own more than 3.5 acres can afford not to sell immediately after harvest and to stock jute and paddy. Some farmers, who own between 2-3.5 acres because they have additional sources of income and small family size, are not forced to sell their paddy or jute to meet the immediate expenses of production. Two exceptions from the lower categories are able to store jute: one because he earns a

Table: 4 Storage Value-Added

| L-H Category | Aus/Aman | Jute | Winter | Total |
|--------------|----------|-------|--------|--------|
| Surplus | 2,460 | 2,840 | 2,525 | 7,825 |
| Medium | 1,785 | 2,360 | 1,475 | 5,620 |
| Small | – | 1,040 | – | 1,040 |
| Marginal | – | 220 | – | 220 |
| Landless | – | 100 | – | 100 |
| Total | 4,245 | 6,560 | 4,000 | 14,805 |

substantial employment income ; the other because he operates a large holding (4 acres) and his family size is small. Only farmers who operate at least 3.5 acres can stock seed for the next seasons' sowing.

The surplus and some medium store paddy in woven bamboo-lined mud containers called *marai*. The medium and small store paddy and/or rice in either large earthen vessels, *matki*; or bamboo cylinders, *dula*. And the marginal and landless store rice in mud-lined cane baskets *katha*, or simply jute bags. Jute is stored either across the beams of the house, or across hanging bamboo racks called *aai*.

Obviously those who can, opt not to sell at harvest but to store and sell for higher prices. Ironically, it is the deficit households from the lower categories who should consume all their paddy who are forced to sell at harvest. They must pay off the money-lenders, *mahajon*, who finance their paddy seed and other expenses of cultivation and subsistence, and the labourers, who helped them harvest. And because harvest is such a busy time they cannot even opt to sell their rice for a better price outside the village; time simply does not allow them the option. They get locked in this way into a vicious pattern of selling what they will later need for consumption to pay off those to whom they will later be indebted again to finance their consumption requirements.

III. Marketing

Whether a farmer is forced to sell at harvest for lower price (or can opt to sell) after storage for a higher price, either price will again vary depending on where the farmer sells his produce. Different markets command different prices. Although it has not been possible to quantify the value-added of marketing by land-holding categories, we can point to a pattern in marketing and rough price differences between markets.

The markets resorted to by residents of Dhankura have been described in our Introduction¹. We will recapitulate here the types of markets and their particular functions. But first let us mention sale within the village. *Furia* or middlemen scout the local markets and villages of Dhankura for jute and winter crops But not paddy. Manikganj is a deficit rice area so more rice is brought in than sold out, and there is no advantage to the paddy *furia* in operating there. Women in the upper categories exercise a fair control over sale within the village in the interest of adding to their private "tills". In the lower categories, because of scarcity, male members of the households sell most produce outside the village in an effort to get the best possible price.

The Dhankura bazaar opens daily from 12:00–3:00. Producers sell directly to consumers and to the *furia* (jute, winter crops, vegetable, poultry and dairy *furia*). Within the region, twice-weekly markets, *hats*, operate. Most *hats* specialise in one item but exchange in some volume almost all items. In the Dhankura region, one *hat* specialises in cattle, another in bamboo, and a third in jute and mustard seed. The government Jute Procurement Center is located at the latter hat. Within a larger radius there are wholesale *hats* which open daily for certain items, but which hold twice-weekly *hats* for all items. Manikganj is a major wholesale and retail centre for the area. Dhankura residents do very little retailing in Manikganj, but those engaged in small and large-scale trade use Manikganj to purchase items wholesale on credit from their business patrons. There is very little direct link with the

¹ These will be discussed fully in the chapter on Trade *later*.

Dhaka market, but the wholesale stockists, *arotdar*, of Dhaka send out their middlemen, *furja*, to scout the region for produce. Dhankura is known for: vegetables, winter crops, jute, milk, and poultry.

Who from Dhankura, then, sells which produce to which markets in the chain? We will look at the pattern of sale by crop. As we have mentioned, no paddy *furja* operates in Dhankura. Manikganj is a deficit rice area so that its residents buy more in than they sell out. The options on paddy or rice sale, then, are sale within the village to other villagers at the local bazaar, or to the specialised *hats*. The largest specialised *hat* for paddy and rice, Sauria, is 6 miles away and trades in paddy/rice only one day a week. A closer, smaller *hat* opens two days a week. The surplus and medium farmers, who can afford not to sell immediately at harvest, sell 20% of their surplus paddy as paddy within the village; most of it to paddy husking business-men. The remaining 80% of their surplus they sell as rice in the specialised markets. Although deficit in paddy for their own needs, the lower categories are forced to sell roughly 40% of their production at harvest to meet production expenses. They sell at least 95% as rice, and to the local market. The price per maund of rice at the specialised market is Tk. 3-5 higher than the price per maund at the local market less transport expenses. If the work load at harvest were not demanding of their time, these farmers would willingly walk the 6 miles to earn the extra 3-5 taka per maund they could command from the specialised markets.

The options on jute sale are to the government procurement centre or to *furja* at the specialised *hat*, at the local bazaar, or within the village. The price scale follows those options. Sale to the procurement centre commands Tk. 10 more per *maund*, less roughly Tk. 1 for transport, than sale within the village. Sale to *furja* at the local market commands perhaps 3-5 taka more per maund, than sale to *furja* in the village. The medium and surplus sell 20% of their jute production to *furja* within the village, and 80% to the procurement centre. Whereas the marginal and small sell 50% to *furja* in the village, and 50% to *furja* at the local market, the one landless farmer who grows jute sells it to the

government procurement centre. The volume of jute a farmer has to sell helps him weigh out the relative advantage of selling to the procurement centre. Certainly one gets a better price, but there are transport expenses to weigh in plus there are some delays in payment and some falsification in weighing at the government centre.

Most winter crops are sold either within the village or at the local bazaar to *furia*. However, all mustard seed is sold to the *hat* which specialises in mustard. The prices to *furia* are more or less equal in the village or at the local bazaar. Some winter crops are bartered by women to travelling tradesmen for utensils, betel nut and other commodities for a low price. Some sales are made within the village at times of scarcity directly to consumers for a high price. Pulses and sweet potato are most frequently sold within the village. The surplus and medium categories sell 10% in the village, and 90% to the local bazaar. Women of the medium and surplus categories control the transactions made by those categories within the village. The lower categories sell 5% of the winter crops in the village, and 95% to the local bazaar.

IV Summary:

What can we say by way of summary about processing, storage, and marketing in Dhankura? There is a clear preference for sale of paddy as rice: for storage of jute, paddy, and seed; and for sale of all produce at specialised markets. However, only those owning or operating 3.5 acres or more can afford not to sell immediately after harvest and are able to stock seed, paddy, and jute. These are farmers who maximise on storage value-added and optimum sale prices. Those operating less than 3.5 acres exercise decreasing options in sale price and little capacity for storage. They try to maximise instead on processing value-added, as processing requires labour not capital or surplus.

ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF INTERNAL INCOME

I. Subsidiary Agricultural Production

Almost all households in Dhankura engage in some subsidiary agricultural production : poultry, dairy, or horticulture. Not all of this production is geared for a cash income- Some households consume most of what they produce thereby saving the household some expenditure. We will examine below the production, consumption, and sale factors of subsidiary agriculture.

Subsidiary agricultural production depends in part upon land available (especially for horticulture), but also in large part on one's capital and risk bearing capacity (especially for dairy). We find in Dhankura that the surplus and medium maximise poultry and dairy products over horticulture. This reflects in part their investment capacity and possession of cows and poultry. But certain normative factors also operate. All of subsidiary agriculture production is the preserve of women, but horticulture requires the most labour - The upper categories, for status reasons, try to conserve their female labour. Only women from the lower categories engage in intensive horticulture. The small marginal, and landless maximise horticulture as they have less capital to invest and fewer cows and poultry. The constraint to their horticulture is the amount of land owned. The following table presents the production, consumption and sale figures in taka by land-holding category (table 1).

Table 1: Subsidiary Agricultural Production

| L-H Category | Type of production | Annual total Production (Taka) | Consumption (Taka) | Sale (Taka) | % of sale within the Village | % of sale outside the village |
|--------------|--------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------|-------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Surplus | Horticulture | 7,470 | 4,320 | 3,150 | 70 | 30 |
| | Poultry | 1,440 | 1,440 | - | - | - |
| | Dairy | 8,640 | 8,640 | - | - | - |
| Medium | Horticulture | 11,530 | 3,780 | 7,750 | 70 | 30 |
| | Poultry | 2,880 | 1,680 | 1,200 | 30 | 70 |
| | Dairy | 13,380 | 10,080 | 3,300 | 10 | 90 |
| Small | Horticulture | 31,320 | 16,040 | 15,280 | 10 | 90 |
| | Poultry | 8,040 | 2,280 | 5,760 | 20 | 80 |
| | Dairy | 8,000 | 2,400 | 5,600 | 10 | 90 |
| Marginal | Horticulture | 11,984 | 7,560 | 4,424 | 10 | 90 |
| | Poultry | 7,051 | 630 | 6,421 | 20 | 80 |
| | Dairy | 2,800 | 700 | 2,100 | 10 | 90 |
| Landless | Horticulture | 16,984 | 8,706 | 7,513 | 10 | 90 |
| | Poultry | 2,442 | 771 | 1,671 | 10 | 90 |
| | Dairy | 700 | 700 | - | - | - |

The landless, with one exception, possess no cows and therefore, do not go in for dairy production. The exception, a Hindu, has invested his surplus employment income in a calf-rearing business: he buys calves at roughly Tk. 500 which he rears to maturity and sells for Tk. 1000 after 8-9 months. He also stocks some cows for milk production. Another exception, whose Tk. 4000 income per annum from lemon cultivation distorts the horticulture production and sale figures for the medium category, should also be mentioned.

The surplus consume all they produce in poultry and dairy. The sale of such items carry low status as the traditional sellers are Hindus of a low caste, *goyala*. Moreover, the consumption of these items carry high status and save expenditure. The medium sell as well as consume poultry, dairy, and horticulture products. The horticulture produce of the medium and surplus is sold largely within the village as the women of these categories by selling to furia within the villages are able to put aside small savings in their secret tills. The small, marginal, and landless sell more than they consume and sell more outside the village than inside. The women of these categories cannot afford small savings but need quick returns and the highest possible prices. Table 2 presents the pattern of consumption and sale by households.

II. Non-Agricultural Production

What commodities, beyond the produce from the land, are manufactured or processed in Dhankura? Eight house-holds manufacture sweetmeats and snack foods (25 family members engaged): three manufacture iron implements and utensils (9 family members and 2 additional labourers engaged): two households produce bamboo craft (5 family members engaged); and 1 household produces jute rope (the wife) and curd (the husband): and 3 households weave handloom (the sons weave and are assisted by additional family members) Table 3 shows the distribution of households and incomes by landholding categories:

Table 2: Subsidiary Agricultural Consumption and Sale

| L/H Category | DAIRY | | | | POULTRY | | | | HORTICULTURE | | | |
|--------------|-------------------------|----------------|---------------------------|----------------|---------------------------|----------------|---------------------------|----------------|---------------------------|----------------|---------------------------|----------------|
| | No. of H/H Consume only | % of Total H/H | No. of H/H Consume & sell | % of Total H/H | No. of H/H Consume & sell | % of Total H/H | No. of H/H Consume & sell | % of Total H/H | No. of H/H Consume & sell | % of Total H/H | No. of H/H Consume & sell | % of Total H/H |
| Surplus | 6 | 100 | 6 | 100 | 6 | 100 | 6 | 100 | - | - | 6 | 100 |
| Medium | - | - | 8 | 57 | 2 | 14 | 12 | 86 | 2 | 14 | 12 | 86 |
| Small | - | - | 16 | 33 | 24 | 50 | 24 | 50 | - | - | 48 | 100 |
| Marginal | - | - | 10 | 48 | 6 | 29 | 15 | 71 | - | - | 21 | 100 |
| Landless | - | - | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 53 | 93 | - | - | 54 | 95 |

Table 3: Non-Agricultural Production

| L-H Category | # | Nature of production | Income From Products |
|--------------|----|----------------------|-------------------------|
| Surplus | 1 | Snack-Food | 2,900 |
| Medium | 3 | Weaving | 4,500 |
| Small | – | – | – |
| Marginal | 2 | Snack-Food-1 | 12,500 |
| | | Curd/Rope-1 | <u>1,200</u> 13,700 |
| Landless | 13 | Blacksmith-4 | 12,950 |
| | | Bamboo-2 | 2,400 |
| | | Snack Food-7 | <u>18,600</u> 33,950 |
| Total | 19 | | 46,050 |

All of these products are manufactured or processed in a traditional manner. Indeed, all but one (ropemaking) are based on hereditary skills. Sweetmeat, snack food, black-smithy, and bamboo craft manufacture are the preserve of particular Hindu castes. Most Hindu producers are landless. There is traditionally for the Hindus more status invested in the hereditary line of business than in working the land. Moreover, as many of the Hindus intend to migrate they do not invest in land as security but rather divest any fixed assets and seek only moveable assets. Curd-making is usually the preserve of the Hindu *ghosh* community. It is interesting to note, however that in Dhankura the man who makes curd and whose wife makes rope is a Muslim who learned that art of curd-making from a Hindu neighbour in his original village (three miles away).

Weaving is the preserve of particular castes and groups of Hindus and Muslims, respectively. In Dhankura the three weaving households are Muslim. They consider the income from the

hereditary occupation supplementary (the sons weave) to their income from land (the fathers are all medium farmers).

The household is the unit production in all instances. No labour in addition to family labour is required with the exception of one blacksmith who, because he operates two furnaces, hires two assistants. Only male members, except young girls to pull the blowers, work the blacksmith's foundry. Both male and female members of the family produce sweetmeats and snack foods and bamboo craft. The products are retailed by the producers themselves from their own homes or through mobile trading both at the local Dhankura bazaar and at the regional *hats*. The clientele for these products are a group of villages.

Only the blacksmiths of this group have no other source of income. One of the sweetmakers, Paresh Shaha, produces an exclusive line of sweets in sufficient quantity to wholesale these to the other Shaha-sweetmakers. Most of the snack food producers have family members earning additional income from other business or employment. Both bamboo craftsmen earn additional incomes; one through carpentry services, the other from a mobile trade in pottery. Add the weaving households and the curd-making household earning an income from cultivating their land.

III. Services: Ritualistic, Medical, Technological and Moneylending

Dhankura requires a range of services which are supplied by a variety of resident and non-resident specialists. Likewise, the region requires certain service which are supplied exclusively by certain specialists from Dhankura. We will examine here the form these services take and which people from Dhankura enter into these services.

One medium farmer, Dalfar Ullah, is known to have special powers to cure all types of pains. He gains a certain status for possessing

and administering this skill, which he acquired from his *pir*.¹ Two other village residents perform both ritualistic and traditional medical services. Jalal Uddin practices *kobiraji*² to treat skin and eye diseases: a skill which he acquired from his father. He receives small sums of money for most of these services but sets a contract rate of Tk. 5-10 for exercising evil spirits. Jalal Uddin otherwise, is a marginal farmer who cultivates his own land: he is also a kinship leader and a member of the mosque committee. Paran Ali, a surplus farmer, learned indigenous veterinary techniques from his *pir* and is able to treat diseased cattle. He acquires a certain status for this service and is sometimes called upon as a religious functionary.

Safela Khatun, a widow, practises traditional midwifery (*dai* service) for which she earns roughly Tk. 150 per year plus clothing. She also performs certain ritualistic practices for newborn babies to ward off evil spirits. For these services she receives clothing, food, and some patronage from her clients. She is also known to be able to cure headaches by reciting verses from the Quran, a speciality which she learned from her husband. Although a *dai* is afforded low status, Safela Khatun makes many contacts through her varied services and is a popular village personality. She is also known as a singer. She keeps up these various small services as one way of safe-guarding her future.

All who practise ritualistic services, whether medical or not have acquired a skill to do so. The authority invested in this skill comes through a *pir*. The economic return is not high for these services, but the social status which accrues is high for these who otherwise are uneducated and of low status. Others do not go into these services either because the sanction from the *pir* is not readily available or because the economic return is not sufficient, The two from the top categories. Paran Ali and Dilfar Ullah, do not charge for their ritualistic services but benefit from the status they gain, Paran Ali expends roughly Tk. 1,550 each year on a religious feast and prayer to celebrate the *pir* who taught him his

¹ A *pir* is a religious leader.

² *Kobiraji* is one of the traditional systems of medicine.

skills. In return, those invited to the feast may bring him a hen, some rice, or a few taka.

The Hindus of Dhankura celebrate seven festivals, *pujas* during the year. There is one Kali Bari (temple) maintained by the community under the leadership of Akhil Shaha. But there is no Brahmin priest in the community. At the time of large, communal *pujas* an image maker from the *pal* (potter) community or a nearby village is commissioned to make the image. The community pools its funds on these occasions. A Durga (mother goddess) image can cost anywhere from Tk. 700-1500. For certain *pujas*, a priest from the neighbouring village, singers, or drama groups are called to perform. Certain other *pujas* are celebrated in individual homes.

There are three types of non-resident private medical practitioners called upon by Dhankura residents. Two local practitioners run small clinics and perform house calls for Tk. 1 –2. And two national pass doctors in the Union run small clinics, and pay house calls for Tk. 5-10. They are licensed and can certify illness as needed. There is an MBBS doctor in Manikganj, but he is expensive and is only resorted to in the most complicated cases. The government salaried doctor will be discussed in the chapter on Public Resources. The villagers judge these practitioners less by their qualifications than by the price of their services. A national doctor must be consulted if one needs to obtain a certificate of illness. And one Dhankura resident provides certain medical services in the village. Shafiqur Rahman, school teacher and faction leader, is a drug compounder and gives injections upon request. He acquired these skills when he assisted a traditional medical practitioner from a nearby village during a cholera epidemic. He gains certain popularity and political backing for providing these services.

Certain technological services, carpentry and blacksmithy, are contracted from Hindu specialists who service the region as the demand for their services are not constant in any one village. Their skills are the hereditary preserve of particular Hindu castes. There is one landless Hindu carpenter resident in Dhankura. He

makes wooden furniture and agricultural implements on contract and for sale. He also builds and repairs houses on contract at the rate of Tk. 15 per day. He contracts his services out to villages within a six mile radius of Dhankura and to Manikganj town. The five blacksmith households of Dhankura supply blacksmiths within a radius of 5 miles. The clients for their services are the village residents within that radius. If they have no contacts at any time, they make implements to sell at Manikganj hardware stores and at the regional hats.

As these technological services are the hereditary preserve of Hindu castes, it is difficult for others to enter these services. Moreover, the demand for their services are low and sporadic. However, carpentry is in transition ; Muslims from neighbouring villages are learning the skill. The reasons for the transition are varied. First, there seems to be fewer Hindu carpenters than blacksmiths still in the region, Secondly, the skill is relatively easy to learn compared to the skill of the blacksmith which takes roughly 6 years of apprenticeship to acquire. Thirdly, there is little capital required.

The following table shows the taka value of these services distributed by land-holding category;

There are no *mahajons* (traditional large moneylenders) in this village, but there are channels for small amounts of credit within the village. Many small loans without interest are made from patron to clients, neighbour to neighbour, kin to kin. These transactions have not been documented, but are known to be one facet of most patron-client relationships within the village. Some individuals extend credit in a more formal manner, charging interest and establishing repayment schedules. Most of this moneylending is done by women from the top categories with their profits from vegetable and poultry sales. They charge a slightly lower interest rate than the men who extend small-scale formal credit.

Table 4: Services

| L-H Category | Nature of Services | Number of Households | Taka Value of Services |
|--------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|
| Surplus | Ritual-1 Money Lending-14 | 5 | 3,700 |
| Medium | Ritual-1 Money Lending-1 | 2 | 400 |
| Small | Ritual-1 Money Lending-1 | 2 | 484 |
| Marginal | Ritual-1 Dai-1 Money Lending-1 | 4 | 2,050 |
| Landless | Carpenter-1 Blacksmith-5 | 6 | 3,600* |
| Total | | 19 | 10,234 |

Five wives of medium and surplus farmers are known to extend credit to kins and neighbours at a monthly interest rate of 8-12%. One wife, a former prostitute and second wife to her aged husband, now controls their land (which her husband sold to her) and is trying to maximise her savings so as to invest in more land. Three small and marginal and one surplus farmer also extend credit to kins and neighbours. They charge a monthly interest rate of 10-15%. The capital for two of the male moneylenders come from multiple sources of income: teaching and sharecropping out land by one, and construction business and toll collection by the other. Another male moneylender leases out his land as he owns no agricultural implements and loans out the lease income (Tk. 400). The small and marginal households average a Tk. 350 income from moneylending, whereas the medium and surplus earn Tk. 920.

* Four of the five blacksmith households manufacture iron items for sale: this income has been calculated under. Non-Agricultural Production. One member of the fifth household is employed in the foundry of another blacksmith: his income has been calculated under employment. This income from blacksmith services is minimal.

EMPLOYMENT

1. Internal Non-Agricultural Employment

The situation of land ownership and employment in Dhankura is one in which 14% of the households own 48% of the land. At the other end are the landless (39%) and the virtually landless (14%). Although the landless and marginal operate and earn a return from more land than they own, employment from land is a critical resource for the lower categories. But only 5.62 paid mandays are generated from the land in Dhankura: a total which guarantees 300 mandays of employment per year to only 19 people. What about the other mandays which must be covered? Internal non-Agricultural and external agricultural and non-agricultural options will be discussed in this chapter.

What internal employment opportunities other than those generated from the land are available to village residents? Who is able to maximise these options? The number of opportunities is very limited in Dhankura. Siraj Munsif is the *imam* of the village mosque. He earns a token Tk. 144 per year, but is paid fees for his services at weddings and special prayers. He possesses some religious knowledge, but his selection was more the chance outcome of factional politics than a choice based on merit. Khaleque Mia is supervisor to Zafar Ali's (his brother's) fuel business. He purchases trees and supervises the felling and collection of the wood. He is hired by Zafar Ali on a per diem basis (Tk. 7 per day) for roughly half the year. Two Hindus work in the blacksmith foundry of another Hindu. One serves as assistant to the blacksmith and earns Tk. 2400 per annum: the other merely

provides his labour and earns Tk. 400 per annum. This particular blacksmith owns two furnaces and therefore needs additional manpower, whereas the other blacksmiths in the village engage family labour only.

The following table shows the distribution of these employment opportunities with their Taka and manday values by landholding category.

Table: 1 Internal Non-Agricultural Employment

| L-H Category | Number of Reasons | Nature of Employment | Total Mandays | Total Income |
|--------------|-------------------|----------------------------|---------------|--------------|
| Surplus | 1 | UP member | 365 | 1200 |
| Medium | – | – | – | – |
| Small | 2 | Imam Supervisor | 595 | 1494 |
| Marginal | – | – | – | – |
| Landless | 3 | Sales Boy-1 Blacksmith- | 1001 | 2800 |
| TOTAL | 6 | – | 1911 | 5494 |

Although the actual number of opportunities are few the mandays generated (1971) are not insignificant when one considers that only 5672 mandays are generated by the land. The opportunities are limited because the demand for specialized labour or services is limited and sporadic in the village. Most specialists are self employed and engage family labour when needed.

II External Agricultural Employment

Certain external employment opportunities, either as permanent or seasonal labourers, are open to Dhankura

residents. One son from each of 7 households (2 medium, 3 small, 11 each marginal and landless) are hired as permanent agricultural labourers, *rakhal*, in Khaliaghury. Another 18 are hired during the harvest season. Agricultural employment in Khaliaghury is arranged either through kins resident in Khaliaghury, the two faction leaders, or a labour contractor from Dhankura¹. Another six persons (1 small, 2 marginal and 3 landless) are engaged as permanent agricultural labourers elsewhere outside Dhankura. Again, kinship ties operate in the recruitment of these labourers. And each year 7 or 8 Dhankura labourers go to Savar and Mirpur at the time of *boro* (winter rice) harvesting. Because Manikganj area does not sustain a *boro* crop of rice, the Manikganj labour pool has, over the years, been tapped for the *boro* harvesting in Khaliaghury and Savar.

III. External Non-Agricultural Employment

Certain households have availed of salaried, non-agricultural employment outside Dhankura. The type of non-agricultural employment ranges from construction work to teaching and government clerkships. Table 1 shows the range of employment opportunities and the numbers recruited to each by land-holding categories.

Two Dhankura residents are Head Masters of regional schools: and four serve as teachers. The educated who seek teaching positions must both be sponsored by a strong patron. It is also said that they must bribe officials. Only one teacher from Dhankura gained his position through merit. The rest gained their teaching positions through patronage. One had an Awami League Patron, two others had relatives who wanted to invest in the education and positioning of their relatives in this profession. Two others were linked to another senior school teacher referred to as a "first class broker." In at least two instances, bribes in addition to the regular subscription for a teachership were paid to the Thana Education Officer. The uncle of Masrur Alam is known to have

¹ Khaliaghury land is discussed in chapter 1. A conflict involving labour contractor and a labourer is described in Part III.

paid Tk. 1200 as a subscription and Tk. 1000 in bribes to obtain an Assistant Teachership for Masrur Alam. In return, Masrur Alam married his uncle's daughter. The patron-uncle is now father-in-law and benefits from both the salary and rations Masrur Alam draws. The head masters earn roughly Tk. 4,200 per annum: the teachers Tk. 300 less per year. All receive rations according to family size.

Table 2: External Non-Agricultural Employment Opportunities

| Nature of Employment | Numbers Recruited | Recruitment by L-H Category |
|----------------------|-------------------|------------------------------|
| Head Masters | 2 | 1 – Surplus 2 – Small |
| Teachers | 4 | 3 – Marginal 1 – Landless |
| Government Clerks | 2 | 2 – Landless |
| Sales Boys | 3 | 3 – Landless |
| Shop Manager | 1 | 1 – Surplus |
| Peon | 1 | 1 – Surplus |
| Police | 4 | 1 – Marginal |
| Few | 9 | 9 – Landless |
| Boat Labour | 1 | 1 – Medium |
| Mail Runners* | 2 | 1 – Landless 1 – Marginal |

* The mail runners' job described is in the chapter on Public Resources

Two Dhankura residents, whose guardians disinvested land to invest in their education, have obtained clerkships in government offices through influential patrons (i.e. patrons who themselves hold government jobs in the respective departments). Akhil Shaha is a clerk in the Food Department, Manikganj. He obtained this job through a patron-friend, the General Secretary of the Ration Dealers Association in Manikganj, and through a football

teammate who works for the Food Department in Manikganj-Saifuddin serves as a clerk in the Forestry Department, Dhaka: a job he obtained through his in-laws upon marriage.

Several sons of Shaha community, for whom grocery business is hereditary, have obtained salesboy and shop manager positions outside through the community's business links. Three sons of Shaha landless households serve as salesboys in Savar and Bhairab: their salaries range from Tk. 400 to 1200 per annum plus room, board, and clothing. A fourth Shaha, son of the richest Hindu, is the business manager of a wholesale hardware shop in Dhaka : from which position he draws Tk. 400 per year. Grocery business is the hereditary occupation of the Shahas. Moreover, the father of Akhil Shaha (clerk of the Food Department) is the owner-manager of a permanent grocery store in Savar. He provides employment-patronage to two of these other Shaha sons in Savar. The other salesboy position in Bhairab, was obtained through a business patron in Manikganj.

Recruitment to the police force has been from one strong kinship group in Dhankura through the payment of bribes and the influence of a kin patron, earlier recruited to the police force through the normal recruitment procedures. Four Munshi kinsmen now serve as police. Originally Shamsur Rahman was appointed through the normal recruitment procedures: exam, medical tests, standards of height and weight. With the influence of Shamsur Rahman and bribes, the other three also obtained police postings, Rafie, for example, is known to have sold half an acre of land to pay the requisite bribe. The policemen earn Tk. 3000 per annum plus ration fringe-benefits and are generally reputed to accept bribes. One lives outside the village with his wife but retains a house in the village. The others, although posted out, keep their wives and children at home in joint families in the village. They take their salary and rations home to Dhankura once a month.

The second Paran Ali, a surplus farmer, serves as a peon in the Construction and Building (C & B) Office, Dhaka. Until 1970. Paran All himself served as a nightguard in a C and B stockyard. Subsequently his first son has become a con-tractor of the C and

B and his second son has gained regular employment in the C and B office. And the son of Dilfar Ali, a medium farmer, is hired as a labourer for six months a year on a boat which belongs to his maternal uncle.

A gang of nine women from Dhankura work regularly outside the village on construction or earth-work projects. There are two gang leaders, *sardarni*, for the gang. Both are widows about 45 years of age. Work contractors generally contact the *sardarni*. In this case, the sub-contractor, son of Paran Ali contacts the *sardarni*, Saleha Begum who works in Safiqur Rahman's house, a close neighbour to Paran Ali. Sometimes the women are trucked to work sites 10-30 miles away. Within the village, they are hired to level land (e.g. for an IRRI project), dig ponds, repair homesteads and houses, dig channels for the deep tube wells.

The following table 3 shows the distribution of external non-agricultural employment with the total mandays and taka value by land-holding category.

How do these extra-village employment opportunities affect intra village relationships? Four teachers spend their working day away from the village teaching at schools within a radius of five miles from Dhankura. Of the three who commute daily two are landless, and the third, Safiqur Rahman, sharecrops out his land. The two teachers who teach in the Dhankura-based school, are able to work their own land either entirely on their own or with hired labourers. One teacher, who is lame, does not commute but resides near the regional school and runs the family's permanent shop;¹ his father and brother work the land. One clerk commutes by bicycle each day to Manikgonj; the other lives permanently in Dhaka, and his joint family members work in the family land. The joint family members of the four policemen posted outside also work in the family land. And the fathers of the four salesboys and one peon are able to maintain the intravillage links. So it would

¹ See next chapter on Trade.

appear that land as a resource and intra village sets of relationships have not been sacrificed to these extra-village employment opportunities.

Table 3: External Non-Agricultural Employment

| L. H. Category | Number of persons | Nature of Employment | Total Mandays | Total Income |
|----------------|-------------------|---|---------------|--------------|
| Surplus | 3 | Head Master-1 Peon-1 Shop Manager-1 | 1,099 | 13,000 |
| Medium | 1 | Boat Labour | 270 | 2,700 |
| Small | 1 | Head Master | 365 | 4,110 |
| Marginal | 8 | Teachers-3 Mail Runner-1 Police-4 | 2,920 | 26,700 |
| Landless | 16 | Mail Runner-1 Teacher-1 Sales Boys-3 Clerks-3 FFW-9 | 4,644 | 46,615 |
| Total | 29 | | 9,298 | 83,126 |

There are obvious benefits from the extra-village employment—higher income with the possibility to save—especially if one remains within the orbit of the village. But if one should aspire to these types of external employment, how can they be obtained? At least four households expressly aspire for teacherships, another four for police postings, and at least five for government clerkships. For teaching, both education and substantial patronage (influence and money) is required. For the police

postings and government clerkships, some education but, more importantly, a patron already employed by the respective department is necessary.

We earlier argued the importance of employment from the land as a critical resource to the lower categories. But only 5,672 mandays are generated from the land in Dhankura; a total employment of 300 mandays per year to only 19 people. The total mandays obtained by Dhankura residents in internal and external non-agricultural employment is 10,479: which works out to an average of 317 man-days for 33 persons. Moreover, agricultural daily wages average Tk. 7-00, whereas the agricultural employment averages Tk. 8.82 per day.

But what percentage of non-agricultural employment benefits go to the lower categories? Twenty-eight small-marginal-and-landless households (22%) avail of 8,745 mandays for which they earn an average of Tk. 8.63 per day or Tk. 3281.70 per year. Five medium and surplus households (25%) avail of 1734 mandays from non-agricultural employment for which they earn an average of Tk. 9.74 per day or Tk. 3380 per year. Thirty, although a slightly lower percentage of lower category households gain these employment opportunities, the return to each household averages out to more or less the same for all categories. This balance can probably be attributed to the Hindu phenomenon in Dhankura. There are a fair number of Hindus in Dhankura, and they have traditionally invested more in business employment and education than in land. The number of landless Hindus explains why employment opportunities are not heavily weighted for the upper land-holding categories.

TRADE

1: Pattern of Trade

Commerce in rural Bangladesh is structured around sets of temporary markets called *hats*. Every region is dotted by *hat* sites, one or another of which operates everyday. *Hats* generally open in the late afternoon allowing the cultivator and the labourer to attend after the day's work in the fields. Some *hats* specialise in certain produce. The permanent market, or bazaar, consists usually of a half dozen permanent shops, tea stalls, and the space in front of them for the itinerant traders and producer-retailer. The permanent shops may stay open all day, unless the proprietor chooses to market his ware at another bazaar or *hat*. The bazaar itself opens daily in the late morning and early afternoon hours. Some bazaars specialise as wholesale outlets for certain items. Each district has its market town, with retail and wholesale shops open all day every day. And then, of course there are the handful of urban centres.

The rural producer, agricultural or non-agricultural, generally retails his produce himself either at a *hat* or in the bazaars. He may retail his produce directly to a consumer or may be wholesale to the middlemen *furia*, who canvass the villages, bazaars and *hats* for produce to be taken to the urban centres. The *furias* operate at various stages in and with various volumes of trade. At the lowest level of trade are the sub *furias*. These are the very poor who try to supplement their slim earnings as day-labourers or

whatever with a small profit earned from buying vegetables or eggs in the villages and selling them at the bazaar or *hats*. They try, that is to usurp some of the sales producers might otherwise make directly themselves. At another level are *furia* financed by business men or other middlemen. They also canvass door-to-door, and market to market, but their volume of trade is higher and more steady. And then there are *furia* who come directly from the urban centres to buy for large wholesaler, *arotder*.

In addition to those who buy *hat* to *hat* and village to village, there are the itinerant traders who sell in the same locations. Many of these traders purchase items wholesale on credit from the market towns to sell to clientele from many villages. Still other traders choose to sell from their own homes to the clientele of one village. Above the itinerant traders are the *hat* marchants who sell regularly from a hired stall at certain *hats* on certain days. And then there are the proprietors of the permanent shops who stock groceries (pulses, spices, soap, utensils) and stationery (hair oil, toilet soap) and other household items. A few gain the monopoly or dealership for items such as oil.

But let us turn to the *hats*, the basic unit in the commercial structure of rural Bangladesh. Several *hats*, as we have said, cater to any one region. Most open one or two known days in a week. At least one *hat* in a region opens every day of the week. Most *hats* open in the late afternoon. The *hat* consists of a series of small stalls, a few tea stalls, and one or two permanent shops. The open space in front of the stalls teem with the make-shift displays set up by the itinerant traders and producers.

How is the *hat* organised? A great majority of them were established and financed by zamindars. After the abolition of the zamindari, these fell under government ownership. And more recently, under a Bangladeshi law all *hats* are owned by government. The sales tax rights and proprietor rights of the *hats* are auctioned off for terms of varying lengths by the government. Most often a single influential person or powerful segment of the community decide the locality needs, say, a school. They bid for the *hat* in the name of the school. It is generally understood that

no one should bid higher than their bid. Those who win the bid become the *hat* organisers, and the revenue of the *hat* goes in part to the school.

The *hat* organisers allocate the stalls, monitor sales, collect the sales tax. Obviously, it is their interest that the volume of the trade at the *hat* be high to guarantee the success of the *hat*. So they balance the trade-off in allocating a certain percentage of the stalls to their village "clients" and the remaining percentage to outsiders who will draw outside customers.

There is then a regional organisation to this form of business. Those who buy produce, beyond the volume exchanged internally to the region, are the large wholesalers, *arotdar*, in the urban centre. These operate through the hierarchy of *furia*. Those who sell products into the region are the wholesalers from the market towns or specialised wholesale bazaars. Their products are sold through itinerant traders and some few permanent shopkeepers who purchase their stock on credit.

Let us turn now to the Dhankura region and describe the *hats* and bazaars and market towns to which and from which Dhankura residents make their sales and purchases. Dhankura is the site not only of the Union headquarters, but also of a small bazaar. There are 8 permanent shops, 2 tea stalls, and the open space in front of them. The bazaar opens daily 11 : 00 to 3:00. There is some sale and purchase here of all items produced in Dhankura, except jute, and it is here that the bulk of vegetables (70%) and milk (90%) are sold by Dhankura producers. Most of the fish needed is purchased here.

There are two *hats* within a mile radius of Dhankura. Each has its own speciality, although most items are exchanged and sold, Coitta *hat* specialises in winter crops (especially mustard seed) and poultry. Eighty percent of those in the top categories market their winter crops here, and 45% of those in the lower categories. The top categories consume the large part of their poultry produce, and market only 20% in Coitta. The lower categories market 60% of their poultry in Coitta. Barobhuya *hat* specialises in

vegetables, rice, and bamboo. Only the top categories can fully exercise their option to use the specialised markets. The lower categories are not free to choose the time, day, or volume of sale. So although the top categories sell 80% of their rice in Barobhuya, the lower categories sell only 45%.

Saturia (6 miles away) was, historically, the wholesale centre for the region, It has been by-passed in importance by Manikganj town with the introduction of the Dhaka-Aricha road. Once a week, there is still a wholesale market in grocery and stationery at Saturia. About one-third of the grocery and stationery purchased by Dhankura residents is purchased there And one-half of the blacksmiths' products are sold at Saturia. Kalampur (5 miles away) is not only a specialised market for cattle, it is the site as well for the government's jute procurement centre. The trade of the jute *furia* and the sale by private producers of jute will be discussed below. Only a few traders go further than Saturia, one to sell bamboo craft at weekly *hat* in Savar (28 miles) and some to purchase rice from Nayarhat and fruit from Aricha (19 miles). Manikganj is the market town for the region. One Hindu, a surplus farmer, runs a permanent shop in Manikganj. Several itinerant traders and permanent shop proprietors buy their stock wholesale on credit from Manikganj.

II. Dhankura's Share in Regional Trade

Dhankura has its own small bazaar. Although the market was established originally as a temporary *hat*, it has evolved into a bazaar with permanent shops and tea stalls. As it is the seat of the Union, Dhankura gets a fair clientele for its bazaar. Moreover, Dhankura is fortunate enough to be only 1 mile from the Dhaka-Aricha road. But the bazaar is not the only place where residents of Dhankura buy and sell.

Let us examine more closely where the individual producer buys necessities and sells his produce to understand Dhankura's share in regional trade- Then we will examine how many of what kind of traders operate out of Dhankura. We will not be able to measure the extent of Dhankura's expenditures against that of

other people of the region, nor will we be able to measure the turnover of Dhankura traders against other traders in the region. But we should be able to see a pattern in Dhankura's trade for a profit and purchases for consumption needs.

Even deficit households sell rice to meet immediate expenses. Rice is bought and sold in several places, the least amount in Dhankura bazaar and the most at Barobhuya and Coitta *hats* on the available days. As the lower categories sell to meet immediate needs, their volume of sale is not high but their number of transactions is high. They see, therefore, no distinct advantage to trading rice at the specialised market, Barobhuya. Whereas the upper categories sell most of their rice (80%) at Barobhuya, the lower categories sell only 45% there. The surplus and medium are able to hold out and select the market and price.

Perishables are sold daily at the nearest possible bazaar or *hat*: therefore the point of sale for perishables are distributed widely and not concentrated in any one specialised *hat*. The bulk of vegetables (70%) and milk (90%) sold and fish purchased by Dhankura residents is at the Dhankura bazaar. Fishermen communities sell their catch at a specialised market which convenes in the very early morning. Fish exchanged within the region is purchased from the specialised market and sold *hat* to *hat* or bazaar to bazaar.

It should be noted that in the top categories women control the sale of what is their preserve in production: vegetables, poultry, and dairy. Because households in these categories are not pressed for immediate needs on the sale of these items, the women are able to market these items either directly in the village or through young boys in the market. The advantage to the women in controlling the sale is that they are able to pocket the profit for their private "tills". But households from the lower categories cannot save but must maximise on sale price, so the lower category women do not control the sale of what they produce.

Poultry and vegetable *furias* canvass the region village to village and market to market in part because of the women's desire to sell directly within the village. The vegetable *furias* of Dhankura operate on a very small scale. They supplement their income from working their own fields or as daily labourers with a small volume of trade. They collect village to village and sell at *hats* or bazaars. Poultry *furias* operate on a slightly expanded volume of trade and profit. Indeed, one poultry *furia* from Dhankura, financed in part by a wholesaler in Dhaka, sells directly to markets in Dhaka. The *furia's* sphere of collection and marketing and volume of trade depends on capital available, mobility, links to the hierarchy of *furia* and *arotdar*, and the availability of produce.

The jute *furias* are not as poor as other *furias*: The jute *furias* are financed by one or another central men at the government procurement centre to whom they promise to sell all jute procured from the villages. At the time of jute harvest, the *furias* are to roam the villages to persuade the cultivator: "Hey, brother give me your jute. Sell it to me now as the government may well lower prices". Moreover, they offer government rates even within the village as they regularly falsify the jute weight. The *furia* counts one maund of jute yield 1 maund 5 seers of jute by adding water and dust. This then is their ploy; to offer government prices within the village. Indeed, only the large and influential jute cultivators really avail government prices at the government procurement centre. At the government centre, the *koil* or weigher must be bribed to get the proper weight and there is often a delay in payment. The *furias* bribe regularly and are not so affected by delayed payments as individual cultivator. So most jute is sold to *furias* and not to a government procurement centre.

With items which are sold into the region even on a limited scale (salt, matches, kerosene oil), the points of sale are widely distributed for convenient purchase: small permanent shops either at *hats* or in bazaars. With items which are sold out but not extensively purchased within the region, the points of sale are specialised centres (Coitta for winter crops: Dhankura bazaar for

vegetables and milk). With perishables or rice sold to meet immediate expenses the points of sale are widely distributed to allow for a daily turn-over.

We have seen then where the Dhankura producer retails or wholesales his produce, and we have seen the pattern of operation of the *furia*. Now we must see how many from Dhankura go into what type and level of trading. Residents from Dhankura pursue the following types of trade:

| | | |
|----------------------|---|----|
| Permanent shops | — | 4 |
| dealership (oil) | — | 1 |
| <i>hat</i> merchants | — | 2 |
| <i>furia</i> | — | 4 |
| <i>sub-furia</i> | — | 4 |
| itinerant traders | — | 16 |
| home businesses ; | | |
| grocery | — | 1 |
| paddy-husking | — | 6 |
| stock | — | 3 |
| other | — | 3 |

Most of these traders share the regional markets with other traders of the same type. Only one holds a monopoly, the oil dealer. Dhankura partakes in two levels of middlemanship: the small-scale, self-financed *sub-furia* and the Dhaka-financed but not Dhaka-based *furia*. Some persons go into multiple business ventures. It seems that Dhankura exploits a greater share than average for permanent shop proprietorship and snack-food itinerant trading in the region.

What are the factors that help explain Dhankura's share in regional trading? Given that Dhankura is the UP headquarters it

commands a greater share of commerce than average for the Union. And given its proximity to the Dhaka-Aricha road, many business is facilitated. For these reasons, the Dhankura *hat* evolved into a bazaar with the opening of a series of permanent shops. But more significantly, Dhankura as a zamindari and Hindu centre historically commanded a large share of regional trade. Certainly some of this share has dropped since the abolition of the zamindari. But the percentage of Hindus has remained higher than in other villages despite migration, and almost all the Hindus who have remained are Shahas who traditionally go into business. Not only have the hereditary businesses of the Hindus been passed on, but the business patronage from Manikganj and elsewhere as well.

III. Recruitment of Dhankura Residents to Trade

We have seen how many people from Dhankura operate the different kinds of trade, but we must also see what kinds of people have entered what kinds of trade. We will begin with the lowest form of trading, that of the self-financed *sub-furia*. There are four vegetable *subfuria* in Dhankura, who supplement their income from day labour or land by purchasing vegetables door-to-door which they resell at bazaar-to-bazaar or *hat-to-hat*. Their sphere of collection, capital, and turn-over is very small. One is Tahshin Ali, whose one son is a permanent labourer and whose other son works the land they own plus hires himself out as a daily labourer. Tahshin All is lame but enterprising. He earns roughly Tk. 2 per day from his vegetable business. Another vegetable *sub-furia*, Rahimuddin gives only 3-4 days per week to the vegetable trade but is able to earn roughly Tk. 5 each of those days. All sell vegetables retail to customers or wholesale to the Dhaka vegetable *furia* who comes to Dhankura bazaar.

There are three poultry *furia* in Dhankura, Kana Mia and his two brothers. They are financed, in part, by a poultry *arotdar* in Dhaka. They purchase eggs and fowl door-to-door and from Coitta *hat*, which specialises in poultry. They then transport these items for direct sale to New Market and Fakirapur market in

Dhaka. Several factors operate to sustain the trade of *furja* in poultry and vegetables. The first is that these two lines of produce are the preserve of women, and in households where the sale of these items is not so critical to subsistence the women control the sale from their homes: Given the transport links to Dhaka Dhankura is noted for its vegetables and other perishables. Given that Manikganj is a paddy deficit area, on the other hand, no paddy *furja* roam the villages of the region.

Paddy husking is a home-business. Six households engage in paddy husking for a subsidiary, seasonal income: 2 medium, 2 small, and 3 landless. One medium farmer mortgaged his land to invest in paddy husking. His operation, is on a large scale than the others: his turn-over is roughly 5 maunds of paddy per week. As we have seen above in the chapter on Disposal of Crops, the profit per maund of paddy processed into rice can vary from Tk. 10.50 to 25.50 depending on the seasonal variations in price for paddy purchased and rice sold.

Two surplus and one medium landholder have gone in for food-grain stock business. That is, they purchase stocks of food-grain which they store for sale when prices increase. They need both capital and storage facilities, but have to contribute little by way of time or labour. The two surplus landowners are owner-managers, otherwise busy. One is a teacher (Kashem Ali) and the other a Member of the Union Parishad. The medium landowner is an owner-worker with a small family, whose expenditures are not high which has allowed him to accumulate some capital to invest.

And one Hindu surplus landowner, Bijoy Shaha, runs a grocery business within Dhankura. He, for one, has followed multiple lines of trade. He has followed the caste and family tradition of snack food and grocery business. At age 15, he went in for a mobile trade in snack foods. His fourth and fifth sons now run this business at the local *hats* and bazaar. When he turned 20, he invested in a small retail outlet in grocery and snack items from his house in Dhankura. His second son is the business manager of a hardware shop in Dhaka. And, most recently, his first and third sons have opened a large permanent grocery store

in Manikganj town, in which Bijoy Shaha invested an estimated Tk. 75,000 in stock.

There are eight other Shahas who operate an itinerant trade in snack foods besides Bijoy Shaha's sons. Seven of them are landless, but have the business links in Manikganj to finance on credit their purchase of stock. The Shaha tradition includes both the production and retailing of sweetmeats and snack foods. The seven landless Hindu families of the Shaha community purchase stock of snack items from Manikganj town and from Paresh Shaha (the only wholesale snack and sweetmeat manufacturers) in addition to what they produce at home. The scale of their operation is determined by their credit worthiness, mobility, and the volume of production.

One of this community, Paresh Shaha, has been able both to increase his production and to specialise in one line of sweetmeats to the scale where he wholesales items to other Shahas. At one time, he was a salesboy for a very skilled sweetmaker. On the occasion of a large regional fair, Paresh Shaha once sold three maunds of sweetmeats in a single day. He expected to receive some kind of bonus for his salesmanship but was awarded no extra benefits. So he spied on the sweetmaker to steal his trade secrets. Now, Paresh Shaha is the only producer and supplier of *batasha* and *misri* (types of sweets) in the region. Given this exclusive skill and accumulated capital over time, Paresh Shaha's production is very high. All the other Shahas *buy batasha* and *misri* wholesale from Paresh Shaha. Like the other Shahas. Paresh purchases additional snack items from Manikganj for his own mobile retail business.

Who else has gone in for itinerant trading and with what line of goods in Dhankura? One small farmer, Rahmat Ali, whose outside kin owns the ice-cream factory in Manikganj town, does a mobile trade, in ice-cream while his sons work the land. Rahmat Ali walks about 20 miles a day with the containers of ice-cream on his head. He nets roughly Tk. 20 per day ; a yearly average of Tk. 5,000. He had initially to pay a Tk. 200 security deposit against the ice-cream container. Rahmat Ali is the only Muslim in itinerant trading.

Shanti Shaha purchases palm molasses from Jitka, south of Manikganj, which he retails at the regional bazaars and *hats*. Another Hindu Manindra N. Das, barter pottery roughly seven months of the year (especially during harvests) for paddy and pulses which he then sells for cash. Some years back, Manindra N. Das sold all his property only to lose all his cash in an attempted migration to India. After the abortive migration when he returned to Dhankura landless and penniless, a friend from a nearby potter's community provided him the credit to purchase pottery wholesale. Manindra N. Das also sells his daily labour seasonally and retails the bamboo craft manufactured by his wife and children. And three Hindus of the Shaha community bid for the produce of local trees on contract and, in addition, purchase fruit from Savar (jackfruit) and Aricha (mangoes) for local sale.

Two men from Dhankura are *hat* merchants, Abed Ali Matbar, for one, started a rice trade after the Liberation of Bangladesh. He had been an owner-worker of his land (he is a medium landowner), but he became ill and had a stomach operation. Since surgery, he has been advised not to engage in strenuous labour. Zafar Ali, co-faction leader to Kashem Ali, helped Abed Ali Matbar make contact with a ration dealer in Mirpur to import rice to Dhankura. Now Abed Ali regularly buys rice on the open market in Nayerhat, which he then sells at Dhankura Bazaar. Barobhuiya and Coitta *hats*. He imports and sells roughly 64 maunds of rice per month at a net profit of roughly Tk. 4 per Maund: a monthly income of Tk. 256. Kashem Ali on occasion purchases paddy from Khaliajhury and Aricha which he sells within the locality, but he is not as yet a full time *hat* merchant.

Four Dhankura residents own permanent shops, one at Manikganj, one at a local bus stand, and two at the Dhankura bazaar. As described above, Bijoy Shaha, a surplus Hindu, owns a large permanent grocery shop in Manikganj. One marginal farmer, Jalaluddin has opened a permanent shop handling grocery, stationery, and snack items at the Gajikhally bus stand during 1978. His second son was a Freedom Fighter during the Liberation War and was able to avail credit for stock purchase through good linkages obtained at that time. The first son is a

teacher at a primary school near Gajikhally bus stand. This son is lame, so rather than commuting from Dhankura, resides at and manages the family shop. They gross roughly Tk. 150-175 per day, a net profit of Tk. 30-35. A former small-scale mobile grocery businessman has opened a permanent grocery shop to rival the original large-scale shop belonging to Zafar Ali. But as yet Kalu Mia maintains much smaller stock and only retails and does not wholesale. The son of this small-scale grocer, Mannan, used to apprentice at a grocery shop in Savar and was able to avail credit from a business patron there. Both Kalu Mia and his son are trying to challenge the factional leadership of Kashem Ali and Zafar Ali.

Zafar Ali is a surplus farmer and the largest businessman of Dhankura. He owns a permanent shop, supplies fuel wood wholesale, and operates an oil dealership. His business patron is a non-Bengali from Mirpur, a fuel *arotdar*. The fuel wood business is Zafar Ali's most longstanding link (since 1950) with this patron. In 1950, Zafar Ali used to transport small amounts of fuel wood by boat to Mirpur. Gradually to build-up his contacts with his patron, who eventually financed Zafar Ali as his fuel *furia*. Zafar Ali now supplies fuel wood (mango, tamarind, jam) which he purchases in the region and transports by truck to the *arotdar*, on a large scale. He trucks the wood to Mirpur from his store house in Dhankura: the profit from this business alone is roughly Tk. 30,000 per year. Zafar Ali helped the non-Bengali patron purchase 6.66 acres of land in Dhankura, which Zafar Ali leases from him and cultivates through permanent labour. Zafar Ali also protected and gave shelter to his patron's family during the Liberation War. In return, his patron arranged a sub-dealership in Jamuna oil from the Zaman Brothers, other Mirpur-based fuel *arotdars* and agents for Jamuna Oil.

Zafar Ali reopened his family's permanent grocery and stationery shop (which had been closed at one time) in Dhankura bazaar in 1977. He is able to invest his fuel wood profit in and transport (on the oil tankers and fuel wood trucks) large stocks of grocery from Dhaka's Chawk and Maulvi Bazaar wholesalers. By saving on transport, he under-sells other wholesalers. In addition he wholesales Jamuna Oil (kerosene and diesel) from his

permanent shop. His main customers for the oil are the 27 deep tube-well projects in the region. An oil tanker delivers twice-weekly, a weekly total of 4,000-6,000 gallons of diesel and 20,000 gallons of petrol and kerosene. The profit from 20,000 gallons of diesel alone is roughly Tk. 250 to 300.

The following table presents the types of and incomes from trade by land-holding categories. what can we say about those who are recruited into business? Four people in Dhankura have gone in for small-scale operations as *subfuria* in vegetables. They are all very poor and self-financed. They act essentially as middlemen between producers, who might otherwise sell directly, and the regular vegetable *furia* who canvass the Dhankura bazaars and hats. Their ploy to the producer is to sell to them as they are so poor. Three brothers in Dhankura are able to operate on a slightly larger and higher scale as poultry *furia*. They have direct links with Dhaka *arotdar* and are, in part, financed by those to whom they sell directly and one operates a jute *furiaship* seasonally.

Table 1: Types of and Income From Trade

| L-H Category | Number of Persons | Nature of Trade | Annual Income |
|--------------|-------------------|---|---------------|
| Surplus | 5 | 2-Permanent Shop (+Other) 2-Stock 1-Construction | 84,600 |
| Medium | 7 | 2-Paddy 1-Stock 1-Hat Merchant 1-Jute Furia 1-Wood+Boat | 22,000 |
| Small | 7 | 2-Paddy - Husking 2-Itinerant Trade 2-Vegetable Furia 1-Investment | 11,960 |
| Marginal | 8 | 2-Permanent shop 1-Hat Merchant 1-Snack Food 1-Fuel Supply 1-Vegetable Furia 3-Poultry Furia | 26,860 |
| Landless | 16 | 2-Paddy Husking 2-Snack Food 6-Itinerant Trade 1-Vegetable Furia | 36,000 |
| Total | 43 | — | 181,540 |

Six households from the lower categories have gone into paddy-husking for a seasonal subsidiary income. One medium farmer has mortgaged his land to invest in larger-scale paddy processing. And three households from the upper categories stock purchased food-grains for sale at higher prices. All are otherwise occupied and see an advantage in this stock business as little time or labour is required.

Sixteen Dhankura residents have gone in for itinerant trading of products bought outside the region. They are all Hindus (with the exception of three Muslims whose business-patterns are kin) from the lower land-holding categories with education for book keeping. They receive their goods on credit from strong, hereditary business patrons outside Dhankura.

The four who have invested recently in permanent shops have done so only after accumulating capital through other avenues of mobility. The Hindu permanent shop owner has simply expanded his scale of business within the same line over the years. Zafar Ali has diversified his business and increased his volume of trade. Mannan was employed as a business manager of a shop, and was able to gain savings, skill, and a patron. The fourth invested in the education of his son which has paid off as the son is able to finance and run the shop. All businessmen of this scale have strong business patrons acquired either through inheritance, employment, or past business ventures.

Dhankura businessmen at whatever scale are drawn from all the landholding categories. Given the Hindu presence in the area and the Hindu tradition of business, quite a few of the businessmen are from the landless category. And given that the return from land in Manikganj is low, many of those in the upper land-holding categories also go into business. Business is seen, like employment, as an avenue through which mobility can be achieved.

Although some are able to expand their business, others have either had to scale them down or abandon them outright. Tahshin Ali, the lame vegetable *sub-furia*, was formerly in a rice business

which failed- And Jamal Uddin tried to open a grocery shop but failed and is now investing in a stock business. Like Mannan, who is currently trying a grocery shop in Dhankura bazaar, Jamal Uddin is from a lower land-holding category, educated for book-keeping, and had a strong, outside business patron. It will be interesting to see whether Kalu Mia and his son, Mannan succeed with their permanent shop both from the trade and the factional politics points of view.

IV. Explanation for the Pattern of Trade

Commerce in rural Bangladesh is structured around sets of temporary *hats* linked to market towns by itinerant traders and permanent shop keepers and to urban centers through *arotdar* and their network of *furia*. With items broadly exchanged within the region or sold to meet immediate expenses and with perishables the points of sale are widely distributed between *hats* to allow for a daily turn-over. With items not extensively exchanged within the region but sold out, the points of sale are specialised *hats*. Itinerant traders and *hat* merchants trade in items produced elsewhere in the district. And the permanent shops carry items brought in from Dhaka and other districts.

There is then a regional organisation to rural commerce in Bangladesh. The *hats* handle all the produce sold out or exchanged within the region. Those who buy produce, beyond the volume exchanged internally to the region, are the large *arotdars* in the urban centre. They operate through a hierarchy of *furia*. Those who sell products into the region are the wholesalers from the market towns or specialised wholesale bazaars. They supply their stock on credit for sale through itinerant traders and the few permanent shopkeepers at the regional *hats*. The *hat* therefore, is an adequate substitute on all items for a trip into the nearest market town. But why do *hats* and not market towns cater to a region of villages? Let us first look at the characteristics, of the *hat* economy. Cash incomes are low and cash transactions few with the rural population. The produce exchanged within the region is often handled in a barter system. That is, producers themselves

conduct a whole series of small daily transactions on kind: my paddy for your fish, my milk for your pulses. Most households are self-sufficient in their main food items or simply cannot afford to buy. The range of requirements in either case is small. Most of what is required is produced within the region. Cash purchases need not and cannot be a daily business.

We don't find a simple barter situation operating in the Manikganj region. A simple barter system can only operate when turn-over is limited and interdependence largely local. But the Manikganj economy has expanded to the point where local interdependence has given way to an interregional interdependence; Manikganj vegetables and poultry for another region's rice, A complex series of transactions operate within this kind of economy. At one end of the system are the large number of small producers who have produce for sale at various volumes to different points of sale depending on their subsistence level, their capacity to store and hold off on sales, and their range of requirements at the time of sale. At the other end of the system are the few big buyers, the wholesalers at the urban centre. A collection system for the produce of the small producers is required. And this collection system is *hat*-dominated in Bangladesh. But why? Once an economy expands and inter-regional inter-dependence develops, one might expect permanent centres or market towns to emerge.

But for the permanent centres to emerge the power to purchase external goods must be considerable. A complex system of *hats* is the best solution for the external buyer. And the monopoly on purchase is held by the Dhaka *arotdar*. Through their *furia* they control the purchases. It remains in the interest of these *arotdars* to keep the production centres small and defenseless. It is also in their interest to have specialised *hats* at key locations where they can control the bidding against the sellers. If selling in of goods were as important as the buying out of produce in the rural economy, other vested interests might emerge to challenge the urban *arotdars*. Businessmen are only interested to have ware-houses or permanent shops where sales are high. But the purchasing power and the range of requirements

by the rural population is so low, that the volume of trade in outside goods does not draw large businessmen into the rural economy. So until such a time as more goods are required by and sold into the rural regions, the commercial structure of rural Bangladesh will be dominated by the *arotdarhat* axis.

For jute, the government has established its procurement centres. But jute is the economy's only major cash crop. Paddy and other crops are handled through the *hat* and *furja* hierarchies. Producers are neither organised nor have the capital to open warehouses at the village level to store produce so that they can be in control of the market. And so the only permanent warehouses are where sales are high in the urban centres.

PUBLIC SECTOR RESOURCES

1. Local Administration

Under the national development plans certain quantities of government assistance are expected to flow into each village of the country. But the actual interaction between the government bureaucracy and the individual village resident in terms of this assistance is not fully known. It can be said that government resources are granted on a differential basis; that is every individual does not receive an equal share of these resources. But what then are the forces which govern the distribution? We will examine here these forces in the context of a single village. We will describe below the form in which public resources come to Dhankura, the stipulated and actual mechanisms which determine their distribution, the instruments used by Dhankura residents to get their share of these resources, and the actual benefits which accrue from these public resources.

The administration will be reviewed, at least in broad outline, at various points in our description in order to understand the mechanisms through which public resources are intended to flow into Dhankura. We will explain briefly, that is, both the proposed mechanisms and the actual channels through which public resources ultimately reach village residents. More importantly still, we will investigate whether and how (i.e. through what channels or linkages) the individual village resident obtains his share of government assistance.

Local administration falls under three tiers; the Union Parishad, (council), the Thana Parishad, and the Zilla Parishad. The Union Parishad, the lowest unit of local government, performs a range of functions for the government and acts as the principle intermediary between the village and the government. (The Thana and Zilla will not be analysed here, and will only be mentioned if and when they have actual bearing on the village resources other than through the Union Parishad). The main functions vested in the Union Parishad are law and order, certain tax rights, judicial, civic, and social welfare functions, development responsibilities, and allocation of public resources.

Each Union maintains a village police force (chaukidhar) to maintain law and order. The village police are appointed for life by the Thana Officer-in-charge (O.C.) in consultation with the UP Chairman. They report to the O.C. once a week and draw a monthly salary in the range of Tk. 100-250 paid by U.P. and taken from public taxes (chaukidhari). They are authorised to arrest persons for known offences and to report the law and order situation to the O.C. In practice, the U.P. Chairman and influential members maintain the link with the Police Office, are known to have influence over the village and with the thana-level police' and receive bribes to exercise this influence.

There are three wards under each Union Parishad. Each ward maintains a Gram Rakshi Bahini (village protection force) of volunteers expected to defend the village residents against dacoits and thieves and to be called upon in the event of a national emergency. These volunteers are provided torches batteries, and refreshments from time to time upon subscription from the village resident. The ward members in consultation with village *matabors* (elders) and the U.P. Chairman select the volunteers, who receive an ID card, badge, and general guidance from the Thana. There is a central Union-level Organisation of the Gram Rakshi Bahini, who are essentially under the control of the U.P. Chairman and its members. The son of the surplus farmer (Paran Ali) is the head of the Union level central organisation and maximises this position to keep a link with the Thana.

According to a local government ordinance in 1976, the U.P. is authorised to settle disputes that are not too severe and impose fines up to Tk. 500 or Tk. 25 per day (if the crime continues to be committed). However, it should be kept in mind that the village-level *shalishi* system is still the major forum for solving local disputes. In these *shalishi*, faction and kinship play a vital role. The U.P. bench may be called in to confirm the verdict of the *shalishi*. If a case is taken directly to the U.P. chairman, he generally consults the local *shalishi* leaders. If a case is too complicated, it is referred to the sub-divisional court. Some complicated cases may be referred back to the U.P. for jurisdiction or the U.P. Chairman might be requested by the judge to investigate the case.

In each Thana there is a Circle Officer (Revenue), who supervises the *tahsil* offices for the Thana. Each *tahsil* office is staffed by one *tahsildars* and two assistant *tahsildars*. These officers collect land and residential taxes from the village residents, lease out *khas* land, issue the certificates associated with mutation. Ownership documents are issued by a Sub-registrar at Thana or sub-divisional Headquarters. A *tahsil* office is housed in the Zamindari house in Dhankura.

The Government invests the Circle Officer (Development) with the responsibility to see that the U.P. carries out its activities according to Government regulation. The activities of individual U.P.'s are discussed at the Thana Parishad, in which the Sub-divisional Officer is Chairman and the Circle Officer (Development) is Vice-Chairman. The U.P. Chairman are ex-officio members of the Thana Parishad and must account for the programmes and overall situation of their respective unions. At both the Thana and Zilla Parishad, the U.P. can submit development plans for government grants and assistance. Acceptance of these plans depends in large measure on the bargaining power of the Chairman. The Sub-divisional Officer (SDO) and the District Commissioner (DC) can at any time investigate and evaluate the activities of the U.P.

II. Public Sector Services: Medical, Family Planning, Education, Postal.

There is both a Primary and a High School in Dhankura village. Manikganj's Debendra College is only five miles down the Dhaka-Aricha road. Moreover, students from Dhankura study at a nearby primary school, and teachers from Dhankura serve at three other regional primary schools. These educational institutions are reasonably accessible and low-cost to the village residents. But we must see how many Dhankura households actually avail of or benefit from these facilities.

Fifty-six children from Dhankura study at the Dhankura and Chointta primary schools. They receive, on occasion, from UNICEF donations of paper, and pencils, and more rarely still, a tiffin of powdered milk and protein biscuits. Two male and 1 female student attend Dhankura High School. Although there are government scholarships awarded to some students (upon submission to a public competitive examination administered by the Board of Secondary Education), these students pay their own tuition. The primary school runs entirely on government funds. The High School runs partly on students' tuitions and partly on government outright and recurring grants (sanctioned by the SDO). Three male students attend Manikganj's Debendra College.

The two leaders of Dhankura serve as Head Masters of the Dhankura and Chointta Primary schools: another four Dhankura residents serve as Assistant Teachers in these and other regional schools. The Masters earn roughly Tk. 4,200 per annum : the Assistant Teachers earn Tk. 300 less per year. These salaries are paid by the government. Lobbying during Sheikh Mujib's time brought an additional fringe benefit to all school teachers : ration cards are issued according to family size. All teachers receive rations of rice, wheat, sugar, kerosene, butter oil, and salt.¹

¹ See chapter above on Employment for a description of how these teachers acquired their positions.

Two hospitals were established by rival zamindars in 1936 (one ostensibly for the treatment of Black Fever the other as a homeopathic dispensary). The hospitals were housed in simple (tin-roofed and paved floor). Adjacent structures. They operated side-by-side until the departure to India of the zamindars in 1950. Between 1950 and 1965, they were brought under the U. P. and operated as a single allopathic dispensary. But in 1965, in an effort to discredit the newly elected Chairman the then ex-Chairman persuaded the people that if the dispensary were closed their taxes would decrease. The dispensary closed down. Between 1965 and 1972, the structure was used for a ration shop and then as a local youth club.

The dispensary was re-established in 1972 with the help of Abdul Alim, who applied for registration of the dispensary under the Department of Health. In 1976, the Department of Health allocated one national-pass doctor, one compounder, and Tk. 3000 per year for medicines to the Dhankura Dispensary. During 1977, the doctor was able to manage a total of 20,000 taka worth of government medicines and another Tk. 28,000 worth of UNICEF medicines through bribes totalling Tk. 2000) to clerks of the Dhaka office of the Health Department.

The doctor is supposed to dispense all medicines free of cost from the dispensary and to visit the houses of the more serious patients. In practice, he dispenses the less costly medicines to the poor and often uses one vial of medicine to inject four or five persons rather than just one. He dispenses the more costly medicines to the rich and influential to whom he pays house calls for a fee. If cost and not volume of medicines is considered, over 50% of the medicines goes to a small number of rich people. The poor are not unaware of this discrimination, but are forced to use the dispensary as it is run. Under government regulation, the doctor (a grade 7 employee) earns a salary of Tk. 600 per month and can charge Tk. 2 per house call; but in reality the doctor collects more. As he will dispense the more valuable medicines free of cost when asked to make a house call, he collects a larger fee for house calls (Tk. 5-10) than permitted. It should be noted that although the dispensary is supposed to service three Unions,

by reason of proximity residents of Dhankura, get a disproportionate share of the benefits. The average dispensary attendance per day is 50 clients of which usually 4 are from Dhankura.

At the Union-level, under the respective Thana officers, are one Family Planning Assistant and one Health Assistant. The Health Assistant is expected to launch vaccination campaigns, make food adulteration checks, and report outbreaks (cholera, smallpox and TB) of illness plus births and deaths to the Sanitary inspector. The Family Planning Assistant supervises three family Welfare Assistants, one for each ward of the Union and residents of their respective wards. They must be Matric-passed and face a competitive exam to obtain the position. Under each are two *dais* nominated by the U.P Chairman to the Thana Family Planning Officer. The FWA provide motivational and oral contraceptive services to the villages. The *dais* main function is to accompany litigation patients to the Thana Health Centres. There are no FWA's or *dais* from Dhankura and the impact of health and family planning services is negligible.

The Dhankura Post Office is a temporary sub-post office, entitled to issue and receive mail, money orders, parcels, and deposits (for savings). The offices is manned by one post master (from outside the village) and one peon. There are two mail runners from Dhankura, whose function is to carry mail from the regional post office to the Manikganj post office. The older mail runner holds the position permanently at Tk. 270 per month ; the younger runner inherited the job from his father at Tk. 250 per month. Four Dhankura residents receive money orders each month from earning members of the family who reside outside the village. Rajjab Ali, a school teacher deposits money for savings at the post office. Many villagers avail of the easy communications afforded by the post office.

III. Public Resources

Dhankura is linked to the main Dhaka-Aricha road (at 1 mile's distance) by an approach road. Temporary employment for many local residents was afforded during the construction of this road (under the ex-chairmanship of Minhazuddin). Several residents of Dhankura are serviced by the approach and Dhaka-Aricha roads in their business activities : fuel (1), wood supply (2), paddy (2), poultry (1), snack food (4), jute (1), and handicrafts (2). Two others, both landless, gain employment as porters along the approach road from the bus stand to Dhankura. There are also a gang of ten female workers who do construction work along the Dhaka Aricha road.

There is one canal in the area, which needs re-excavation and is navigable only during the rainy season. Some fishing is done from this canal. The nearest river, Gazikhali, is 1 mile away. The son of Sharif Miah earns a living as a ferry boatman during the high-water level. Some 11 sample households hold small quantities of land within the Choto Chotoria Pump Irrigation Project, which is irrigated from the Gazikhali. And one marginal farmer earns Tk. 100 and 5 maunds of paddy per season for channeling the water through the project area block.

The other public resources of the village include those bequeated to the area by the abolition of the zamindari *khas* land, *khas* ponds, and the zamindari house itself. The land inherited by the government from the zamindari totals an approximate 16 acres of which 8 are cultivable. The land is supposed to be leased out by the revenue department in consultation with the Union Parishad. Three Dhankura residents lease some of the land through this channel. Masrur Alam, a landless farmer, leases land through the help of an ex-U.P member, Joinal Abedin. Two landless immigrants to the village, lease some land through the Chairman. And one landless immigrant, without a lease occupies a room in the zamindari house. The *tahsil* office and *tahsilder's* residence are also in the zamindari house. A greater portion of the *khas* land is being utilised under illegal terms. Paran Ali for one, simply occupies and cultivated 2 acres of *khas* land on either side

of the road leading to the zamindari house. The current Chairman, when questioned, said he would gain too many enemies if he tried to contain the illegal occupation.

Paran Ali's case deserves some attention, as *khas* land is not the only form of public resources he exploits. First by way of explanation. Paran All served at one time as a village chaukidar and maintains close ties with the Thana police. So no one challenges the *khas* land, from which he harvests 16-18 maunds of paddy per year. Paran Ali also benefits from a scheme which he and other influential persons of the area (Kashem Ali, Suraj Miah, and Asgar Ali : all linked to the ex-Chairman) undertook with two *khas* ponds (approximately 4 acres). They leased these ponds in the name of a member of a fishermen's cooperative for Tk. 900 for a five-year term. They then turned around and leased these ponds to the fishermen's cooperative for Tk. 6000 per year. During the construction of the Dhaka-Aricha road, Paran Ali served as a night-guard for the C and B stockyard. The C and B contracts out its construction jobs to registered contractors. A Class A contractor patronises two of Paran All's sons. This contractor-patron and Paran Ali pooled Tk. 10,000 each to register one son as a Class C contractor to the C and B (of chapter on Trade above).

IV. Development and Extension Agencies

There are in Bangladesh various administrative devices for micro-level development (other than the services mentioned above)- These devices include: 1) the government offices and officers who provide expertise, inputs and loans; and 2) various counterpart associations at the Thana, Union, and village level formed to receive the expertise, loans, and inputs. Mention will be made here only of those offices, officers, and associations which affect the resource picture of Dhankura.

The same Union Agricultural Assistant has been posted by the Ministry of Agriculture in Dhankura Union for the past seven years. He has his BA and took a ten-month diploma course from

the Tejgaon Agricultural Institute. His responsibilities are to advise farmers as to the proper use and new varieties of fertilizers, insecticides, and seeds; to assist farmers in the procurement of the same ; to recommend farmers for BADC loans; and to influence the level authorities to introduce projects at the union level. With the introduction of 9 IRRI projects in the Union, for which he lobbied together with the ex-Chairman and his backers, the Agricultural Assistant is busy supervising the projects everyday and trying to avail the necessary inputs. He has been able to assist the IRRI project leaders obtain BADC loans for the project members.

The two institutional sources of loans for Dhankura residents are the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) and the Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation (BADC). Both the Agricultural Assistant's recommendations are necessary for individual farmers to obtain BADC loans. But due in part to three defaulters on loans from another village in the Union and in part to the Agriculture Assistant's inability to bribe or influence the right officials, the Union Agricultural Assistant has not been able to avail many loans for Dhankura residents. Indeed, only two Dhankura farmers, have taken BADC loans. They are both members of the IRRI project cooperatives; one the project manager himself and the other the brother-in-law of the project manager. Only the U.P. Chairman's recommendation is needed for an ADB loan. One farmer, closely related to the Chairman, has taken an ADB loan worth Tk. 750. And another Dhankura farmer used his son's influence as a member of the Thane Mukti Juddha Sangstha (Freedom fighter's Association) to obtain the loan.

A Jute Extension Office (semi-autonomous body under the Ministry of Agriculture) was established in Dhankura in September 1977, The mandate of the Jute Extension Board is to motivate interest in and provide inputs for improved, high-yielding varieties of jute. The average current yield is 35-45 maunds of jute per acre. The new varieties should yield 90 maunds per acre. A block of 400 acres in Dhankura Union has been brought under jute cultivation. The block Chairman is Naziruddin, former U. P. member and partner of ex-Chairman Minhazuddin. Nasiruddin

owns two wheat mills at Nayardinghi. He has two sons: both receive jute loans, one serves on a Deep Tubewell project Committee, the other is a ration dealer. Between them, the family exploits a lions's share (roughly 25%) of the external resources allocated to the Union. The jute extension Committee is Composed not of block farmers but of influential people of the locality.

The Jute Extension office provides loans, fertiliser on credit, free improved varieties of seed, line-sowers weeders, and guidance to interested farmers. A total of Tk. 17,000 has been allocated for loans to the Union; Dhankura village residents avail roughly Tk. 900 of this amount. A total of Tk, 10,000 worth of fertiliser is to be sold en credit through the Union: Dhankura village residents take roughly Tk. 180 worth of the fertiliser. Dhankura then does not take a disproportionate amount from the Union allocation, as the jute Extension committee members represent a wider set of vested interests than the one village. Indeed, although Dhankura is the seat of the Union, it has not had either very rich or very powerful members on the Union Council. And the jute Extension Committee, which controls the disbursement of jute loans, represents the rich and powerful under the ex-Chairman.

But a few in Dhankura have taken jute loans, who are they ? Zafar Ali, who is linked to the Block Chairman and Secretary through they ex-Chairman has taken a TK. 500 loan. Four others have taken loans of Tk. 200 each: all four are linked to the office bearers of the jute Extension committee through the two faction leaders of Dhankura ; One is the brother and deputy faction leader of Safiqur Rahman, another the brother-in-law and deputy faction leader of Kashem Ali. Three from the sample households take Tk. 60 worth of fertiliser each on credit: one is the brother-in-law of Kashem Ali, and the other two are brothers to Kashem's deputy faction leader.

As early as 1968 (under the Up Chairmanship of Minhazuddin) applications were placed to the Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation (BADC) for irrigation projects in

Dhankura Union. Various influential persons in the area (Kashem Ali, Asgar Ali and Kamal) together with the ex-Chairman and the Union Agricultural Assistant lobbied for the irrigation projects. All tubewells and pumps were sanctioned in 1975. Two pumps were operational by 1976, the remaining projects went operational in 1978. There are now 10 IRRI irrigation projects supported by the BADC in Dhankura Union: 7 deep tubewell projects and 3 power pumps projects. Three of the deep tubewell and 1 power pump project affect residents of Dhankura village.

Once a tubewell or pump is sanctioned to cover a certain area of land, the owners of land within that area join to form a KSS (krishi Samobaya Samity, Farmer's Cooperative society) to run the project. The number of members may vary, but each KSS forms an Executive Committee of 11 members including a President and a Secretary. The members also select a Manager for the project, who gains the fertiliser dealership for the project. Each KSS must be registered under the Cooperative Registration Act. Members must contribute a lump sum for registration, plus a monthly subscription fee to the KSS.

The BADC posts 1 technical supervisor to 10 irrigation projects. Drivers, paid for by the project members, are given two month's training by the BADC. The tubewell or pump is supplied by the BADC at a subsidised yearly rent to the projects. Fertiliser and insecticides at controlled prices plus loans are offered to the project members through the Project Manager by the BADC. Cost of fuel and building and maintaining water channels must be borne by the project members: members are generally charged Tk. 8 per decimal of land per season, although the costs average roughly Tk. 5-6 per season. Obviously, there are distinct monetary advantages to being a Project Manager.

A total of 17 farmers from Dhankura are members of 4 KSS within the Union (probably totalling 160 members in all), Kashem Ali is the Project Manager of a deep tubewell project at the southern side of the village. The total land under this project is roughly 30 acres, belonging to a total of 85 farmers; 12 from Dhankura own 7-82 acres in this project. Members must pay Tk.

10 per decimal per season for access to the water and use of insecticides. BADC allocated Tk. 16,000 in loans to this project, but it is generally rumoured that 25% of the loan granted goes into bribes and other expenses. Of the 12 Dhankura residents, 4 have taken loans of Tk. 800 each. One, of course, is Kashem Ali himself; of the other three, two are related in marriage to and one is the neighbour and factional-supporter of Kashem Ali.

These projects do not actually operate according to regulation. BADC is supposed to supply fuel, fertiliser, and insecticide at controlled prices. But at least one project is forced to buy fuel at the open market price because the bribe necessary to avail the controlled price fuel is too high. Each Executive Committee is supposed to receive an insecticide sprayer for Tk. 86, but the Thana Agricultural Office charges Tk. 130.

It should also be noted that one of the deep tubewell projects runs off electricity (due both to its proximity to the Dhaka-Aricha road and a Tk. 8,000 bribe paid to the Power Development Board by the Project Manager) rather than diesel and its operational costs are significantly lower. The Members pay only Tk. 3-4 per decimal per season for access to water. The managers of the other projects have been lobbying for electricity for the past two years to the Power Development Board (PDB) offices in both Dhaka and Manikganj: but they have been led to believe each project must be able to raise Tk. 10'000 in bribes to guarantee supply of electricity. By way of postscript, in late 1978, Kashem Ali who has worked for a national political party was told by the Dhaka head of that party, that electricity would be supplied before the national election in early 1979.

V. Government Aid

What then are the goods that flow into the village through the offices and associations discussed above? The range of goods and aid include rations, fertiliser, insecticides, agricultural implements, tubewells, deep tubewells, power pumps, food-for-work wheat, and credit. But who in the village actually benefits from these goods?

Manikganj is classified as a modified ration area. Ration dealers are appointed by the UP Chairman in consultation with the Department of Food. There are currently 15 ration dealers in Dhankura Union : seven were appointed by the present chairman; two by the ex-chairman; and six by the Department of Food. For every ten government employees, one ration dealer can be appointed by the Department of Food. Three of the ration dealers were appointed then in consultation with the Thana Education Officer for the 30 school teachers and other government employees of the Union. Currently three ration dealers are from Dhankura; one is a boyhood friend of the current Chairman, another his supporter, and the third was appointed by the Department of Food and certified by the local school leader.

The ration dealer gets a certain percentage of the selling price from the Government. They usually give out less weight (an average of 2 *chataks* less per *seer*¹), exchange the quality of grain received from the government for a lesser quality, and sell off the jute bag in which the grain is shipped and stored. Usually they operate the dealership out of their own houses. Sometimes the member get a share with the dealer. They receive the grain in 6 or 8 instalments during the year. It is known in the locality that more rations are actually being distributed under the current Chairman than were under the ex-Chairman (who allocated rations only to supporters and sold off a good proportion of the rations).

The Union Parishad is divided into three wards. Each ward is divided into three parts by the UP Chairman and assigned one

¹ A *seer* equals nearly a kilo: there are 16 *chataks* in a *seer*.

member to allocate ration goods to each part. The members submit lists of those who will receive rations. Different grades of slips entitling the holder to purchase particular items at subsidised rates are distributed. Generally, the surplus and medium farmers are allocated A-slips to purchase luxury items such as sugar, butter oil, and good quality rice, kerosene and salt, while the small, marginal, and landless are allocated B-and C-slips to purchase necessary staples such as rice and wheat. Roughly ninety percent of the luxury goods go to the surplus and medium: about 2/3 of that amount to factional supporters of the ward members, and the other 1/3 to others from the upper categories by way of keeping them happy. The members determine the list of recipients after seeing the quantum of rations for each part of the ward. The recipients are most often supporters and kins.

Fertilizer dealerships are allocated by the BADC to nominees forwarded by UP Chairman and to irrigation project managers. There are currently five dealers in the Union. Two were nominated by ex-Chairman Minhazuddin: three are the managers of the IRRI irrigation projects and are entitled to sell fertiliser to their respective project members. Any interested farmer is entitled to purchase fertiliser from the non-project dealers. However during periods of scarcity, only the influential are able to procure fertilizer at the controlled price.

There is one insecticide dealer in the Union. The current Chairman certified him to be educated and responsible. He received some training both from the Thana Health Department and the BADC, and was then licensed by the BADC. The Chairman certifies which farmer should receive insecticide. The amount to be received is determined by the dealer according to land ownership. One outsider, known to hire himself out as an insecticide sprayer at Tk. 6 per acre, is the manager of one of the IRRI projects. Weeders and sowers are supplied by the Jute Extension office members of the Jute Extension Block.

Shallow tubewells, supplied by UNICEF through the Department of Health, are allocated by the Chairman. Three Dhankura residents have had tubewells sunk on their home-

steads: one through the patronage of faction leader Shafiqur Rahman : another through his links to the Thana police and the ex-Chairman: a third whose husband held some influence over the ex-Chairman, A fourth tubewell has been sunk near the Tahsil office situated in the zamindar's house.

Some 200 maunds of CARE-donated food-for-work wheat was distributed in Dhankura Union by the Chairman during 1977. Food-for-work Project Implementing Committees were formed with the local leaders and primary school headmasters. 150 maunds went for a scheme to clear the Munshikhali Canal. Ten persons from Gayaria *para* were employed in this scheme through the influence of Shafiqur Rahman: 4 were his kin-supporters, 1 a neighbour and 5 were poor Hindus from his *para*. Another 40 maunds were distributed to local youth clubs, who supported the current Chairman in his election. Seven maunds were allocated to the madrasha: and 2 to primary schools for a waterhyacinth-clearing project (the process went into a school fund).

There are three sources for institutional credit available to the village: the ADB, the BADC, and the Jute Extension Office. As mentioned above, two Dhankura residents have taken ADB loans: both have close ties with the Chairman, and one, in addition, has links with the Thana-level Freedom Fighters Association. Five have taken BADC loans after the inauguration of the IRRI irrigation projects: one is the Project manager himself: the other four are related to him; all are members of the deep tubewell KSS. Five Dhankura members of the Jute Extension Block have taken Jute Extension loans; a deputy faction leader and his two brothers, a brother-in-law to one faction leader and the brother of the other faction leader.

VI. Pattern of Distribution

We have not been able to fully quantify the resources that flow from the public sector into Dhankura. To get the actual value of fertilizer one would need to calculate market rate less the subsidised rate times the volume for the different fertilisers utilised in Dhankura. But it is impossible, given our data, to calculate this value for fertiliser. We have from the case-history of a fertiliser dealer calculated the annual worth of the dealership to him. For the year June 1977 - June 1978, he received in 7 instalments the following quantities of fertiliser from the Thana Agricultural Officer upon payment by a bank cheque:

| | | |
|--------|-------|--------------|
| Urea | 326 | maunds |
| TSP | 81 | " |
| Potash | 18 | " |
| | <hr/> | |
| | 425 | Maunds total |

His commission per maund is Tk. 4.50 carrying charges (Tk. 3.50) and overhead (Tk. 0.50): a net profit of Tk. 0.50 per maund at roughly Tk. 212.50 per year. This is the amount the dealer is entitled to: in actual practice, he may sell the fertiliser at "black market" rates and pocket more.

There are hidden values to some public resources. An IRRI Project Managership is worth a certain amount; the Project Manager's charges for irrigation often exceed costs plus he has the control over access to all inputs. Such hidden values are difficult to quantify. But we will summa-rise below the trends in distribution of these resources.

Education services, in the form of teacher's salaries and benefits (including rations), grants to schools, scholarships to students, and occasional UNICEF donations (lunches, benches, tubewell, latrines) whose distribution is regulated by the Thana Education Officer, benefit the following in Dhankura ;

- 4 Assistant Teachers
- 2 Head Masters (the two factional leaders)
- 56 primary students unevenly recruited from 41 households
- 14 surplus students
- 9 medium students
- 12 small students
- 10 marginal students
- 11 landless students

Medical services come to Dhankura in the form of a government salaried doctor and government dispensary, compounder, and Tk. 3000 worth of medicines whose distribution is in theory, regulated by the Sub-Divisional Health Officer plus an Assistant from the Health Department. In practice, the national-pass doctor is able to direct the flow of additional medicines (roughly Tk. 48,000) through bribes to clerks of the Dhaka Office of the Health Department. If the cost and not the volume of medicines is considered, over 50% of the medicines go to a small number of top category people. The doctor dispenses the least costly medicines to the poor who come to the clinic, and dispenses more costly medicines to the rich to whom he pays house call for a fee. The dispensary serves roughly 60 villages (3 Unions), but by reason of proximity residents of Dhankura get a disproportionate share of the benefits; 4 out of the daily 50 clinic visits.

Rations (including sugar, wheat, rice, oil, salt, butter oil), in the form of teacher's and policeman's fringe-benefits, are regulated by the relevant departments and the Food Department. Six teachers and 4 policemen and their families benefit in Dhankura. Rations, in the form of public rationing, is regulated by the politicians of the Union Parishad and supervised by the Food Department. The Union Parishad members select beneficiaries on the following principles :

- ration dealerships go to wealthy supporters of Union Parishad members and Chairman.
- 90% of luxury ration goods are distributed among the rich

- of the village (70% of these to factional supporters, and 30% to keep other rich happy and pacified).
- remaining 10% of luxury ration goods and the non-luxury goods are distributed to the factional supporters of the UP politicians.

Table 1 **Public Ration Benefits**

A. VALUE ADDED PER COMMODITY*

| Commodity | Per Maund | Per Seer |
|-----------|-----------|----------|
| Rice | Tk. 55 | 1.4 |
| Wheat | 15 | .4 |
| Salt | 35 | .9 |
| Sugar | 95 | 2.4 |
| Oil | 295 | 7.4 |

* Value-added equals market price less government price.

B. VALUE ADDED PER PERSON

| L-H Category | Sugar | Oil | Salt | Wheat | Rice | Total |
|--------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-------|
| Surplus | (1.75× 2.4×3)** 12.6 | (1.75× 4.4×3) 38.8 | (1.75× .9×3) 4.7 | — | — | 56.1 |
| Medium | 12.6 | 38.8 | 4.7 | — | — | 56.1 |
| Small | — | (.33× 7.4×4) 9.8 | (.75× .9×4) 2.7 | (6.25× .4×4) 10 | (8.75× 1.4×4) 49 | 71.5 |
| Marginal | — | 9.8 | 2.7 | 10 | 49 | 71.5 |
| Landless | — | 9.8 | 2.7 | 10 | 49 | 71.5 |

** Calculation based on following formula:
 average ration weight (1.75 seers) × value-added per seer (2.4) × number of annual payments (3) = annual worth of rice ration per surplus house-hold

C. TOTAL VALUE ADDED

| L-H Category | Number of HH | Value-Added | Total Value |
|--------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|
| Surplus | 6 | 56. | 337 |
| Medium | 14 | 56.1 | 785 |
| Small | 48 | 71.5 | 3,432 |
| Marginal | 19 | 71.5 | 1,359 |
| Landless | 31 | 71.5 | 2,217 |
| Total | 118 | — | 8,130 |

So although rations are supposed to benefit lower categories, they average Tk. 71.5 and upper categories 56.1. And only 19 out of 21 marginal and 31 out of 57 landless receive rations at all, whereas all from the top three categories receive rations. These

figures are those for rations actually distributed. The ex-Chairman and his members were accused of hoarding and selling off a significant portion of the rations allocated to the Union. Whereas the current Chairman is known to distribute a larger percentage of these rations and to distribute them more equitably.

Fertiliser and insecticides are distributed in three ways: by licensed dealers to the public; by IRRI Project Managers to project members; and by the Jute Extension Committee to growers of HYV jute. Fertiliser dealerships are allotted to wealthy supporters of the ex-Chairman, when there is a fertiliser or insecticide shortage, dealers are known to sell at 'black market' rates at which time only rich, influential cultivators are able to buy. Otherwise cultivators from all land-holding categories are known to buy fertiliser.

Credit in the form of ADB, BADC, and Jute Extension loans, are regulated in principle by the Agricultural Ministry's officers at the thana and union levels. However, the UP Chairman must certify which loans are to be used for productive agricultural purposes. So, in practice, only the rich and influential can forward their loan applications through the Union Parishad. The same holds true for the loans through the IRRI projects and the Jute Extension Committee.

Public resources through the IRRI irrigation projects in the form of membership, managership, tubewells, pumps, credit fertiliser, some employment, is regulated in principle by the project Manager and supervised by the Union Agricultural Assistant. The Project Managers are all surplus farmers, connected with the ex-Chairman (during whose tenure lobbying for projects was initiated), who paid bribes to get sanctions for the projects. The tubewell and/or pump are supplied by the BADC at a yearly subsidised rent which includes the services of a mechanic. The Project Manager controls selection of driver and labour, plus distribution of water, credit, and fertiliser- The beneficiaries are mostly kins (whose land lies near the Project Manager's) particularly "politically-loyal" kin (who receive the credit in addition to the irrigation facilities).

We have brought together all the figures on quantifiable public resources to show their worth to those who benefit.

VII. Public Resources and the Union Parishad

The general principle operating behind the distribution of public resources is that when government makes something available, the politicians at the Union-level draw up a list of supporters, and the supporters derive the benefits of the public resources. A slight variable may operate when the politicians decide it would be expedient to assuage the opposition : that is, to keep the opposing rich and influential happy by, say, as with the ex-Chairman in Dhankura, giving all rich, not just loyal supporters the major share of luxury ration goods.

The UP Chairman must not only build his power base but maintain his power. With the resources at his command to disburse, he must not only build political influence but tame political opposition. This balance between keeping supporters and opposition happy involves choices at two levels : at the Union level between villages and at the village-level between factions. With any one Chairman in power one networks of factions and villages is dominant. With a new Chairman a new network emerges dominant. What strengths does Dhankura as a village offer? Under the ex-Chairman Dhankura had no rich or influential members. However the new rich of Dhankura (including the faction leader Kashem Ali) emerged under him.

Given the importance of UP politics in the distribution of public resources, let us review the history of Dhankura Union. Until the mid- fifties, there was always a Hindu Chairman in the Union. With the abolition of the zamindari and migration of Hindus to India, Muslims came into power. The Chairman who served from the mid-fifties to the mid-sixties was Jan-e-Alam, a Muslim Leaguer and son of a *pir*. His was a rich, traditional family linked to the Dhaka Nawabs. His cronies were Naziruddin (who control roughly 25% of Dhankura Union's resources), Minhazuddin (the next Chairman), Joinal Abedin, and Mohammed Ali.

Table 2: Public Resources

| L/H Category | Public Ration | | Teacher's Ration | | Police Ration | | Fert Dealership | | Loans | | Total |
|--------------|---------------|-----------|------------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|-----------------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|
| | No. | Tk. Value | No. | Tk. Value | No. | Tk. Value | No. | Tk. Value | No. | Tk. Value | |
| Surplus | 6 | 337 | 1 | 1524 | — | — | 1 | 300 | 2 | 156 | 2317 |
| Medium | 14 | 785 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 785 |
| Small | 48 | 3432 | 1 | 756 | — | — | — | — | 5 | 414 | 4602 |
| Marginal | 19 | 1359 | 3 | 2664 | 3 | 4200 | — | — | 3 | 126 | 8349 |
| Landless | 31 | 2217 | 1 | 756 | 1 | 900 | — | — | — | — | 3873 |
| Total | 118 | 8130 | 6 | 5700 | 4 | 5100 | 1 | 300 | 10 | 696 | 19926 |

* The value of loans is taken as the use value; that is, the value of the annual interest on the loan.

Note: The value of khas land is calculated in the chapter on utilisation; the value of the salaries of teachers and policemen are calculated in the chapter on Employment.

A leadership crisis broke out in this group in the mid-sixties. With the indirect elections for Chairmen under the "Basic Democracy" principles of Ayub Khan in 1965, Minhazuddin was elected. Jan-e-Alam tried then to discredit Minhazuddin by among other things, spreading the rumour that Minhazuddin was running the local dispensary at Tk, 3000 a month but charging the community Tk. 8000. If the dispensary were to close down, so Jan-e-Alam's story went, the people would have to pay less taxes. So the dispensary closed down and in its place a ration shop appeared. But Minhazuddin remained in power until the Liberation war of 1971.

With the emergence of Bangladesh, power was deflected throughout the nation from the traditional leadership to the youth. Relief Committees replaced Union Councils. And the Relief Committees were chaired by young Freedom Fighters nominated by Awami League politicians. A new national socialist ideology with associated myths (e-g. "land to the landless") was evoked. But the optimism soon waned. With the massive inflows of relief and assistance, the youth were discredited by charges of misappropriation,

And so, by the UP elections in 1973, the traditional leadership reemerged under the Chairmanship once again of Minhazuddin. Only Jan-e-Alam who had died was missing. His replacement as Member was Abdul Mazid from Dhankura. But although the youth leaders of 1972-73 had been discredited, the traditional leaders had never been any less corrupt. Moreover, the long tenureship in power had led to a certain slackening of their interest to nurture their power base. Rumours of their financial misdeeds increased. Scandals revolving on their relationship with the prostitutes of the region circulated. They were no longer thought to be impartial when they sat to judge on the *shalishi* bench. They were known to charge high "fees" for what should have been free services (e.g. the signing of certificates). The mood in the region seemed ripe for some promises of change.

A group of 14 educated youth of the area rallied a campaign to elect as Chairman a fairly charismatic bachelor from the region

resident in Dhaka. This man was Abdul Alim, who had first gained attention in the region by reporting the traditional leaders on charges of corruption to the Martial Law authorities back in the early sixties. A series of cases and imprisonments had followed: first the traditional leaders were in jail, then Abdul Alim himself. In between, he worked at a small printing press in Dhaka. Two side ventures at the printing press also drew attention to Abdul Alim. He was the ring leader of a group that minted false currency, to the tune of a few lakh rupees in an effort to destabilise Pakistan currency. Again he was imprisoned. Also he took to printing leaflets for a political party on the side and himself became more "politicised". Given his political leanings, his known opposition to the traditional leaders, and his folk-hero popularity with some elements of the population he was called back to Dhankura and ran uncontested for the Chairmanship in 1977.

But what was the basis of his power? And why did the traditional leaders concede? Among those originally behind Minhazuddin and his members, some were secretly discontent. Over the years, those at the top of their political base had gradually ignored those at the bottom. Those at the bottom felt they were no longer getting impartial judgements in judicial matters, free counsel in administrative matters, and perhaps most critically, their rightful share of the rations allocated to the Union. There were confirmed charges of financial and sexual corruption in addition. So by the time elections were held in 1977 the traditional leaders recognised they were going to lose in this particular round and admitted defeat, at least temporarily.

Those openly opposed to Minhazuddin and his "cronies" included Shafiqur Rahman's faction. Shafiqur Rahman was one of the 14 educated youths who launched Abdul Alim's campaign. They were able to draw into his following those who had remained fairly neutral during the earlier UP regime- In particular, they rallied the youth of the discontented and neutral block. But what was their rallying call? What was it that Abdul Alim promised to offer to assuage the discontent of the open opposition and the disappointment of the secret opposition.

To begin with Abdul Alim was notorious for his open challenge to the corruption of the traditional leaders as far back as the early 60's. He was able to maximise on these charges and the associated discontent and mounting disloyalty. Moreover, he had proved not just a talker but a doer by establishing a dispensary for the Union even before he was in power, as early as 1972. And the dispensary's closure and loss of medical services to the area had been the price the community had paid for the leadership conflict between the traditional leaders in 1965. So here was a man who had pinpointed the ills of the traditional leaders, openly challenged their authority, and had brought back to the community a major public resource health services, which they had squandered in a fight to discredit each other.

But what more did he offer? And what additional unmet expectations did he promise to fulfil? Abdul Alim rode in part the wave of socialist promises brought in at the emergence of Bangladesh. He represented the youth who promised more equality. One of his major promises was to distribute more rations to the landless. Abdul Alim welded discontent, that is, into a campaign promise to wrest the bulk of public resources from the hands of the rich and influential surrounding Minhazuddin. In Dhankura, at least, those rich and influential followers of the traditional leaders were the only politically active in surplus category. Indeed, they had all risen to the surplus land-holding category under Minhazuddin's political patronage. Shafiqur Rahman and his factional followers were not drawn from the surplus category. So Abdul Alim's political following was drawn from village leaders not at the very top, youth of all groups except those still loyal to Minhazuddin, and the discontented and opposition from the loyal categories.

Looking back at the critical points in the history of the Union over the past thirty years, what can we say about the winning of political influence and the building of a power base ? With the migration of the Hindus in the early 50's, the Union elections in the mid-50's brought in a leader on a wave of Islamic resurgence. But in order to retain his power, this leader slowly built up his circle of close followers and his wider circle of supporters by wrestling

public resources for the area. Indeed, by the early '60's, these traditional leaders were not being criticised on whether or not they had secured enough resources for the area but on whether these were in fact being distributed equitably. They had lobbied effectively enough on behalf of the Union with the thana and sub-divisional level officers to acquire resources, but they were not living up to promises even to all of their supporters.

Again in 1972-73, a new leadership was swept in on ideological grounds. Here were the youths who had fought for nationhood. Now things were going to be better. Government land, previously illegally occupied by the traditional rich, was going to be distributed to the landless. But, instead, relief and other public resources were squandered as much if not more by the youth as by the traditional leaders. They too lost out because they were not, liberally, delivering the good to sufficient numbers. The traditional leaders reemerged, but they had not changed. Discontent only grew. Again, the political base was not being nurtured and maintained with enough care and disbursement of goods and services as expected.

So the pattern is clear. A leader can emerge on promises, on ideological ground, religious sentiments, national sentiments, or most clearly equality sentiments. But the leader must live up to the expectations that won him his votes. And repeated ideology does not fulfil expectations. What makes or breaks the leadership is the leader's ability to divert public resources to his constituency and, as importantly, to distribute these resources in the proper balance between supporters both within the inner and outer circles and within the opposition.

So where does Abdul Alim stand in relation to the promises he made, the expectations he raised? The bulk of public resources are still regulated by the ex-Chairman and his supporters as can be seen in the following list. The list shows the resource being regulated by the power groups behind the current and ex-Chairman's in early 1978.

Present Chairman

Rations-more equitably
7 ration dealership
Insecticide dealership
1 tubewell
ADB loans
government dispensary
200 maunds FFW

—
—
—
—
—

EX-Chairman

Rations-less equitably
2 ration dealerships
5 fertiliser dealerships
2 tubewells
BADC loans
—
—
IRRI projects
Khas land
Khas ponds
Jute Block Chairmanship
Jute Block fertiliser and loans

It took Abdul Alim well into 1978 just to get a hold on the administration of the area. He must come through with his promises on a new order if he is to stay in power. But the opposition has its own strategy to discredit him adopted before the decision not to contest his election in 1977. The strategy is quite simply one of non-cooperation. Previously, Abdul Alim tried to lease the *Khas* ponds within the zamindari estate on behalf of the local school. The lease was up for renewal. The traditional leaders who had leased it earlier on private terms realised that they should not appear greedy. So they managed to renew the lease in the name of a member of a landless fishermen's cooperative. Having renewed the lease for Tk. 200, they turned around and sub-leased the pond for Tk. 1500 to, the cooperative. Abdul Alim was not able to benefit the school, and he had lost one round in the contest for regulating the public resources available to Dhankura.

What then are his prospects given the non-cooperation campaign by the traditional leaders? Already some are slowly campaigning for the 1981 elections saying that Minhazuddin's son should be Chairman and Kashem Ali one of the members. Abdul Alim is known now to be distributing all of the rations allocated to the region and distributing them more equitably. But is this enough? It would appear he must come through with something dramatic for the region if he is to survive. Potential public resources of a large scale include electricity and the re-excavation of the Ghazikhally canal. Abdul Alim has joined the President's party. Certain public resources may be gained through national political patronage. But he is not the only one linked now to the political and influential in Dhaka. Kashem Ali is the member of a national party and has lobbied already for electricity with the powers that be in Dhaka. He has been promised electricity before the national elections of early 1979 in return for his political support. So the battle for public resources at the Union level continues.

PART III

THE RESOURCE FLOW

QUANTUM OF RESOURCES

In Part II of this study we examined the resources of Dhankura and presented the distribution of these resources between the five land-holding categories of households. In so doing, we discussed certain trends in and explanations for the distribution pattern. In Part III we will provide further explanations as to why the resource system of Dhankura functions in the way it does. To do so, we will present the flow of resources, examine the mediating factors and institutions which regulate the distribution and flow of resources, identify the resource strategies which individuals adopt given these institutions and factors, and analyse the conflicts which arise when individuals adopt these strategies.

But first let us quantify by blocks the total resources of Dhankura. The derivation and distribution of these quantum will be presented in the tables of Chapter 2 below where we discuss the flow of the resources. The value of each block and the total from all blocks of resources are presented here :

| | |
|-------------------------------|---------|
| Ownership of Land : | 277,803 |
| Utilisation of Land : | 199,422 |
| Additional Internal Sources : | 192,418 |
| Trade and Employment : | 280,039 |
| Public Resources : | 19,926 |
| Total : | 69,6089 |

The fact that the resources of Dhankura are of this nature and of this magnitude is the result of a whole series of factors. Many of these factors emanate from the overall economy of Bangladesh,

its governmental policies, and its international position. Other factors which affect the resource picture of Dhankura are regional and not national. The government's agricultural policies have a direct bearing on the price of agricultural commodities, cost of agricultural inputs, and the rate at which new agricultural technologies are absorbed in the rural economy. And these factors, in turn, have direct bearing on the productivity of the land.

Certain factors particular to the Manikganj region also influence the productivity of the land in that region. Over the years, and with a massive flood in 1946, the rivers of the Manikganj region have silted in to the extent that they are most often not navigable. And the land itself has silted over to a height that annual floods cannot replenish the soil nor be trapped to allow for the cultivation of transplant *aman*, which requires standing water at sowing. Manikganj has become a rice deficit area. Winter crops have gained in significance with the change in cropping, as most winter crops can only be sown where *aman* has not been cultivated.

The economy of Bangladesh is a subsistence agricultural economy. But what does this imply? Does this economy vary from place to place? With the urban sector as it is in Bangladesh, generally the demands for village produce is low and trading opportunities few. But trading facilities in Manikganj are higher than average given its proximity to Dhaka and the transport facilities of the Dhaka-Aricha Road. Manikganj exports vegetables, chickens, eggs, and milk (all perishables) to Dhaka. But despite the transport facilities, so long as demand and marketing facilities remain inadequate, there will be no significant increase in production.

With the industrialised sector as small as it is in Bangladesh, the numbers drawn out for non-agricultural rural or urban employment is small. Even though Manikganj is only 40 miles from Dhaka with frequent bus services, a commuting population is almost non-existent in Manikganj. Education facilities are greater than in other regions. There are several primary schools, four high schools, a college in Manikganj (6 miles) and a university in Savar

(20 miles) accessible to Dhankura residents. But so long as employment opportunities for the educated do not increase, the rate of investment in education, particularly higher education, will probably not increase.

These national and regional factors have only been mentioned by way of a reminder of their influence on the quantum of resources available to Dhankura. But it is to the internal factors which affect the quantum and distribution of resources in Dhankura that we turn in Chapter 2.

FLOW OF SOURCES

Given the complement and quantum of resources available to Dhankura, let us re-examine the way in which resources are being distributed between the members of the Dhankura community. We have consolidated the figures presented in Part II into a series of tables in order to show the flow of income by resource block across the land-holding categories. For each block of resources we have presented; 1) the total taka value of the resource by land-holding category; 2) the average taka value by land-holding category; and 3) a return ratio taking the average to the landless as one.

Block A: Ownership of Land

In Chapter 2 of Part II, we discussed the differences between cultivable, operational, and return holdings. And in the same chapter, we explained what we mean by the owner's net return per crop: gross return (average yield x price) less input cost (wages, seeds, and fertiliser). The owner's share equals : acreage under each crop times owner's net return per crop. A certain income is earned by Dhankura residents from land owned in Khaliyahury: this land and its return are discussed in Chapter I of Part II. We have taken the owner's share from return holdings in Dhankura and owner's share from land in Khaliyahury to arrive at a taka value for land owned by Dhankura residents. We have brought all these figures¹ together in the following table :

¹ Supporting tables to this block-table are:
Table 3, Chapter 1, Part II
Table 7, Chapter 2, Part II
Table 10, Chapter 2, Part II

Table 1: Ownership of Land

| | Surplus | Medium | Small | Marginal | Landless |
|-------------------------------|---------|--------|---------|----------|----------|
| Cultivable Holding | 48.91 | 48.94 | 86.04 | 8.25 | — |
| Return Holdings | 52.81 | 44.26 | 78.40 | 10.72 | 13.62 |
| Average Return Holdings | 8.8 | 3.2 | 1.6 | 0.5 | 0.2 |
| Owner's Share Return Holdings | 67,518 | 62,728 | 101,133 | 14,436 | 18,283 |
| Average Owner's Share | 11,253 | 4,481 | 2,107 | 687 | 321 |
| Sub-Ratio-1 | 35 | 14 | 7 | 2 | 1 |
| Khaliyahury Return | 1,800 | 1,900 | 6,900 | 2,700 | 400 |
| Total Return | 69,318 | 64,628 | 108,038 | 17,136 | 18,683 |
| Average Return | 11,553 | 5,616 | 2,251 | 816 | 328 |
| Ratio-1 | 35 | 14 | 7 | 2 | 1 |

The usual way of looking at land and income from land is to take the amount of cultivable land owned and discuss the return from it. But we can see from this table the degree ownership alone is misleading. The first choice the farmer faces is how much of his cultivable land to operate himself. His return from his land will depend on how much he operates and how much he leases, mortgages, or sharecrops in and out. It is preferable to look at returns rather than cultivable holdings which is: surplus-1: medium-16 : small-8 : marginal- 2.5 : and landless-1.

But to look simply at return holdings is also misleading. The owner's share is determined not simply by the quantum or return holding but also by the cropping pattern. Cropping choice, in turn does not depend simply upon amount of land owned but also on the individual farmer's capital and risk-bearing capacity and hence, his investment pattern. Investment capacity and investment practice, it should be noted, differ in resource and individual to individual. This difference is highlighted if we compare owner's share per unit of land by land-holding category : that is, if we divide the total owner's share per land-holding category by the total return holdings of that category we get the following share per acre of land :

| | |
|------------|------|
| Surplus : | 1279 |
| Medium : | 1417 |
| Small: | 1290 |
| Marginal : | 1347 |
| Landless: | 1379 |

So although the average return holding and hence average owner's share for the surplus is higher than the medium the cropping pattern of the medium is better.

What accounts for the fact that the owner's share of the surplus per acre of land is lowest ? We presented the acreage under cultivation and net return per crop by land-holding category in table 10, chapter 2, Part II. The medium have more land under jute and winter crop cultivation (crops with the highest returns)

than the rich. Although their investment capacity is presumably equal or lower than the surplus, the medium make larger investments in land. The surplus put more of their investment capacity into non-agricultural investments. And the marginal and landless, who cannot invest so heavily in jute (highest inputs) have a significant acreage under winter crops (highest returns). And those from the landless who operate land invest fairly heavily in crops, although the category as a whole invest in other sources of income.

The surplus farmers as a category earn a disproportionate share of the return from the land (a ratio of 35 to 1 compared to the landless), but not as disproportionate as their share of return holdings (a ratio of 4 to 1 compared to the landless). The return from land owned in Khaliakhury is presented under this same table. But it should be noted that the ownership of internal land does not have a consequence on the ownership of land in Khaliakhury or vice versa. And it should also be noted that the ratio of return from and is not affected by the addition of the Khaliakhury income.

Block B : Utilisation of and

In Chapter 2 of Part II, we discussed the manday implications of the system of cultivation chosen by the land-holding categories. We calculated the average number of mandays required per crop per acre for the tilling, sowing; and harvesting stages of cultivation. We then calculated the total mandays required for the cropping pattern chosen by each land-holding category, and finally, the number of paid and unpaid mandays by land-holding category. The income from both paid and unpaid family labour was calculated at the rate of Tk. 7 per day for field work. The income from working the land of the surplus and medium households has been distributed between the marginal, landless, and small households. Roughly Tk. 4000 of some Tk. 9000 worth of paid mandays generated by the small has been distributed between the marginal and landless categories.

In Chapter 3 of Part II, we discussed the manday implications and value-added by the disposal of crops by land-holding categories. The income from both paid and unpaid family labour was calculated at the rate of Tk. 5 per day for processing. The return from unpaid family labour was included in the income from processing one's own yield. The income from processing others yield represents the return from the paid processing womandays by the surplus and medium categories distributed between small, marginal, and landless categories. A storage return per crop was also calculated. We have brought all these figures¹ into the following table 2:

Let us examine each line of this table to see the flow of income from land utilisation across the categories. First let see how much labour is used per acre of land by each category. If we divide the total mandays² by return holdings for each land-holding category, we see the following pattern:

| | |
|----------|----|
| Surplus | 75 |
| Medium | 78 |
| Small | 75 |
| Marginal | 76 |
| Landless | 76 |

The medium grow the most jute and require the most mandays.

But what is the ratio of paid to unpaid labour by land-holding category with the surplus the ratio is roughly 1 to 1.

¹ Supporting tables to this block-table are
 Table 5, Chapter 2, Part II
 Table 1, Chapter 3, Part II
 Table 2, Chapter 3, Part II
 Table 5, Chapter 3, Part II

² See table 3. Chapter, Part II

Table 2: Utilisation of Land

| | Surplus | Medium | Small | Marginal | Landless |
|-------------------------------------|---------|--------|---------|----------|----------|
| Mandays | | | | | |
| Paid | 2,049 | 1,991 | 1,404 | 166 | 221 |
| Unpaid | 1,910 | 1,487 | 4,567 | 652 | 809 |
| Return from unpaid family labour | 13,370 | 10,409 | 31,969 | 4,564 | 5,663 |
| Return from paid labour | — | — | 13,500 | 5,500 | 15,000 |
| Income from processing own yield | 13,872 | 10,431 | 28,934 | 4,591 | 5,763 |
| Income from processing others yield | — | — | 2,300 | 900 | 2,595 |
| Storage value added | 7,825 | 5,620 | 1,040 | 220 | 100 |
| Total return | 39,026 | 29,938 | 83,714 | 16,593 | 30,151 |
| Average return | 6,504 | 2,138 | 1,744 | 790 | 529 |
| Ratio — 2 | 12 | 4 | 3 | 1.5 | 1 |
| Land total | 108,344 | 94,566 | 191,752 | 33,729 | 48,834 |
| Land average | 18,057 | 6,755 | 3,995 | 1,606 | 857 |
| Ratio — 3 | 21 | 8 | 5 | 2 | 1 |

But with the medium the ratio is roughly paid-4 to unpaid-3. But why should the ratio between surplus and medium rates for paid and unpaid differ when they operate more or less the same amount of total land ? The surplus families have remained joint with an average of 2.4 labour available per household, whereas the medium families are no longer joint and average only 1.4 labour available per household. And two medium households find it more economical to hire their sons out as permanent labour and to hire in daily labour as needed. The surplus do not hire out their family labour.

With the small category, the ratio of paid to unpaid takes a high reversal: paid-1 to unpaid-3. And with the marginal and landless the ratio is 1-4. What does all this add up to in terms of the resource flow? An income from 4040 paid mandays (i.e. Tk. 28,280) flows from the surplus and medium to the small, marginal, and landless. And, roughly another Tk. 4000 flows from the small to the marginal and landless. Another roughly Tk. 5000 worth of paid mandays circulate within the small category.

The income from processing crops also flows from the surplus and medium to the small, marginal, and landless. Indeed, processing holds quite a significance for those in the lower categories. In Chapter 3, we compared the net return to value-added by processing for *aus* and *aman* crops and found that the two upper land-holding categories add only 31% value by processing to returns whereas the lower three categories add another 45% value to their returns¹. We can, to highlight the processing significance for the lower categories, compare the small's return holding (78.40 acres) and their processing return from their own yield (28,934) to the return holdings (97.07) and processing value-added (24,303) of surplus and medium combined. Although the small earn a return from less land than surplus and medium combined, yet they earn far more value-added by processing their own yields. Moreover, roughly Tk. 5795 income from paid womandays of processing flow from the upper two categories to the lower three.

¹ See table 3, Chapter 3, Part II

However, the processing advantage to the lower categories is offset by the storage advantage to the upper. Indeed, the storage value-added ratio landless to surplus is 1,652. Storage requires facilities within the homestead, but, more importantly, a margin of surplus so that one is not forced to sell at harvest. Only the surplus can really maximise on storage. Even the medium return from storage is on the average one-third that of surplus.

Ratio 2 shows the distribution of income from use of land. The surplus-landless ratio stands at 12-1 compared to 35-1 under ownership of land. The landless use of their own labour accounts for the large drop in the ratio. We can see clearly from ratio 1 and 2 how misleading a simple ownership calculation can be. It is interesting to compare how much income the small, marginal, and landless categories derive on the average from their own cultivation and from working other's land. Own includes owner's share plus return from unpaid family labour plus income from processing own yield plus storage value-added. Other's includes return from paid labour plus income from processing other's yield:

| | OWN | OTHER'S |
|------------|------|---------|
| Small : | 3541 | 329 |
| Marginal : | 1262 | 305 |
| Landless : | 530 | 309 |

Surplus do not sell their labour; and medium sell their labour almost exclusively outside the village. Ratio 3 shows the distribution of the combined incomes from the ownership and utilisation blocks. Compared to the ownership ratio, the marginal-landless ratio remains constant. The small-landless ratio drops least. And the drop in the medium-landless and surplus-landless are comparable. The important thing to remember is that land ownership does not determine control over other resources even land utilisation.

Block C: Additional Sources of Internal Income

The additional sources of income from within the village income from subsidiary agricultural and non-agricultural production plus services were discussed in Chapter 4 of part II. Subsidiary agricultural production includes dairy, poultry, and horticulture : all of which derive from the land. The figures indicating how much each land-holding category produces, consumes, and sells were presented in table 1 of chapter 4. Non agricultural products manufactured in the village include snack foods, curd, rope, iron tools and equipment, bamboo craft and handloom. The distribution of income from these products by land-holding category was presented in table 3 of chapter 4. Services include the medical, ritualistic, and religious provided by village residents for the income from these see table 4, chapter 4. We have brought all these figures together in the following table :

Subsidiary agricultural production depends in part upon land available (especially for horticulture), but also in large part on one's capital and risk-bearing capacity (especially for dairy). We see that the surplus and medium maximise poultry and dairy products over horticulture. This reflects in part their investment capacity, but certain normative factors also operate. All of subsidiary agricultural production is the preserve of women but horticulture requires the most labour. The upper categories try for status reasons to conserve their female labour. Only women from the lower categories engage in intensive horticulture. The small, marginal, and landless maximise horticulture as they have less surplus to invest in the capital required for cows and poultry. The constraint to their horticulture is land.

If one takes the ratio from the taka value of the total subsidiary agricultural income one gets the following:

Table 3: Additional Internal Sources of Income

| | Surplus | Medium | Small | Marginal | Landless |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Subsidiary Agriculture | 3,150 14,400 | 12,250 15,450 | 26,640 20,720 | 12,945 8,890 | 2,422 10,177 |
| Land Total | 125,894 | 122,356 | 239,112 | 55,564 | 61,433 |
| Land average | 20,982 | 8,740 | 4,982 | 2,646 | 1,078 |
| Ratio-4 | 20 | 8 | 5 | 2 | 1 |
| Non-Agricultural production | 2,900 | 4,500 | - | 13,700 | 33,950 |
| Services | 3,700 | 400 | 484 | 2,050 | 3,600 |
| Sub-total | 24,150 | 32,690 | 47,844 | 37,585 | 50,149 |
| Average | 4,025 | 2,335 | 997 | 1,790 | 880 |
| Ratio-5 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 |

surplus-13, medium-9, small-4, marginal-5, and landless-1. Whereas the ratio if one takes the cash income alone looks like this: surplus-13, medium 21, small-13, marginal-15, and landless-1.

We have added the income from subsidiary agriculture to the totals from the land ownership and utilisation blocks to arrive at a grand total for all incomes deriving from land. The surplus-landless ratio drops while the other ratios remain constant between ratio 3 and 4. The movement of incomes from the land by block has drifted consistently from the upper categories towards the lower.

Non-agricultural production reflects in large part hereditary caste and class occupations. The high income in the landless category represents that from landless Hindus engaged in caste occupations. Service incomes do not reflect investment capacity, caste lines, or whatever but are largely idiosyncratic. The ratio of incomes from this block of non-related sources is the lowest : surplus-5 to landless-1.

Block D: Trade and Employment

Trade and employment incomes have been discussed in separate chapters in Part II. We have seen from tables 1 and 3 of Chapter 5 the incomes from employment by land-holding category. And we have seen from table 1 of chapter 6 the incomes from trade by land-holding categories. We can show all these figures in the table 4:

Trade is clearly of more significance for the surplus than for the medium. Indeed, the medium remain quite land-based and exercise little hold over either trade or employment: If we compare the surplus to medium incomes from land and trade-and-employment the surplus derive on the average three times as much from land as the medium but eleven times as much from trade and employment. The hold of the small on trade and employment is weaker still than the medium, whereas for the lower two categories trade and employment are significant. It

Table 4: Trade and Employment

| | Surplus | Medium | Small | Marginal | Landless |
|---------------------------|---------|--------|--------|----------|----------|
| Trade Income | 84,600 | 22,000 | 11,960 | 26,860 | 36,000 |
| Average Trade income | 14,100 | 1,571 | 249 | 1,279 | 632 |
| Ratio-5 | 22 | 3 | - | 2 | 1 |
| Employment Income | 14,200 | 2,700 | 5,604 | 26,700 | 49,415 |
| Average Employment income | 2,367 | 193 | 117 | 1,271 | 867 |
| Ratio-6 | 3 | - | - | 2 | 1 |
| Sub-Total | 98,800 | 24,700 | 17,564 | 53,560 | 85,415 |
| Average Sub-Total | 16,467 | 1,764 | 366 | 2,550 | 1,499 |
| Ratio-7 | 11 | 1.2 | - | 2 | 1 |

should be remembered that in these lower two categories behaviour is not uniform or predictable. Those who go in for trade do not necessarily go in for the same volume or type of trade. The average income from trade for the marginal is distorted by Paresh Shaha's (the large-scale sweetmaker's) income which is significantly more than other trade incomes for that category.

But the more significant fact is that even at the lowest level any surplus is invested in trade and/or employment before land. A small surplus invested in trade brings a quicker return than that surplus invested in land. The level of surplus to be invested affects the status and scale of business investment. Certain types of business require, obviously, less capital than others. Once a surplus is earned from a small-scale or low-status business, that additional capital may be invested in a large-scale or more related status business. Once a significant surplus is generated, then only is land which is less of a quick-return investment but more status and secure related, invested in. The line of upward mobility is through trade in Dhankura.

Dhankura is in some respects, typical of a rural society in that most of those who inherited a surplus migrated out. The vacuum caused by the Hindu migration was filled by new surplus who had not inherited land but were entrepreneurs. The medium category reflects the more typically" land-based class who earn most of their income from land and have not diversified their resource base.

And if we look at the consequence of land on other resources we find that land has had little consequence on business investment in Dhankura. Rather, once a trade income is obtained only then is land invested in. The surplus land-owners of 1947 turned their surplus into savings for migration. The medium land-owners of 1947 remained land-based. And the new surplus land-owners came to that position through business. In Dhankura, business has had a consequence on land purchase rather than the other way around.

But land, and more generally resources, have had some significance on employment. Again, the medium and small categories have very little hold on employment, and the importance of employment income for the surplus is low. But in the lower categories some got their jobs by selling their land to pay requisite bribes others through the special circumstances of caste or family linkages. Those who have gone in for employment are still building their capacity to invest or reinvest in land. None have been able as yet to purchase land.

The total income from trade and employment (Tk. 280,039) in Dhankura is fairly substantial ; amounting to nearly one-half of the land total including subsidiary agricultural production (Tk. 604,359) and over half of the land total excluding subsidiary agricultural production (Tk. 477,255). The position of small in the trade and employment block is absolutely minimal. The small remain absolutely land-based and represent in a way the traditional subsistence-level farm household, with little surplus to invest in any other resource other than the maintenance of agricultural livestock and equipment. Two different sets of ratios could be taken for this block of income, one with the small as one and the other with the landless remaining as one. We have chosen to retain the landless as one by way of uniformity and comparison with the ratios in the other blocks.

Block E: Public Resources

We have seen from Chapter 7 in Part II the public resources which have benefitted residents of Dhankura. We include the salaries from police and teacher positions in the employment figures and the value of public land for those who cultivate it under the land utilisation figures. The other public resources, including public teacher, and police rations plus the annual value of a fertiliser dealership plus the use value on public loans were presented in Table 2 of Chapter 7. We were not able to calculate the value (market price less government subsidised price) of fertiliser purchased. The value of the public resources to each category are presented in Table 5:

Table 5: Public Resources

| | Surplus | Medium | Small | Marginal | Landless |
|------------------|---------|--------|-------|----------|----------|
| Public resources | 2,317 | 785 | 4,602 | 8,349 | 3,873 |
| Average | 386 | 56 | 96 | 399 | 68 |
| Ratio-9 | 6 | – | 1.4 | 6 | 1 |

The marginal average and ratio is particularly high because all 4 police from Dhankura are marginal and their rations weigh significantly. It should be pointed out that although public rations are supposed to help deficit households the surplus and medium as categories benefit more, on the average, than the landless from the public rations distributed to Dhankura, The average and ratio for public rations received are presented below :

| | Surplus | Medium | Small | Marginal | Landless |
|---------|---------|--------|-------|----------|----------|
| Average | 56 | 56 | 72 | 65 | 39 |
| Ratio | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1 |

What is actually being distributed through the Union Parishad to Dhankura appears to be insignificant. The total value of public resource in 1977 for all land-holding categories was Tk. 19,926. less than the land income average (including subsidiary agriculture) for the surplus (Tk. 20,982).

Why, if the benefits that flow are so slim, the strong factional allegiance to the Union Parishad? Certain potential public resources are perceived by the people of the region. What is it then that the people of Dhankura are waiting for the UP Chairman to do? Previously he reinstated health services in the form of the Dhankura Dispensary for the region. His political manifesto promised additional services and income-earning schemes:

irrigation schemes electricity, transport facilities. By 1978, an additional 9 irrigation schemes had been introduced in the area a total of 18. And in early 1979, the Chairman is still actively lobbying for electricity for the region. The statutory powers of the UP Chairman give him power not only over public resources but also, to some degree, over the private resources of the region. He has executive and legal powers which entitle him to intercede in judicial, fiscal, and law-and-order matters of the region. So the residents of Dhankura perceive the UP Chairman not only as a distributor of potential public resources but also as a guarantor of actual private resources.

Flow of Resources

The flow of resources from one land-holding category can best be seen if we take the total from each resource block and add them together in sequence. The following table 6 then shows the running totals, averages, and ratios by resource block :

It is interesting to note that the landless-to-marginal ratio remains constant through-out : 1-2. Although their starting point as far as land holding position differed 1-2, we can assume from the subsequent constant ratios that they adopted more or less the same combination of strategies. The landless-to-small ratio dropped by 2 points with land utilisation and again with trade and employment. We have already discussed how the small represent the "typical" subsistence-level farm household, which remains completely land-based and invests its small surpluses, if any in maintaining agricultural assets.

The landless-to-medium ratio dropped 6 points with the utilisation block, 3 points with additional sources, and another 2 with the trade-and-employment block. The medium category's behaviour is fairly well understood. We have already said they act like the "traditional" surplus farmer. Their income is almost exclusively from the land, and for status reasons they attempt to avoid the sale of family labour within the village. The landless-to-surplus ratio drops significantly with land utilisation and the traditional income blocks.

Table 6: Flow of Resources

| | | Surplus | Medium | Small | Marginal | Landless |
|-------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|----------|----------|
| Land Owned | Total | 69,318 | 64,528 | 108,038 | 17,136 | 18,683 |
| | Average | 11,558 | 4,616 | 2,251 | 816 | 328 |
| | Ratio | 35 | 14 | 7 | 2 | 1 |
| Utilisation Block | Total | 108,344 | 94,566 | 191,752 | 33,729 | 48,834 |
| | Average | 18,057 | 6,755 | 3,995 | 1,606 | 857 |
| | Ratio | 21 | 8 | 5 | 2 | 1 |
| Additional Income Block | Total | 132,494 | 127,256 | 239,596 | 71,314 | 98,983 |
| | Average | 22,082 | 9,090 | 4,992 | 3,396 | 1,737 |
| | Ratio | 13 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| Trade and Employment | Total | 228,394 | 151,956 | 257,170 | 124,874 | 184,398 |
| | Average | 38,066 | 10,854 | 5,357 | 5,946 | 3,235 |
| | Ratio | 12 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| Public Resources | Total | 233,611 | 152,741 | 261,772 | 133,223 | 188,261 |
| | Average | 38,935 | 10,910 | 5,453 | 6,343 | 3,303 |
| | Ratio | 12 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 |

The differences between the medium and surplus categories can be highlighted by calculating the ratios for their average incomes by blocks:

| | Ownership | Utilisation | Additional | Trade/ Employment |
|---------|-----------|-------------|------------|----------------------|
| Medium | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Surplus | 2.5 | 3 | 1.5 | 9 |

The utilisation factor reflects the fact, discussed above, of family size and available labour pool for the two categories. The surplus, with larger, joint families are able to maximize land returns by using family labour more than the medium can with their smaller, nuclear families. Trade and employment differential reflects the difference in starting points between the two categories. The medium inherited land and remained land-based. The surplus purchased land only after generating an adequate surplus through trade and employment.

These features in the flow of resources are better seen in the following tables (7-10):

The significance processing to the lower categories is clear. Processing returns add at least another third if not another half (landless) to owner's share on the average. Whereas in the upper categories processing represents only another 20% increase in value to the average owner's share.

Storage carries the greatest significance for the surplus, some for the medium, but absolutely none for the lower categories. The flow of resources downwards suddenly reverses with storage returns.

Even for the surplus, subsidiary agricultural production return averages twice as much as storage value-added. For the medium and small subsidiary agricultural production return comes to just under half of the owner's share. For the marginal and landless

who invest in horticulture, the return is greater than the owner's share for the marginal and two-thirds of the owner's share for the landless.

Table 7: Owner's Share and Return for Processing

| | Owner's Share | | Processing Return | |
|----------|---------------|---------|-------------------|---------|
| | Total | Average | Total | Average |
| Surplus | 67,518 | 11,253 | 13,872 | 2,312 |
| Medium | 62,728 | 4,481 | 10,431 | 745 |
| Small | 101,138 | 2,107 | 31,234 | 651 |
| Marginal | 14,436 | 687 | 5,491 | 262 |
| Landless | 18,284 | 321 | 8,358 | 147 |
| Total | 264,104 | – | 69,386 | – |

Table 8: Owner's Share and Return for Storage

| | Owner's Share | | Storage Return | |
|----------|---------------|---------|----------------|---------|
| | Total | Average | Total | Average |
| Surplus | 67,518 | 11,253 | 7,825 | 1,304 |
| Medium | 62,728 | 4,481 | 5,620 | 401 |
| Small | 101,138 | 2,107 | 1,040 | 22 |
| Marginal | 14,436 | 687 | 220 | 11 |
| Landless | 18,284 | 321 | 100 | 2 |
| Total | 264,104 | – | 14,805 | – |

Table 9: Owner's Share and Subsidiary Agricultural Production

| | Owner's Share | | Subsidiary Agricultural Income | |
|----------|---------------|---------|--------------------------------|---------|
| | Total | Average | Total | Average |
| Surplus | 67,518 | 11,253 | 17,550 | 2,925 |
| Medium | 62,728 | 4,481 | 27,790 | 1,985 |
| Small | 101,138 | 2,107 | 47,360 | 987 |
| Marginal | 14,436 | 687 | 21,835 | 1,040 |
| Landless | 18,284 | 321 | 12,599 | 221 |
| Total | 26,104 | – | 127,134 | – |

Table 10: Owner's Share and Return from Trade

| | Owner's Share | | Trade Income | |
|----------|---------------|---------|--------------|---------|
| | Total | Average | Total | Average |
| Surplus | 67,518 | 11,253 | 84,600 | 14,100 |
| Medium | 62,728 | 4,481 | 22,000 | 1,571 |
| Small | 101,138 | 2,107 | 11,960 | 249 |
| Marginal | 14,438 | 687 | 26,860 | 1,279 |
| Landless | 18,284 | 321 | 36,000 | 632 |
| Total | 264,104 | – | 181,420 | – |

For the small, trade is insignificant. For the medium, return from trade averages one-third of the owner's share. For the surplus, trade income is higher than owner's share. But for the marginal and landless, trade income averages out to double owner's share.

Both trade and subsidiary agricultural production reflect an investment pattern. The medium, for example, invest more in subsidiary agriculture than in trade as their behaviour is land-based. The return to the marginal from subsidiary agriculture nearly equals their return from trade. Whereas the return from trade to the landless is triple that of return from subsidiary agriculture, because land as well as investment capacity is required for subsidiary agriculture.

Employment return carries no significance for the medium and small. The surplus derive only one-fifth of the owner's share from employment. The marginal earn early as much from employment as from trade (both returns nearly double that from owner's share). And the landless derive more from employment than from trade.

In comparing owner's share to total income, we see clearly the significance to the medium and small categories of land income to total income—nearly half. Whereas for the surplus land income is less than one-third of total income. And for the marginal and landless, land income drop to one-eighth and one-ninth of total income respectively.

To the surplus, trade return is the most significant, even more so than land return. Whereas neither trade nor employment returns are significant to the medium and small. Again trade return holds a slight edge over employment for the marginal whereas the reverse is true for the landless.

Let us close this chapter with a few observations on the general flow of resources. Land income earned from the produce of and labour on the land is the single most important source of income to Dhankura. Yet income from trade and employment totals over half of the total land income.

Table 11: Trade and Subsidiary Agricultural Production

| | Trade Income | | Subsidiary Agricultural Income | |
|----------|--------------|---------|--------------------------------|---------|
| | Total | Average | Total | Average |
| Surplus | 84,600 | 14,100 | 17,550 | 2,925 |
| Medium | 22,000 | 1,571 | 27,790 | 1,985 |
| Small | 11,960 | 249 | 47,360 | 987 |
| Marginal | 26,860 | 1,279 | 21,835 | 1,040 |
| Landless | 36,000 | 632 | 12,599 | 221 |
| Total | 181,420 | – | 127,134 | – |

Table 12: Owner's Share and Return from Employment

| | Owner's Share | | Employment Income | |
|----------|---------------|---------|-------------------|---------|
| | Total | Average | Total | Average |
| Surplus | 67,518 | 11,253 | 14,200 | 2,367 |
| Medium | 62,728 | 4,481 | 2,700 | 193 |
| Small | 101,138 | 2,107 | 5,604 | 117 |
| Marginal | 14,436 | 687 | 26,700 | 1,271 |
| Landless | 18,284 | 321 | 49,415 | 867 |
| Total | 264,104 | – | 98,619 | – |

Table 13: Owner's Share and Total Income

| | Owner's Share | | Total Income | |
|----------|---------------|---------|--------------|---------|
| | Total | Average | Total | Average |
| Surplus | 67,518 | 11,253 | 233,611 | 38,935 |
| Medium | 62,728 | 4,481 | 152,741 | 10,910 |
| Small | 101,138 | 2,107 | 261,772 | 5,453 |
| Marginal | 14,436 | 687 | 133,223 | 6,343 |
| Landless | 18,284 | 321 | 188,261 | 3,303 |
| Total | 264,104 | – | 969,608 | – |

Table 14: Trade and Total Income

| | Trade Income | | Total Income | |
|----------|--------------|---------|--------------|---------|
| | Total | Average | Total | Average |
| Surplus | 84,600 | 14,100 | 233,611 | 38,935 |
| Medium | 22,000 | 1,571 | 153,741 | 10,910 |
| Small | 11,960 | 249 | 261,772 | 5,453 |
| Marginal | 26,860 | 1,279 | 133,223 | 6,343 |
| Landless | 36,000 | 632 | 188,261 | 3,303 |
| Total | 181,420 | – | 969,608 | – |

In comparison with land or trade and employment, the other avenues through which the village earns its internal income are as a block equal to less than trade or labour from the land alone. And if one puts the total income from subsidiary agriculture under land income, the additional sources of internal income are of even less significance. And the income from public resources are of minor significance.

Table 15: Employment and Total Income

| | Employment Income | | Total Income | |
|----------|-------------------|---------|--------------|---------|
| | Total | Average | Total | Average |
| Surplus | 14,200 | 2,367 | 233,611 | 38,935 |
| Medium | 2,700 | 193 | 152,741 | 10,910 |
| Small | 5,604 | 117 | 261,732 | 5,453 |
| Marginal | 26,700 | 1,129 | 138,223 | 6,343 |
| Landless | 46,175 | 810 | 188,261 | 3,303 |
| Total | 98,619 | – | 969,608 | – |

MEDIATING INSTITUTIONS AND FACTORS

Having analysed the flow of resources in the tables of Chapter II, let us now investigate the mediating institutions and, factors which regulate the flow and distribution of resources in Dhankura. We will try to see to what extent these mediating institutions influence resource allocation. And from the operational point of view, how and why they regulate resources in this way, The institutions and factors we have found to have a mediating influence on resources for Dhankura include family, kinship, faction, the Union Parishad and both an ideological and an economic logic which we will define.

A. Kinship

Kinship, under certain circumstances in Dhankura, determines the flow of the following resources: land transactions, agricultural employment, credit, and public resources. Kinship regulates most sales and purchases of land in Dhankura. This regulation has both legal backing (Islamic preemption laws) and social sanction (kinship norms). One is, by the preemption laws, forbidden to sell inherited land outside the kinship group so long as some kin can offer the market price. Such a legal provision would be difficult to enforce without social reinforcement. In Dhankura, the social reinforcement operates. The preemption laws are evoked with sale both of the land internal to the village and of land in the outside block common to other villages. There is a marked trend of sale by poorer kin to richer kin. Moreover the quality of Dhankura land is low and the price high¹, so there is little

¹ For the discussion of price of land in Dhankura, see Chapter One Part II.

purchase of Dhankura land by outsiders. So kin, not outsiders, are buying up land that is sold.

Kinship norms argue against the sale of land generally. Given an option, a landholder would prefer not to sell land especially that belonging to his father or kin. Indeed, rather than sell kin's land some mortgage it out with the hope of redeeming it. However, most who mortgage out their land cannot redeem it. Foreclosure and sale at a price far below market price follow. An exception to this process is Hafizuddin (a medium farmer) who has mortgaged out 1.33 acres of his own land to buy the land of a kin in order to prevent the sale to non-kin. Hafizuddin remains confident of redeeming his own land, as he derives a substantial supplementary income (Tk. 4000 per annum) from the cultivation and sale of lemons. Others forced to mortgage out their land, sharecrop it back in.

Ownership and operation of land in Khaliaghury is directly regulated by kins. For certain historical reasons¹, ancestors of the Furia, Bepari and Munshi kin groups acquired land in Khaliaghury. It is their direct descendents and kin who own the most land there still. And those who own Khaliaghury land from Dhankura chose to operate this land through kins resident in Khaliaghury.

Kinship dominates labour transactions as well as land transactions. Three mediating factors regulate labour. Status, operates to determine how much paid and unpaid labour is provided by each land-holding category². Kinship and faction operate to determine who gets hired as paid labour.

Kinship is the first consideration in the hiring of daily agricultural labour. The non-political cultivator normally hires kin. What he wants is a steady supply of labour for peak periods, and because in Dhankura residences cluster along kinship lines, kins provide the most steady supply of labour. If the kin pool of labour

¹ Describe in the chapter on Ownership of Land in Part II.

² See the discussion below and section on Selection of Labour in chapter 2, Part II.

is sufficient, he might consider the skill of his kin. If the kin pool of labour is insufficient he might hire neighbours. The political cultivator favours “political” supporters.

Whenever possible, he will hire kin who give him factional support. Next he will turn to factional supporters from other kinship groups. Only when such "factional" labour is not available will he turn to less-actively-loyal kin or neighbours. Faction, however, is the first consideration in the hiring of permanent labourers in Dhankura¹. But most labour in Dhankura is hired on kinship lines with factional emphasis. We have estimated that roughly Tk. 24,000 out of Tk. 35,000 for paid labour flow along kinship lines emphasizing faction.

Non-institutional sources of loans often flow along kinship lines. Kins with some savings are expected to provide loans to poorer kins. Even institutional loans, which can be regulated by a kin or faction leader, flow often along kin lines. These include the BADC and jute loans extended through the Project Managers of the irrigation schemes and the jute extension committee members respectively, but not the ADB loans which are regulated by the UP Chairman.

Under most circumstances the flow of public resources into Dhankura is regulated heavily by factions. Factions provide the most immediate link to the UP, where the allocation of public resources is made. So public resources flow along factional lines with kinship emphasis. An exception, almost by default, is the benefit from the various irrigation schemes. One or another kin or faction leader, who lobbied for these schemes, is generally appointed project manager once the scheme is introduced. The block of land covered by the scheme centres around his land and, therefore, covers the land of many of his kin-neighbours.

The solidarity of the kinship groups depends upon the intensity of the fight for resources and the leader's ability and willingness to give proper guidance to his kins in this fight. The leader of a

¹ See the discussion on faction below.

kinship group is expected to: give legal counsel and defense provide social support and security; be shrewd, educated and relatively rich; and/or gain command over and distribute resources. A combination of all these attributes and circumstances will guarantee the tenureship of a kin leader. Command over resources is the single attribute which can also guarantee tenureship. Other attributes are not a guarantee against challenge.

Factional loyalty through patronage (e.g. employment or public resources) and marriage can cut across kinship lines. This operates most often in a deliberate attempt by one faction leader to erode the kinship support base of a rival faction leader. Under strong, influential leadership, kinship groups remain united and enter (as a group) factional politics: the advantage to the group being the leader's control over resources. Under weak leaders (no longer able to command economic, social, or legal benefits for the group), challenges to the leadership surface and the kins are dis-united. Members of weak kinship groups try to maximise other links for economic gain: faction, patron, or neighbourhood.

The differences in the strength and cohesion of different kinship groups in Dhankura can be summarized. The two kinship groups Behala and Furia, of the two faction leaders Shafiqur and Kashem Ali respectively, give complete support to their kin-faction leaders. Another kinship group, Muda, is divided as the two co-leaders support the rival faction leaders. The reason for their divided loyalties is resource based: the one co-leader is a sharecropper of Shafiqur, and the other co-leader receives labour patronage from Kashem Ali. Two other groups, Bepari and Munshi, remain fairly neutral in factional politics as the kin leaders themselves are neutral figures in the village. Interestingly, Munshi group has the most educated members and four policemen whereas Bepari kins have the most women engaged in food-for-work. A position of neutrality does not, apparently, correlate with economic position. One comparatively poor kinship group, Paramanik, linked to Furia through marriage seeks economic and social security from the Furia group. The group with the least dependable clients and most shifting loyalties is Mal. Zafar Ali,

supported by most of Mal, is behind Kashem Ali. However, a subgroup led by Kamal, Zafar Ali's brother, support Shafiqur. And Mannan, with Shafiqur's patronage, is challenging Zafar Ali's leadership and has opened a rival permanent shop to Zafar Ali's in the Dhankura bazaar. Zafar Ali is known to default on benefits due to/promised to not only his kin but his next of kin, his brothers.

Despite diversification and cross-factional divisions, kinship loyalties have remained strong in Dhankura? But why is this so? Or we can ask this question the other way around. When is it that kinship ties break down, and why haven't they so broken down in Dhankura ? Kinship ties do not break down simply when kinship ideology breaks down or kin norms no longer operate. It is not sufficient to say that in some societies kinship ideology breaks down or kin norms no longer operate. There has to be some explanation as to why kinship ideology breaks down. Kinship ties begin to break down when other ties, essentially economic ties, become strong. Then as kinship ties break down the ideology and norms may begin to wear thin. As diversified avenues of income become increasingly significant to a community, traditional avenues may become less significant. If a landless labourer goes in successfully for small trade, he will be less dependent on a kin-patron for labour opportunities. If the sons of a marginal farmer have all received external employment, the marginal farmer may no longer require the sharecropping patronage of his richer kin. If a small farmer goes into business, he will rely more heavily on the business patron who gives him goods on credit than on kin who give him small amounts of credit and some seasonal employment.

So far in Dhankura not enough resources flow through other avenues to challenge those resources that flow through kinship channels. Employment from the land, for example, is still a major resource to Dhankura, and labour returns flow along kinship lines. Trade and employment returns are only half of the land-labour returns. Public resources and institutional loans to Dhankura are not yet very significant. So kinship loyalties have remained strong and kinship clustering prevails in the residential pattern of Dhankura.

Kinship units then, by virtue of their residential and economic solidarity, become the basic political units in Dhankura. Factions develop around the core of a major kinship group. Smaller, weaker kinship groups align with the larger kinship groups in an effort to derive some economic gain. The resources which flow through the faction further strengthen this kin-based faction alliance.

B. Faction

Faction, under certain circumstances in Dhankura, determines the flow of the following resources: permanent agricultural labour, institutional credit, and public resources. All who hire permanent labour in Dhankura are involved in factional politics. They weigh the additional cost of permanent labour against the political loyalty gained by giving permanent-labour patronage¹. A political patron in the employment-from-land context is one who dispenses more than employment and receives more than labour. Benefits dispensed include wages, monetary assistance, social security, and links to public resources. Benefits received include labour, quasi-political support, and certain services gratis. All employers of permanent labourers are patrons in these terms.

Faction sometimes cuts across kinship lines to determine the flow of resources. In order to enlist the support of a challenger to the rival faction leader or the support of clients from a rival kinship group, a factional leader may arrange employment in Khaliakhury, sharecrop out his land, or establish a strong patron-client relationship even with seasonal labour.

Factional leadership in Dhankura is drawn from those who are leaders of strong kinship groups who maintain union-and thana-level political administrative links. Anyone who aspires to factional leadership needs a strong kinship and a resource base and outside linkages; a family tradition of leadership and education is helpful. It is through the outside linkages that the factional leaders can help to regulate the flow of public resources.

¹ See Chapter 2, Part II for a discussion of these costs.

Which of the public resources distributed to Dhankura have factional leaders helped to allocate? Public relations are regulated by the UP politicians. In 1977, over 90% of the luxury ration goods were distributed among the rich of the village : to both factional supporters and opposition; the non-luxury ration goods were distributed by the pro-Chairman factional leaders to their political backers. The ADB and Jute Extension loans are regulated by the UP officials. Factional leaders forward the loan applications of their factional supporters. The residents of Dhankura who have availed of jute loans are either brothers or deputy faction leaders to the faction leaders. ADB loans given to two residents of Dhankura have been the direct result of their own links to the UP (Freedom Fighters Association and close relation to the Chairman) and not through a faction leader.

Public resources through the IRRI Irrigation projects (in the form of membership, tubewells pumps, credit, fertiliser, some employment) is regulated in principle by the Project Manager and supervised by the Union Agricultural Assistant. The Project Managers are all surplus farmers, connected with the ex-Chairman (during whose tenure lobbying for the projects was initiated), who paid bribes to get sanctions for the projects. Kashem Ali is one of the Project Managers. The tubewell and/or pump are supplied by the BADC, at a yearly subsidised rent which pays for services of a mechanic. The Project Manager controls selection of driver and labour, Plus distribution of water, credit, and fertiliser. The beneficiaries are mostly kins (whose land lies near the Project Manager's) and particularly, politically-loyal kin (who receive the credit in addition to the irrigation facilities).

C. Union Parishad

The general principle operating behind the distribution of public resources is that when the government makes something available the politicians at the Union level draw up a list of supporters (i.e. the pro-Chairman faction leaders from the villages of the Union). These pro-Chairman faction leaders are entitled to derive benefits from and distribute the public resources. A slight

variable to this principle may operate when the UP politicians decide it would be expedient to assuage the opposition (i.e. the anti-Chairman faction leaders from the villages of the Union). The ex-Chairman of Dhankura, for instance, chose to give all rich, not just loyal supporters, a major share of luxury ration goods to keep them pacified.

With the resources at his command to disburse, the UP Chairman must not only build political influence but tame political opposition. This balance between keeping supporters and opposition happy involves choices at two levels; at the Union level between villages and at the village level between factions. With any one Chairman in power one network of factions and villages is dominant. With a new Chairman a new network emerges dominant.

But what public resources were distributed in 1977? The bulk of public resources are still under the residual control of the ex-Chairman's followers : 7 ration and 5 fertiliser dealerships, *khas* land and ponds, Jute Block and IRRI project activities, and the BADC loans. The current Chairman has gained control over less: 7 ration and insecticide dealership, government dispensary, food-for-work wheat, rations, and ADB loans. The actual value of these public resources distributed to Dhankura is not high : a total of Tk. 19,926.

If what is being distributed through the UP is insignificant, why then the factional allegiances? What are the people of the Union waiting for the UP Chairman to do? What potential set of economic benefits do the people of the Union expect from their factional allegiances? Additional irrigation schemes are being lobbied for. In addition, it is hoped that if electricity is introduced operation costs on the pumps will be substantially reduced. The reexcavation of a large irrigation-cum-transport canal is envisioned. Local youth, through an ex-MP have an idea to establish a vocational technical school on the zamindari premises. The village could be declared "Swanirvar" for which many inputs

would be allocated under the national programme for self-reliance. These potential resources must be lobbied for by the current Chairman if he is to retain public support.

What powers beyond distribution of public resources does the UP Chairman command? The statutory powers of the Chairman give him certain legal and tax rights. He is entitled to adjudicate, with the rank of a third-grade magistrate, on civil, criminal, and land cases. He can collect *chaukidhari*, trade license, ferry ghat, fishery, and certain sale (of moveable assets) taxes. So the UP Chairman has power not only to distribute public resources but to regulate certain private resources, and the possible benefits from and powers of the Chairman are not all economic.

D. Family Structure

Family structure also influences resource allocation. In looking at family structure, as a mediating institution we can see clearly how both normative and economic factors interact in the operation of resources. What is "traditionally" accepted as the norm for Bangladesh is the joint family structure. But the norm is breaking down given economic pressures and a new set of norms and values around family will in time emerge.

What are the differences between households that break and those that remain consolidated? What are the principles of disaggregation and aggregation that operate? Previously, and only to some degree now, a normative principle which placed weight on a joint family operated. Even now, after the father's death and the division of the inheritance shares some families stay consolidated for normative reasons : for example, until the mother's death in the interest of not upsetting her equanimity. But the main principle of aggregation is economic. Sons remain united until the division of property at the father's death and then economic considerations are made whether to remain consolidated or divide.

What is the economic reasoning that goes into the decision? Even before the father's death, an earning son will balance out his salary and its division among the larger family unit against his expected share of inheritance. After the father's death, the earning son will balance out his salary against certain other advantages for staying in the joint family; power, kinship prestige, status, options for business. He may choose to sacrifice some of his income for these other benefits and remain in the joint family.

Let us explain what we mean by options for business in a joint family. But first let us point out that we use here a broad definition of joint family. A joint family, in our terms, can take different forms : father with one or several married sons ; or two or more married brothers living together. Accepting this broad definition of joint family, what are the advantages in a joint family for business options? One brother can do well in employment or business or both while the other brothers work the land. Kashem Ali, for one, is able to invest his time in business because the family labour pool at home frees him from the obligation of working the land.

A joint family has a greater chance of cornering resources than nucleated units in that they can save from their pooled incomes. And they can invest this savings in business because the family labour pool frees the time of one or more earning members. Leaders of joint families in Dhankura consider a solid investment for political but not economic reasons. Let us explain. Dhankura land is known for its low productivity. Moreover, leaders of a joint family will have to share land income but not necessarily business income (which can more easily be "hidden"). Although there is then little economic logic to land investment for the leader of a joint family, there is some political logic. One can add to one's following by providing labour employment on one's land to another.

Most families that remain consolidated were affluent, and with consolidation comes options for diversification. The joint family usually is a rich family, therefore, not only because they have remained aggregated but also because the joint family structures allows for diversification. In Dhankura 6 out of 6 surplus

households have remained joint, whereas only 6 out of 14 medium households are still united. The medium have diversified less.

E. Ideological Logic

Ideology can also be taken as one of the mediating factors in the distribution of resources. Ideology operates in the evaluation of resources and this evaluation is reflected in the distribution. We have examined certain elements of ideology all of which are interconnected status, norms, values and life-styles.

We have taken status as the way people in Dhankura look at each and rank occupations and life-styles. People are valued in terms of a scale. The factors in this scale in Dhankura include: wealth (especially inherited), family, education, character (moral and religious), links, treatment of others, origins. The four areas given the most weightage in Dhankura are: what people inherit (family and land), economic status, internal origins (i.e. insider versus outsider), and external links (political, commercial, and employment).

Jalaluddin, although only a marginal farmer, is ranked fairly high in that he is educated in Arabic, a ritual practitioner, wellbehaved, and has two educated sons. Kashem Ali has a mixed ranking. Although his genealogy is fairly good (his grandfather was a renowned kin leader) Kashem Ali himself is considered an outsider to the village, And although he is religious and a teacher, both high rated attributes, his behaviour as a teacher (marriage to a student) has lowered his standing. And although his wealth is high, he has not fully outlived the label of being a collaborator during the Liberation War.

Occupations are also ranked. Those associated with the land are ranked highest. And, broadly put, those outside land are good if they are perceived to be open to all and not disadvantageous to others, Landowners are ranked high as they provide work to others. Employment, as it is more or less open to all, is valued

highly if legitimately obtained. Education, in that is open to all, is highly valued. The services of ritual practitioners and products of craftsmen are seen as supportive to the society. Those in trading are, generally, given a low rating as people are seen to be in their clutches. Business is not open to all and is, therefore, not highly valued. Moreover although business is marked up for wealth it is marked down for the means in which wealth is achieved. Businessmen are caricatured as rapacious and exploiting the predicaments of others. Within the various lines of business some are ranked higher than others. Paddy-husking based on family labour is rated low, whereas stock which takes savings but no labour is rated higher.

We have taken norms to be the operation of status in day to day activities, and values the explanations behind these norms. Sets of norms and values centre around critical areas of Dhankura society : land, kinship, neighbours, wealth. Many of the norms and values concerning around land and kinship overlap. Land, if one is forced to sell, should be sold to kin. Work on the land should be provided to kin. The kinship value system prescribes that kin live together and rally together in the face of an emergency or an affront. Of course, in day to day interactions, conflicts between kin surface. But other kins put pressure between the contesting kin to settle disputes, certainly before any ceremony or occasion. One set of norms and values operate around wealth : Dhankura society does not value sudden wealth or the unscrupulous businessman. People with wealth are expected to behave in a certain way, expend on certain items. Good neighbours exchange small reciprocities and services. Different sets of values, reflecting the different classes of household, regulate roles within the household. Kashem Ali is criticised because his wife and children have a higher life style than those of his brothers.

An individual's life-style reflects that individual's reaction to the norms in his attempt to attain status. Essentially each individual aspires to increase his income and his status or power. Often these two goals are mutually exclusive. Choice for the individual comes both when he chooses the avenue of income and the investment of his savings or surplus. Some may choose to spend

their surplus on immediately unremunerative commodities : that is, in status and power. Others may choose to directly reinvest their surplus to guarantee increased income.

Actual and aspired levels of income and status regulate lifestyle changes. Those with some income, but no land, can attain some status quickly by changing life-styles. This is most often done by those at the bottom in land-holding who have some employment. Those at the bottom with some education and outside employment come into contact with towns-people, their aspirations for status increase so they often find it necessary to change their life-styles. For them economic mobility proves slower. Zafar Ali took a different course. He started in small-scale trade and made a series of economic reinvestments. He has modified his life-style only recently; he now sports a *kurta*, *gamcha* (shawl) over his shoulder, and shoes.

Status operates in a society's evaluation of life-styles. Often the evaluation remains unarticulated, But Shafiqur Rahman elaborated explicitly the following order in life-style conversions; changes in dress; increased social exchange (e.g. markets in the evening; attendance at Juma prayers) hiring of additional labour; improved housing and sanitation (e.g. building a latrine); and improved food habits. He has been quoted as saying "that a household is known to have raised its status if anyone from the household carries a *dula* and milk carrier to the market to bring back fish and milk".

Life-style conversions are directly reflected, that is, in expenditure patterns : especially on food, clothing, and education. The expenditure patterns are more closely related to income than land-holding and therefore cut across land-holding classes. The average villager's view holds that those earning such and such not those owning so much land should spend so much.

It is interesting in this regard to describe the life-style of the surplus in Dhankura. None of the surplus have been surplus for very long. Whereas with the "typical" rich it is expected their consumption would be high and their use to family labour low, we

do not see quite this behaviour in the surplus of Dhankura. Rather the continued acquisition of wealth and income appears more important to them than a demonstration of its effect. They have struck a compromise between refraining from working on the land, working on it fully, tilt between expenditure on immediately unremunerative and remunerative commodities. We have classified their style, therefore, as "modified rich".

Some of the rich, even though they have come to the position by way of trade, do consume more and save less. And some in the marginal and landless categories accumulate savings slowly because life-style, as a set of values, operates for them. The point of maximum savings appears to come before those who are improving themselves through trade, stabilise themselves and start investing in life-style and not economic, conversions. Two medium farmers, Hafizuddin and Jamaluddin, compete in life style with the surplus. Hafizuddin is known to have married his son to a low status but high resource girl in the interest of maintaining a high standard of life.

We have seen through this discussion that the ideological system of norms, values, and status interacts with the resource system. Normative as well as economic explanation must be offered when describing resource flow and distribution. It should be kept in mind that the interaction of the ideological factors themselves and with the resource system is circular. Status evaluation reflects values. Norms are the operation of status in day to day activities. Values offer explanations for norms. Resources help determine the ideological system and are, in turn, regulated by ideology.

The particular ideological system which operates Dhankura is tied in with the income base of Dhankura. The ideology generally values land and the man who inherits land. The implications from this land-based valuation are: if your wealth is inherited you have not done anything detrimental to the interests of others, and if your wealth is inherited you must let others benefit through your labour and credit patronage.

Incomes from business are still seen as income that unsettle the resource system of Dhankura. Businessmen are seen to appropriate for themselves what should be distributed throughout the society. The businessman's income is seen to be derived at the expense of others, and his wealth no guarantee to benefits for a large number. With his surplus the businessman buys land and products at a cheap price for sale elsewhere. The current ideology in Dhankura about business will change only when the numbers of businessmen increase; when benefits from business begin to trickle in and when money from business begin to trickle down, and when money from business no longer remains in the hands of a few people.

F. Economic Logic

Let us turn now to the set of economic calculations which also regulates resource distribution. Dhankura as a village weighs the four determinants of economic mobility—income, expenditure, savings, and investment—against the four options of mobility—land, business, employment, and education—in a certain way. What we mean here by economic logic is the village view of mobility.

What then is the basic logic of the Dhankura economy? There is no enormous surplus in the economy. Indeed most households enter a downward spiral, if they don't get enough income. They can avail of credit and sell off capital assets and land only so long. What are their options to over-coming the downward spiral?

When people drop to the bottom, survival is essential. Labour remains the first and often only option for survival. For those who have overcome survival needs or for those who have not yet fallen to the bottom, diversification is compelling. Those who can try to add business income to labour income at the lowest level. The types of small-scale, low-status businesses are often labour-dependent : for example, paddy husking and mobile trading. Small savings are invested in small businesses.

Accumulation of additional capital is a prerequisite for certain other types of businesses as well as for obtaining certain types of employment. Land purchase requires substantial capital. With less capital, one can further activate land through leasing, sharecropping, or mortgaging in. Education requires certain small expenses but is not seen as a secure investment. Very often at the lower levels, education of a third son might be considered only after the first two sons are gainfully employed on the land or elsewhere.

Let us explore the issue of investment in land a bit further. The option to invest in land is viewed from both an ideological and economic perspective. As the productivity of land is low in Dhankura, investment in land does not bring quick returns. So for those in the lower categories, either the surplus they have to invest is too small to have any land-purchasing power or investment in other surer and quicker returns is needed. At the other end the surplus in Dhankura are not heavily in land. Only one inherited land. They are mostly entrepreneurs. They have reached a surplus position through trade and employment not land income. They consider land a good investment for mostly "political" reasons: that is, one can build up a following by providing work from one's land and some status from the ownership of land. And for the lower categories, from an ideological perspective, paddy subsistence from the land is valued. The lower categories are willing to pay heavily for the first half acre of land once they have a sizeable surplus. The land price in Dhankura has risen, therefore, to a point where it is often not worth it to the upper categories to invest in land except for political reasons. The land situation in Dhankura then is one where most of the land circulates in the lower categories, moving from the hands of those caught in the downward spiral to pursue a line of upward mobility.

The village's view of mobility may be one thing and a villager's options quite another. The villagers usually cannot make the choice to maximise the economic logic of mobility. A villager's choice is most often a function of opportunities. The options taken, given these opportunities, is what we have called in this study the

individual villager's strategy. The principles of economic logic are best seen in operation; that is, as expressed in the strategies individual villagers adopt.

STRATEGIES

In the preceding sections we have reexamined the resource structure of Dhankura in terms of the institutions and factors which mediate in the distribution of resources in Dhankura. We must now see how the people of Dhankura adapt to and exploit the system and institutions available. So far, that is, we have looked at structures and institutions, but now we will look at the actual behaviour of individuals in Dhankura. We cannot, of course, examine in detail the behaviour of each individual and have, therefore, grouped the individuals of Dhankura into ten categories of strategies. That is, we have classified the behaviour of Dhankura residents into ten lines of strategy in terms of resources.

The strategy any one individual adopts is in terms of an ideal. And the ideal exists in a particular form which reflects the ideological and economic system of Dhankura. What then is the ideal of the Dhankura community? How does the community define a high status man? A man with high status in Dhankura must possess land; preferably he should have inherited land. He should, if possible, refrain from direct cultivation himself and hire others to work his land. He should not only thereby provide an income to others, but also be willing to intercede on behalf of others in many ways. He is expected to be a surplus farmer earning a good income. And he should be educated, even if he does not necessarily use his education. He will gain added importance and respect from the degree of outside contacts he acquires and maintains.

The ideal of Dhankura community reflects the fact that the value system of Dhankura has remained land-based. Employment incomes are generally rated high, but if land is owned in addition one's status is higher still. Other avenues of income are still not valued highly. The three essentials of the ideal are: land, income, and patronage. Why, if this is the ideal for Dhankura are different people trying to reach the ideal in different ways? Why does everyone not invest directly in land? Everyone aspires to a similar ideal but must act in terms of his or her own starting point, options, add circumstances. It is the difference in these not a difference in ideal which determines people's strategies.

We have, after examining individual strategies, grouped the residents of Dhankura into ten broad categories. We have classified people into these strategies by asking the following question: given what options and circumstances

Table 1: Strategies by Land-Holding Categories

| Strategy | Land-Holding Category | | | | | Total |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------|--------|-------|-----------|-----------|-------|
| | Sur-plus | Medium | Small | Mar-ginal | Land-less | |
| I Labour | – | – | – | 3 | 31 | 34 |
| II Land-Labour | – | 2 | 22 | 9 | 2 | 35 |
| III Land-Education | – | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 7 |
| IV Land-Low Status Buisness | – | 3 | 11 | 3 | 2 | 18 |
| V Land-Employment | – | – | 4 | – | 1 | 5 |
| VI Land-Statusful Business | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | – | 7 |
| VII Employment Education | – | 3 | – | 3 | 4 | 10 |
| VIII Politics-Business | 2 | – | 1 | – | – | 3 |
| IX Business savings Migration | 1 | – | – | 1 | 15 | 17 |
| X Land | 1 | – | 7 | – | – | 8 |
| XI Miscellaneous | – | – | – | – | 1 | 1 |
| Total | 6 | 14 | 48 | 21 | 57 | 146 |

which decision has been taken by individuals at what point in the ascent or descent in the lines of mobility? For each category, we have defined the prototype individual in terms of starting point, intermediate goal, means, and idiom of behaviour. We have grouped together individuals that share a predictability of resource behaviour; that is, people of whom it can be said they generally follow this strategy except in these instances. We have also explained the logic of each strategy; that is, people of this category perceive their options in this way and adopt this strategy for these reasons. The perceptions tie in closely with the logic of economic and ideological factors we discussed above.

Strategy 1: Labour

Let us turn then to the first strategy category: Labour. These are individuals who have no land or whose land is in hock (i.e. mortgaged out with little hope of redemption). Their immediate goal is survival: the critical issue is how to maintain themselves. They seek labour at all times from any source. Few status differentials or political loyalty considerations can operate for them. The men of this category seek even the lowest forms of employment; as boatmen or sweepers Women's labour as a maidservant or in food-for-work and construction is frequent. The children work to supplement their parents income and to earn favour of employment patrons by collecting and drying cow dung, babysitting, running errands to the market. They try through small services of the wives and children to obtain employment patronage from kins and neighbours. These then are people who have dropped to the bottom and must overcome the survival question. Labour is essential to them as they have no access to other sources of income.

Strategy II: Land-Labour

These are all people who inherited land and employment patrons. They all cultivate land but have fallen resource wise at some point. Their immediate goal is to acquire land and regain resources. They all cultivate land and seek labour

opportunities at off-times and by certain family members. Labour, although not highly valued, is still sought, given limited access otherwise. But they do not seek any kind of labour. Some status differentials not just access operate in their pursuit of labour. The men will not be boatmen or sweepers. The women will not serve as maidservant or go for food-for-work, but may go to kins for processing paddy.

Limited status differentials operate in life-style as well. They are able to buy fish. On the days the men work their own fields, they change in the evening into a fresh *genji* and *lungi* to visit the market and school. They provide some labour employment to each other and to those from strategy I.

They are people who have not fallen to the bottom rung, neither have they accumulated any savings. They cultivate land but have no surplus to invest in either the further activation of land through operational holdings (except the landless of this category) or and purchase. They have no surplus to invest even in low-status business. Those from the medium in this category differ from other medium farmers in that they have the larger families and lowest holdings, no other sources of income, and provide permanent labour outside and daily labour inside the village.

Strategy III: Land-Education

People in this category represent people in more or less the same land holding position as those in strategy II. But in this strategy, all have improved their land-holding position and are activating larger operational holdings. They are operating, that is, on a definite land-line of mobility. Moreover, they avoid labour if possible and never sell their labour within the village. Their life-styles are higher than those of strategies I and H. They are able to eat fish two or three times a week and put on clean shirts at the end of the day.

Education of their children is seen as a conscious investment ; that is, these are not families educating a third son

only after the first two sons have been gainfully employed in the land or elsewhere. Rather they invest in the education of first and only sons.

After survival is overcome (strategy I) and after some savings have accumulated (after strategy II), three options are open to individuals; business, investment in land (through activation or purchase), and education. Those in strategy III have not gone the business-line. They are investing in the further activation and purchase of land plus the education of their children with a view to potential employment. It should be noted here that a conscious investment in education entails an expense of roughly Tk. 100 per year per child at the primary level and Tk. 600 per year per child at the secondary level.

Afiluddin is a landless farmer who immigrated to Dhankura, his wife's village. His residential plot was part of his dowry. He leases and sharecrops in land from a rich-kin-patron from his nearby original village. He sells his labour in his original village on a daily basis and seasonally in Khaliyahury but never, for status reasons, in his wife's village. They have one adopted child whom Afiluddin is educating. Occasionally, he engages his wife's labour in a small paddy husking business with credit in kind (paddy) from a cross-village neighbour who buys the rice back for his stock business,

Strategy IV: Land-Small Business

People in the strategy have invested in land (through activation or purchase) and also in small, low-status (i.e. labour-dependent) business. Many also sell family labour both inside and outside the village. They aim to improve their resource position through whatever means are open. Status consideration do not operate heavily. Their constraint is the amount of capital available for investment. They have only a small amount of capital to invest in business, so the range of business is paddy-husking and mobile trading (rice, grocery, ice cream) and vegetable *furia*. The vegetable *furiaship* is the lowest in status and requires the least initial credit: roughly Tk. 50. A paddy husking business can be financed with Tk. 150.

Nisar Ali is one of the landless from this strategy category. The original family house went to his brother, but Nisar Ali was able to purchase a residential plot and a small cultivable holding (50 acre) in Khaliyahury. He is known to be a good farmer and is able to lease and sharecrop in land through the patronage of Shafiqur Rahman. He sells his labour inside and outside the village. And, with credit from Shafiqur Rahman has started a small paddy husking business.

Strategy V: Land-Employment

People of this category are educated and earn employment income. Their immediate goal is to purchase land. Their options included investment in small-scale business which they have rejected, Those who have employment based on education opt to fix their hold on land. They perceive their line of mobility as follows: education-employment-activation of land-eventual purchase of land.

Masrur Alam was willing to marry an ugly girl and to live in his father-in-law's house in order to gain employment as a teacher. His father-in-law was his employment patron. He keeps all the social links being a teacher provides him, yet he is willing to work directly in the fields he operates. As an immigrant to Dhankura who came with education and employment but no land, his objective is to build a surplus to purchase land through his own labour and employment.

Strategy VI: Land-Status Business

All those in this category inherited land and have improved their land-holding position. They are from the top to land-holding categories. Their immediate goals are to increase resources so they can pursue status and power. They maintain relatively high standards of living: quality food and dress plus social linkages. They receive external patronage (business) and extend internal patronage (labour). They have Union level political ambitions and are using marriage and education of their children as tools to enhance their status.

All these life-style conversions have entailed high expenditure in comparison to their income from land. They have gone in, therefore, for status business to ensure they can continue to maintain a certain standard of living. They have invested some capital in the purchase of stocks of grain which they store for sale at optimal prices. The business has status because it is a form of business which demands no labour only capital and storage facilities. And it is the type of business that does not divert them from other activities by demands on their time or labour.

Strategy VII: Employment-Education

People in this category all inherited and were educated. They have all since divested some land but are yet upwardly mobile. They divested some land to invest in the education of their children. Their main income is from employment. And the surplus from this employment, they are investing in business or keeping in savings. They all received external patronage to obtain their employment and now extend some internal patronage to their kins and neighbours. Although some are kinship group leaders, they belong to strong neutral kin groups and are not active in factional politics. Some of their surplus is invested in life-style conversions: especially fancy clothing (pants and shirts or costly *kurta-pajama*) and cycles. They pursue the following line of mobility: education-employment-investment in education-savings and/or business investment.

Jalaluddin's son followed the education-employment line quite closely. His first son, Faruk Mia is a primary school teacher at the Datara primary school near a bus stand on the Dhaka-Aricha road. With his earnings the son invested in a snack food and stationery shop at the bus stand. The school teacher son also uses the shop for his lodging as it is difficult for him to commute daily to the school as he is lame. The son and his father gross TK. 150-175 per day and net Tk. 30-45 per day.

Strategy VIII: Politics- Business

We have grouped the three most active political types of Dhankura into this strategy category: Kashem Ali, Shafiqur Rahman and Zafar Ali. The three inherited some land but have decidedly improved their land position of late. Their goals are status, power, and resources. They come from strong kinship groups and are themselves faction leaders of Dhankura. Their lifestyles are the highest in the village. Kashem Ali and Shafiqur Rahman have always earned a steady income from their teaching and have also invested some surplus in status businesses.

Zafar Ali differs from the other two in certain significant ways. He did not earn an employment income rather he moved upwards through a series of small business. Indeed for some years he suspended any status considerations to invest his money in whatever forms of business appeared open to him. Only most recently has he invested some money in life-style conversions. Zafar Ali also pays less heed than Kashem Ali and Shafiqur Rahman to the patronage ideal. Whereas the two faction leaders have always to calculate the effect of their decisions on their political following, Zafar Ali seems to pay less heed to his following.

Strategy IX : Business-Migration

All of the people of this category are Hindus who intend eventually to migrate to India. They all inherited the line of business traditional to their caste. Most of them are Shahas known for grocery and other forms of mobile trading. Most are educated as the occupation demands book-keeping skills. Their line of mobility is fairly straight forward: inherited business-reinvestment in business-saving-migration. Most are landless.


Bijoy Shaha is the one surplus land-holder of the Shaha community. He sharecrops out the land which he inherited. He started a small mobile snack food business when he was 15. When he was married at 20 he received Tk. 300 as a cash dowry which he used to finance a small permanent shop in front of the

Kalibari of Dhankura from which he sold grocery, stationery, and snack food. His sons took over this business in 1965. And most recently, after the liberation of Bangladesh, he opened a permanent grocery and stationery shop in Manikganj town. He inherited several business patrons at Savar, Maulvi Bazar, and Manikganj from whom he can take goods on credit.

Strategy X: Land

In this category we have the prototype of the "traditional rich farmer". who inherited land has not diversified into other resources. But the so-called "traditional rich farmer" of Dhankura, although he associates heavily with the land and partly because he does do so, does not keep a stranglehold on the village. Indeed those of this category in Dhankura remain fairly neutral, almost isolated, and leave others alone. The phrase used to describe them is "they are neither seven nor five." They extend some labour patronage but also engage family labour on the land. In our discussion of the strategies, we have seen that villagers must decide at various points in time whether to invest their savings or credit into one of the four options for mobility-land, education, employment, business—or into life-style or power conversions. Let us then build a mobility model elaborating the conversion stages in sequence and the position of the strategies within these stages:

| CONVERSION STAGES | | STRATEGIES |
|----------------------|----|--|
| 1. Little or no land | I | - Labour: have come down to stage 1: trying to generate small savings through labour. |
| 2. Savings or credit | | |
| 3. Surplus | II | - Land-Labour: have come down to stage 1: trying to generate savings through cultivation and labour. |
| | V | - Land-Employment at stage 1: but willing to take risks: have education and employment. |



| CONVERSION STAGES | | STRATEGIES |
|-------------------|--|--|
| 4. | Low-status Business Land Education | IV - Land-Low-Status Business: have come up to stage 4; have improved land position; have improved land position; engaged in small-scale low-status business; but not yet able to avoid labour |
| 5. | Surplus | III - Land-Education; have come up to stage 6; seek both education and land as investments: avoid labour if possible. |
| | ↓ | |
| 6. | Status Business Education Land Employment Status ¹ | VI - Land-Status Business: at stage 6; receive land plus business incomes; extend patronage with hopes of power. |
| 7. | Surplus | VII - Employment-Education: came down and then up to stage 6; divested land for education; now upwardly mobile given employment income. |
| | ↓ | |
| | | X - Land: at stage 6: inherited land and have not diversified. |
| | | VIII - Politics-Business: have come up to stage 8; all derive multiple income exercise power, and maintain high life-styles. |
| 8. | Status Business Land Education Employment Status Power ² | IX - Business-Migration: special category of Hindus who do not hold village ideal as they hope to migrate. |

¹ Status: measured by degree of life-style conversions made.

² Power: measured by degree of patronage extended.

CONFLICTS

We have examined the mediating institutions and factors which regulate the distribution of resources between the members of the Dhankura community. We have explained how various types of people, given these mediating institutions and factors, adapt to and exploit the resource system. But we cannot leave our analysis at this point. If people are adopting different strategies in response to the same mediating institutions, conflicts and tensions are bound to surface.

Individual members of the Dhankura community do not adapt and exploit the system in isolation, they do so in relationship to one another. And sets of norms prescribing relationship behaviour within each mediating institution exist. Kins should treat each other in this way; neighbours in that way. An agricultural labourer should behave in this fashion to his employer. Individuals in adopting particular strategies must often choose whether to break the norm of behaviour for a particular relationship. And whenever norms are challenged or broken, conflicts of varying degrees of intensity arise.

We cannot conclude our analysis of resource distribution without an analysis of village disputes. So the following discussion on the areas and levels of conflict in Dhankura is offered as a corrective to the peaceful, undynamic picture of how resources are being distributed and how people adapt to and exploit the resource system in Dhankura.

There are four major relationship areas in which conflicts emerge in Dhankura; the household, agriculture, commerce and employment. Tensions and conflicts within the household may arise between the generations, the sexes, household head and others, or the separate units of a joint household. The conflicts may arise over land-shares, life-styles, marriage, income shares, or day-to-day transactions.

It is interesting to examine the types of conflict which precede and lead up to the fragmentation of a joint family household. As we have discussed above under family structure, both economic and ideological factors argue for the joint family to stay united until the father's death. Conflicts are either resolved by the father (ideology) or contained until his death (economics). But after the father's death households stay together for varying lengths of time (a few months to 15 years, seldom indefinitely) until some conflict or series of conflicts bring about separation. A major area of conflict is the sharing of income. Conflict takes various forms. One of several brothers living together may have a larger family than the others. The others begin to complain his family receives more than his share. Another brother may have or be suspected to have a separate non-land-based income which he is keeping "hidden" and not sharing equally with the household. If he is not working the land alongside the other brothers, the tensions over this separate income will be greater still. His wife and children may be accused of or actually maintain a higher standard of living than the other family units. The families will quarrel between themselves and eventually one or another will decide to separate from the joint family.

Jalaluddin, a marginal farmer, lived in a joint family with his four brothers and mother for 15 years after the death of the father. His mother was a very strong personality and the family remained united until one year after her death. At that time, one of the brothers, Khaleque Mia, who had saved some capital on his own through a wood-supply business decided not to live in the joint household. His decision precipitated a decision by all five brothers to separate.

Tensions and conflicts over agriculture-related activities are unlimited. Conflicts arise between landowner and land-owner or between landowner and labourer over the selection and/or reciprocity of labour, over boundaries, over land transactions, etcetera. If a landowner contracts labourers for a job which requires more labour than expected, the labourer may demand higher wages and a conflict will arise. Landowners frequently abuse each other's property: letting a cow graze on other's field, cutting fodder from another's field willfully damaging another's crops. Misunderstandings over expected reciprocities of services and labour between land-owners are frequent. And many conflicts arise out of land transactions: two landowners contending to lease the same parcel of land: one landowner able to outbid another for the purchase of land : two landowners disputing over a boundary.

Zafar Ali has the reputation of always being in the centre of one conflict or another. It is very easy when repairing boundaries between fields after the rains to slowly extend one's property into a neighbour's plot. Zafar Ali has slowly expanded his property and taken over 7 decimals of Nazar Ali's land. A surveyor was hired to testify on the illegal occupation. Both Shafiqur Rahman and the UP Chairman requested Zafar Ali to give back the land but so far he has refused. Zafar Ali willfully drove his bullock cart by way of a short-cut over the local palm-reader's field of paddy seedlings. The palm-reader claims : "I'm ready to go to court to protest", but he has neither the resources nor the links to do so. Zafar is generally criticised by people. Some say : "What he takes he does not return". Others say : "With the power of wealth he has become imbalanced." He is compared to the *buwal*. a large fish that feeds on smaller fish.

Conflicts often arise in commercial transactions : between sellers, between buyers and sellers, between the borrower and the lender of business credit. Zafar Ali again, in his fuel business transactions, is known to promise one price and pay another for trees purchased. One of his brothers, moreover, invested some shares in Zafar Ali's fuel business but Zafar Ali to date has not shared any profits with him.

Paran Ali invested some of his capital in the fuel supply business of Hazrat Ali. During a bad storm, a boat transporting the fuel sank on its way to Narayanganj. With the help of hired labour, Hazrat Ali salvaged the fuel wood and the boat. He was able to realise most of his profit less the expenditure on labour. However, Hazrat Ali told Paran Ali he had lost everything but would repay Paran Ali his capital. Paran Ali doubted the story and in his anger brought the case to the *shalis*. Shafiqur Rahman, Kashem Ali, and Abdul Mazid (UP member from Dhankura) were the main personalities in the *shalish* which sat twice on the case. At the second hearing, Hazrat Ali was asked to submit his accounts. The books showed a loss. The *shalish* deliberated and decreed that as a business partner Paran Ali was forced to bear his share of the loss. Kashem Ali, for one, is known not to be impartial in his dislike of Paran Ali.

And those who pursue employment opportunities often end up in disputes. Nazu Ali served as the night guard for the local school from 1962-72. In 1973 he backed Abdul Alim for UP Chairmanship, but Abdul Alim failed and Nazu Ali lost his job. Now that Abdul Alim is in power, Nazu Mia is trying to regain his job as night guard. He has the backing of some local youth and Shafiqur Rahman, but Abdul Alim apparently is trying to play it cautiously so as not to anger the opposition who back the current night guard.

Kashem Ali is the Headmaster of Dhankura Primary School, but he keeps busy with his irrigation project work and is known to gamble in Manikganj. Shafiqur Rahman is contesting for the position. He has influenced Samad, Vice-Chairman of the Primary School and Abdul Alim, the UP Chairman. And he has gone so far as to organise the local youth to lobby with the Thana Education Officer to get Kashem All transferred. Shafiqur Rahman tried to use Kashem Ali's reputation as a gambler and philanderer to discredit him and argued that Kashem Ali spends more time with his irrigation project work than as a Headmaster. Kashem Ali, in return, influenced the Sub-Divisional and District Education officers and the lobby petition has been dropped.

Conflicts are resolved in a variety of ways. The resolution depends not only on the nature of the conflict but also on the level of the community drawn into the conflict. Household conflicts are often resolved internally or by kin. Conflicts between neighbours often remain at a low level and, if not resolved mutually over time, may be settled by the village judicial, the *shalish*.

Barkat Ali and Dhala Mia are neighbours. Barkat Ali annually contracts labourers whom he transports in his boat for the Khaliaghury harvest. The labourer who receives labour employment through Barkat Ali transported Dhala Mia to Khaliaghury, but for some season failed to obtain employment for Dhala Mia once there. Dhala Mia was forced to find his own employment. Barkat Ali still demanded the 1/8th share for his transportation services. Dhala Mia refused to pay and the case went to the *shalish*. Nibaran Ali, Jalaluddin, and others who own land in Khaliaghury and knew the particulars of the case were called to arbitrate. In the end, Dhala Mia had to pay only 1/16th of his earning to Barkat Ali.

But only those conflicts which remain at the lowest level can be arbitrated by the *shalish*. Once a conflict escalates to involve kinship or factional issues or personalities, the *shalishi* cannot act as arbitrators as they are no longer impartial. Higher authorities are then called upon: the UP Chairman or another extra-village party.

And many conflicts in Dhankura are escalated to this point. Let us explain what we mean through an example. Zafar Ali contracts labour to cut some trees for Tk. 30. The labourers find the felling takes more time than expected and they demand more wages. Zafar Ali beats the labourers, who happen to be kin and factional supporters of Shafiqur Rahman. Shafiqur Rahman comes to the defense of his kin and enters the fray. Shafiqur is concerned about his kin's welfare, but he also worries about the images of his faction "My kin are not men, they should have beaten Zafar Ali in return". The conflict is no longer a low-level commercial conflict. The controversy has been escalated to a factional idiom which is kinship-based; Shafiqur is indirectly challenging Zafar Ali, deputy

leader of the rival faction, through a conflict between his kin and Zafar Ali. Zafar Ali's son eventually comes to apologise to Shafiqur, and Shafiqur backs off but not without hopes that he has increased loyalties to his faction through a show of support of his followers.

The UP Chairman or members are most often called to resolve conflicts which draw in factional or kinship personalities. And with the resolution, the norms which centre around the institutions involved surface again: kin and faction leaders are expected to behave in this way to their followers and to each other. Resolution may come only after a redefinition or complete rupture in relationships of the parties drawn into the conflicts; the labourers may not again receive a contract from Zafar Ali. Or resolutions may result in the realignment of the institution drawn into the conflict; Zafar Ali may lose factional support due to his anti-social behavior. Those norms which are challenged or broken when a conflict arises may be reaffirmed or modified when resolution is reached.

As we have seen, conflicts of different intensities are innumerable in Dhankura. But can we find any pattern to these conflicts? Conflicts in Dhankura arise between both people on equal terms and people on unequal status and income levels. There seems to be no one pattern to who's fighting whom over a period of years in Dhankura. But a pattern does emerge in the resolution of conflicts; the alignment of support behind the parties in a conflict is vertical (factional) not horizontal (class). In fact, factional and kinship leaders use their support to parties in conflict as a basic weapon in their political arsenal to build a following.

The leaders of factions seldom come into direct, open confrontation. What really is there for them to fight for? A following and benefits from the Union. Most people fight if they are sure they'll win, and the factional leaders have little to win from open confrontation. If the group they support is in power at the Union-level, they are presumably enjoying the benefits. If not, the faction leaders can only benefit from a policy of tacit support to the powers that be or a policy of subtle campaigning for their own

power with the next election in view. They can only win at the Union-level if they build up a following at the village-level. So leaders of factions often enter the conflicts of others. Since the factional leaders see the possibility of continuous realignment of factional support behind themselves through conflict, conflicts in Dhankura are frequently escalated into the factional idiom. So most confrontations between leaders are over the issues of their followers, and most conflicts between followers become issues between their would be leaders.

CONCLUSION

Let us recapitulate. In this village we have seen that the income earned from the produce of land (Tk. 277,803) and labour off land (Tk. 199,422) are the two most important sources of income to Dhankura. The income from trade (Tk. 181,420) and employment (Tk. 98,619) together total only half of the joint land income. The other avenues of income—subsidiary agriculture, non-agricultural production, services, and public resources—taken individually are of minor significance and as a block equal only slightly more than the trade or labour income alone.

Yet the dominance of land as a source of income is deceptive. In tracing the flow of resources across the land-holding categories, we found a steady decrease in the ratio surplus-to-landless income-wise as we moved from land through labour, trade, and employment. Ownership of land is not the only determinant of access to other sources of incomes. Land-holding is an imperfect codeterminant of income.

Indeed, if we look at the consequence of land on other resources in Dhankura we see that land has had limited consequence on other types of investment. The line of upward mobility in Dhankura appears to be through trade not land. This is due in part to the history of Dhankura. Most of those who inherited surplus land-holdings (Hindus) migrated out. The vacuum left by the Hindu migration was filled by a new surplus group who had not inherited land but were entrepreneurs. The new surplus land-owners came to that position through business. Even at the lowest

land-holding levels small surpluses are invested in trade and/or employment before land. Only when a significant surplus is generated is land, less of a quick-return investment but having more status and secure, invested in. In Dhankura, then, trade has had a consequence on land purchase rather than the other way around.

So land is not necessarily the first economic investment although it is considered the ultimate economic "security". Those who can, purchase land as a security to the level needed to sustain their subsistence needs. Moreover, land is considered a political investment. One can earn a political following through labour patronage off one's land. And a certain status is invested in land ownership. Yet there are certain social constraints to land purchase operating as well. The Islamic preemption laws, supported by kinship norms, curb the instinct to sell. Sales are not made if they can be avoided for obvious economic as well as social reasons. Whenever sale of land is unavoidable, sales are made most often to richer kins. The rich again do not want to over-invest in land lest they lose the favour of their "clients" by denying them access to the land.

So the pushes and constraints on land purchase are weighed by each land-holding category. The surplus, as a category, are not heavily into land for both economic and ideological reasons. Land is neither a quick-return nor a large-return economic investment in Dhankura. Land is invested in for status and patronage considerations. The right balance is struck when one can provide "clients" with sufficient labour patronage but not deny "clients" the options to buy land themselves. Those in the lower land-holding categories must also balance the economic and ideologic logic behind land purchase. There is an explicit economic and ideological value to earning one's subsistence from land owned. So those in the lower categories are willing, if able, to pay a high price for the first half acre of land owned. But other incomes are required to facilitate the capital required for land purchase.

The comparative self-sufficiency of some village economies is not present in Dhankura. External incomes are vital not only to the purchase of land but also to the village economy as a whole and certain land-holding categories in particular. Trade and employment incomes are more significant on the average than land incomes to the surplus, marginal, and landless in Dhankura. The surplus, despite their land-holding, are heavily in trade and employment. Their trade income is higher than their average owner's share from the land. The marginal and landless, because they own less land and because of the fair number of landless Hindus in Dhankura, derive nearly twice as much from trade on the average than from their owner's share off the land. And employment incomes are as significant or more so than trade incomes for the marginal and landless respectively.

Only the medium and small as categories have remained land-based. The medium category reflects the more "typically" land-based class who earn most of their income from land and have not diversified their resource base. They behave, that is, like the "traditional" surplus farmer. Their income is almost exclusively from the land. And, for status reasons, they attempt to avoid the sale of family labour within the village. The small represent the "typical" subsistence-level farm household which derives its income almost exclusively from the land and invests any small surpluses in the maintenance of agricultural assets and, occasionally, in small, family-labour-intensive home businesses.

The particular ideological system which operates in Dhankura is tied in with the income base of Dhankura. The ideology generally values land and the man who inherits land. The implications from this land-based valuation are: if you own land you must let others benefit through your labour patronage. The two accepted goals of the system are the long-term increase in status and power through land ownership and the short-term increase in status and power through patronage. External incomes resultant of education and employment and converted into internal land ownership and internal patronage are given some emphasis in the value system.

But income from trade is still seen as income that unsettles the resource system of Dhankura. Businessmen are seen to appropriate for themselves what should be distributed throughout the society. The businessmen's income is seen to be derived at the expense of others and his wealth as no guarantee to benefits for a large number. With his surplus, the businessman buys land products at a cheap price for sale elsewhere. The current ideology in Dhankura about trade will change only when the numbers of businessmen increase, when benefits from trade begin to trickle down and when money from trade no longer remains in the hands of a few people.

Here then is a village turning over to a point where trade and employment, at least superficially, are increasingly significant. Yet the idiom of its struggle is factional and the logic of its values heavily land-and kinship-based. So far in Dhankura not enough resources that flow through other avenues to challenge those resources that flow through kinship channels. Income from labour is second only to produce income, and labour returns flow along kinship lines. Dhankura will probably not lose its feudal basis until the income from agricultural labour are of less significance and the pattern of labour use changes. Until such a time, because so much of the available resources flow through kinship channels, kinship units are the basic political units in Dhankura. Factions develop around the core of a major kinship group. Smaller, weaker kinship groups align with the larger kinship groups in an effort to derive some economic gain. Any resources which flow from the Union through the faction only further strengthen this kin-based factional alliance. So although the resource base for factions is not high, the strength of factions derive from the close integration between kinship and factions. And although avenues of external income have become significant to Dhankura, the internal distribution of these resources and the individual villager's behaviour in response to these resources has remained "traditional".