On August 27, protesting students of the Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET) and several other engineering universities were intercepted by law enforcers during a protest and dispersed using tear gas, sound grenades, batons, and water cannons.
On March 25, a clash broke out between police and garment workers when law enforcers charged at them with batons and allegedly deployed sound grenades and tear gas in response to protesters demonstrating for unpaid wages, Eid bonuses, and leave.
On March 12, several teachers from private primary schools were charged with batons and water cannons by the Bangladesh police authorities, as they protested against the current government for not accepting their demand for the nationalisation of primary schools.
These incidents, coming months after the fall of the Awami League regime in August 2025, reveal that accountability remains elusive despite widespread public distrust. The police continue to use excessive force against citizens exercising their right to protest, justifying their actions as retaliation against protesters who attacked them. It is deeply concerning that the culture of impunity seen before and during the July 2024 revolution still casts its shadow over the country.
Police as an Agent of Political Agendas
The July 2024 uprising revealed the extent of political control exerted through policing, yet this is only part of a broader pattern, as reports of torture and abuse in custody continue to surface. In August 2025, Durjoy Chowdhury, an office assistant at a government school in Chokoria, Cox’s Bazar, died while in police custody. Police claimed he took his life, but his family contests this account, alleging custodial abuse. In October 2024, Raihan Ahmed was picked up by the police in Sylhet, and died the next day. Following a case filed under the Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention) Act by his wife, an investigation team of Sylhet Metropolitan Police found the allegation of torture of Raihan in police custody as true. The main accused has since been released on bail.
A functional democracy requires accountable and transparent law enforcement. While the formation of the Police Reform Commission is a welcome first step, similar initiatives were launched in previous years and failed to bring about any meaningful change. In 2005, a police reform program was initiated to fulfil a vision of five fundamental strategic changes to the institution: organisational reform, community policing, enhanced training, the inclusion of women in the police force, and gender sensitisation, as well as IT integration. This was largely met with rejection by police personnel, particularly senior officials. While some limited reforms were implemented (such as the inclusion of women police officials), citizen-centric ideas were mostly discarded.
The most important stakeholders in police reform are the citizens themselves. This is why citizen-centered policing—grounded in robust public oversight and accountability mechanisms—is essential when envisioning meaningful reform. A paper published by the BRAC Institute of Governance and Development (BIGD), ‘A People’s Police: Reform Suggestions for a Democratic Police’, authored by Faruq Hossain, Inteemum Ahsan, and Md. Al-Mamun, explains that while people acknowledge the “centrality of the institution in upholding law and order”, they also believe that any effective reform must involve structural changes paired with changes in the police-citizen relationship. Based on a study conducted in the Tala thana of Satkhira, the paper draws on interviews of participants from a diverse range of occupations, including teachers, businessmen, farmers, housewives, students, politicians, retired service holders, police personnel, and representatives of the local government.
Democratic Policing: What It Means and How It’s Done
As it currently stands, the police are often perceived as serving ruling-party interests, wielding significant coercive and repressive powers against the public. Democratic policing, on the other hand, stresses “mutual cooperation”, where citizens and the police work together to establish trust and ensure equitable policing practices.
Such a system could also encourage a shift in the use of law enforcement agencies as partisan tools. When a new political party comes to power, the police are often subjected to various harassment and punishment, such as transfers or demotions, for having served the interests of the previous regime. BIGD’s paper suggests that in a democratic model of policing, citizens would feel empowered to support the police, instead of viewing them as a repressive force or an instrument of the regime. This could pressure political powers to reconsider their exploitation of law enforcement for partisan gain, as democratic control and heightened public scrutiny increase the demand for political accountability.
Public Suggestions for a Democratic Police
Respondents of the BIGD study suggested several types of reforms, emphasising a strong interest in a community-driven approach to accountability, with suggestions ranging from “deploying monitoring cells, involving third parties in conflict resolution by deploying a neutral party,” to “fostering reciprocity between the police and the public, and building stronger connections with the police”.
Building on these suggestions, the paper suggests that a citizen-led thana-based committee could be established in Bangladesh to support the police in maintaining local peace and order, report violations of law, and raise public awareness about police procedures, regulations, and citizens’ legal rights.
The committee, comprising a maximum of 15 people—with members including teachers, socially influential individuals, student leaders, non-governmental organisation workers, retired government officials, and union chairmen, alongside partisan individuals from the local community— irrespective of wealth, religion, gender, or other discriminating factors selected through deliberative community elections. The selection will be a discussion-based process rather than a vote-based one. The OC of the thana could serve as the member secretary of the committee, responsible for convening and organising meetings every three months. To minimise the risk of political subservience, the committee’s tenure should be half of the central government’s term.
Respondents also advocated for a legal foundation to ensure legitimacy and public trust. Apart from administrative and social recognition, the committee should have some degree of authority to enforce its decisions. Respondents also argued for capacity-building initiatives, alongside measures to ensure transparent operations, to ensure that the committee remains effective and free of corruption. To prevent ruling party control over the police, a parliament-centered model of accountability—established through a clear and transparent oversight framework—has been proposed.
There are concerns that political actors may resist the formation of such a committee, as well as doubts about how truly non-partisan and inclusive it can be. However, with a strong legal framework and parliamentary backing, a people-centered committee could lay the foundation for a police force that serves public interests rather than the agenda of the ruling regime.
