November 12th, 1970. One of the deadliest cyclonic storms made landfall 95 kilometres west of Chittagong. In seconds, roughly half a million lives were swept away by the churning walls of muddy water, as high as thirty feet, engulfing the low-lying chars stretched across the delta. Survivors consisted mostly of strong men who could climb high up the trunks of palm trees and hold on through hours of battering by the storm, while scores of women, children, the sick and elderly perished.
The Great Bhola Cyclone, as it was named later, remains one of the deadliest storms in recorded history with estimates of the deaths ranging from 300,000 to 500,000—half of those who died were children. Roughly 3.6 million people were affected, and 13 islands were left completely barren.
It is impossible to say how much damage could be prevented, but the negligence of the Pakistani government in preventing as well as taking precautions was starkly visible. There was no proper comprehensive plan for disaster prevention nor necessary safety measures despite experts’ warnings about the risks (Dunn 1962). The radar station in Potenga, Chittagong, was damaged about a month before the cyclone and was left unrepaired. Thus, it failed to detect the storm. But neither did the government pay heed to the warnings given by foreign meteorological agencies. Consequently, most people did not receive appropriate warnings about the impending danger and were left completely unprepared.
The apathy of the government became clearer after the cyclone. The devastation was met with a torturous silence and sluggish relief efforts by the government. Several calls for declaring a state of national emergency, two days after the cyclone, by Moulana Bhashani, founder of the National Awami Party (NAP) (a political group representing the rural peasantry and working-class), were abruptly dismissed (Dainik Sangbad 1970). The army was not deployed despite mounting concerns for immediate relief. The requests by East Pakistan’s governor for more helicopters to distribute relief were also refused (The Pakistan Observer 1970). Even ten days after the disaster, help did not reach the more remote regions and much of the relief goods were left at the Lahore airport or even when reaching destination, remained undistributed for days. (The Pakistan Observer 1970; Rohde 2014)
The reaction of General Yahya Khan, then President of Pakistan, epitomized the attitude of the Pakistani rulers towards the Bengalis—that their lives mattered little. He was touring China at the time and was supposed to return to Dhaka the day after the storm. But he decided to spend the day for relaxation and visit the day after. During his stay of 24 hours, he showed little concern—journalist Sydney Schanberg of the New York Times found him in a press conference, “walking through with polished boots and a walking stick with a gold knob.” as people starved in the coastal areas. He would also go on to say that the scale of the disaster had been exaggerated and would not acknowledge any negligence on part of the state. Dr Hameeda Hossain, human rights activist and academic who was the editor of Forum[2]in then East Pakistan, said she observed a bizarre festivity among government officials at a reception for participants of the grand Asian Highway Rally soon after the storm. Reflecting on the apathy of the Yahya regime, Archer Blood, American Consul General to Dhaka, East Pakistan commented, “it was almost as if they just didn’t care” (Bass 2013, 20). The terribly poor governance was interpreted as ‘the Government’s “betrayal” to peoples’ cause’ (The People 1970).
Deadly cyclones occurred in the coastal region of East Pakistan twice a year, on average, between 1959 and 1969. So Bhola was not a surprise. The complete unpreparedness of the government to protect the people from the cyclone reflected how little the Pakistani regime cared (Chowdhury 1970). Their promises to improve warning systems, relief distribution agencies, flood control and cyclone mitigation efforts (Sobhan 1970; Sullivan 1970) had remained on paper for too long. In addition to the severe negligence in safeguarding East Pakistan from natural disasters, the systematic inequality in infrastructure development that the region was facing proved fatal. It is estimated that over 90% of those who perished during the Bhola cyclone could have survived if the most basic instruction for safeguarding vulnerable coastal regions—erecting earth mounds—had been followed (Dunn 1962).
In contrast to the state’s apathy, the human suffering sparked deep humanitarian consciousness and the rise of a critical united alliance across rural peasantry, urban elite and global humanitarian actors in how they responded both politically and developmentally.
Political organizations and people-led groups based in East Pakistan immediately mobilized. Although bedridden, 85-year-old Bhashani rushed to witness the level of destruction in the islands. After returning to Dhaka, he informed the press that the survivors said, “none of them came,” indicating the unresponsiveness of the state in the face of an acute humanitarian crisis (Hossain 2018, 196). In his 12 day-long visit, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, leader of the political party Awami League (AL), engaged other local AL leaders for urgent relief operations. Led by Begum Sufia Kamal and Dr Sultana Sarwat Ara Zaman, a group of women activists collected and distributed relief goods. In the deeper South, eminent economist Dr Rehman Sobhan walked from village to village, witnessing the spectacle of indistinguishable remains of human and animal flesh. Student-led protests that had begun since 1969 intensified as the motivation for political struggle was made real by the cyclone and its aftermath.
The impulse for responding to the humanitarian crisis would also be deeply entangled with the ongoing political movement. Efforts were made in unison both locally and globally, from state and non-state actors leading to a distinct form of humanitarianism—with the local at the centre of the emergency response and development interventions working synergistically. International relief operations by foreign governments provided immediate aid supporting locally based volunteer groups consisting of students, journalists, cultural activists and others who rushed to the protection and rehabilitation of survivors.
In what he described to be, “the single most extraordinary event that radically transformed the substance, texture, and trajectory of his life”, cyclone Bhola’s aftermath would redefine Sir Fazle Hasan Abed, then an accountant in his mid-thirties, and his group of friends as they began efforts to help.