December 2025 - BRAC Institute of Governance and Development

She Won the Election, But Who Holds the Phone?

Posted on 24 December 2025 | by BIGDAdmin | Leave a Comment

Imagine this: Sunita (Name changed) has just won Gram Panchayat (local government) elections, which are held to directly elect and form the lowest tier of government in India. She is now the Sarpanch, the elected head, of her village council in rural Madhya Pradesh. On paper, she holds the power to prioritize ensuring drinking water availability for the community, build roads, and ensure government schemes reach the families who need them the most. Her signature is on every official document.

But when there is a phone call from a district official, which is a common method now for communication between higher and lower tiers of governance, she is not the one holding the phone. It is in her husband’s pocket. He answers, listens, and makes a decision. Later, he tells her where to sign or what to do.

This case is not an exception. It is a reality that paints a complex picture of women’s leadership in India. While India has championed women’s political representation, bringing over 1.4 million women into local governance, a persistent question remains: Does a seat at the table guarantee a voice?

Our recent interviews with 81 Sarpanches in one of the districts of a central state in India reveal a story of two starkly different realities. When we asked the male sarpanches if they had the final say in village decisions, 90% said yes. When we asked the women the same question, only 18% felt they had that ultimate authority. These patterns echo a broader national concern highlighted in the Report, “Transforming Women’s Representation and Roles in Panchayati Raj Systems and Institutions: Eliminating Efforts for Proxy Participation” by The Ministry of Panchayati Raj (MoPR), Government of India (GoI)¹.

What is standing in the way of decision-making by women leaders? Often, it is the powerful, invisible force of “proxyism,” where male relatives exercise power on behalf of the elected woman. And surprisingly, the very tool we think of as an equalizer, the mobile phone, is playing a complicated role.

An Efficiency Upgrade for Patriarchy?

A mobile phone would mean a gateway to independence, in the form of communication, for a woman leader. It offers a direct line to officials and other elected members, a way to share information with villagers via mediums such as WhatsApp, and it can also provide access to a world of information.

For some, it is exactly that. But for many women we spoke to, the mobile phone has become an instrument of control. It has, in effect, given patriarchy and cooptation of their power by their male kins an “efficiency upgrade.”

One woman Sarpanch told us that because she doesn’t control the phone, she is not the one who receives information about official meetings with block or district officials. She said: “That also comes to my husband.” Another was even more direct: “My husband looks after most of the work… he handles everything.” Her husband even attends the meetings for her

In this system, the proxy no longer needs to be physically present to control the narrative. He can manage everything remotely, turning his wife’s official position into a role performed via his device.

Why women sarpanches don’t use phones

The numbers from our interviews are telling. While every single male Sarpanch (100%) interviewed owns a phone and uses it for Panchayat work, less than half of the women (44%) from the interview sample own a phone, and only a quarter (26%) use it for their official duties.

The reasons comprise a tangled web of social norms, low confidence, and a lack of digital literacy. “I don’t know how to use the phone much,” one woman admitted, “I just dial the number and make the call.” Another woman’s husband actively discouraged her from using his smartphone, telling her, “Don’t mess something up.”

This gap in usage is not just about making calls; it is about access to the entire machinery of governance. All the male Sarpanches that we spoke to talked about how they use the Panchayat Darpan App – an app designed by the government to monitor their Gram Panchayats’ budget receipts and expenditures and various other details related to sanctioned work in their Panchayat.

This digital access, via mobile phones, also helps build crucial support networks. Male Sarpanches are connected with block and district officials via WhatsApp groups, receiving real-time updates. They also have such groups with other male Sarpanches. When we asked if women Sarpanches were in these groups, we were told that, almost always, it is their male kin, mostly husbands, who are included.

Furthermore, the male Sarpanches are using these tools with a high degree of skill. One of the male Sarpanches also shared how he records video messages about various government schemes to share them with the citizens of his Gram Panchayat over WhatsApp groups. This is one step ahead of sharing updates via WhatsApp text messages, particularly for many such citizens who are unable to read.

This is the world of mobile phones, which promises a plethora of information, efficiency, and peer support, that many women Sarpanches are locked out of. More interestingly, it is not just due to a lack of a device, but driven by the low skills and, more than that, the lack of agency to use the mobile phones.

Promise for a Different Future

But that’s not the whole story. Hidden within these challenging narratives are powerful glimmers of hope.

Meet the woman Sarpanch who used to be a cook for a school’s mid-day meal program. Today, she confidently uses her own phone to coordinate directly with local MLAs and other Sarpanches. Or the former Anganwadi (childcare) worker who now runs a village WhatsApp group to keep her citizens informed. When we called over a hundred women Sarpanches to schedule interviews, only four answered the phone themselves. These two women were among them. The rest were answered either by their husband, son, father-in-law, or brother-in-law.

For these two women Sarpanches, who have prior work experience, using or accessing mobile phones isn’t a challenge; it is a means to function efficiently as elected leaders of their Gram Panchayats.

Another Sarpanch, who answered the phone herself, when asked about the significance of the phone for panchayat work during the interview, mentioned that “There are multiple works that a Sarpanch has to do, I cannot be running everywhere, the issues that can be addressed over phone are taken care over phone calls only… It helps save time & energy…”. And when asked about, since when has she been owning a personal phone, if she got one only after becoming the Sarpanch, she answered that she has been using a phone even before becoming the Sarpanch. Clearly, these incidents, however small in number, highlight the significance of exposure, which plays a vital role in agency and confidence-building for women.

Their experiences demonstrate that when women acquire relevant skills, be it as basic as knowing how to use a smartphone and developing the self-belief in their capacity to utilize it, they may be better positioned to assert a more substantive role in their elected office. This empowerment can offer a means of circumventing or lessening the control of traditional (often male) intermediaries, thereby enhancing their effectiveness as leaders.

So, as we look to deepen democracy at the grassroots, the challenge is clear. It is not enough to simply bridge the digital divide by handing over phones to women. The government, with the support of civil society, must also invest in building their confidence, skills, and support networks. The goal is to ensure that when the official phone rings, it is the Sarpanch herself who answers, ready to lead.

How Changing Village Politics is Reshaping Citizen-State Relationship in Rural Bangladesh

Posted on 9 December 2025 | by BIGDAdmin | Leave a Comment

For decades, villages have been at the heart of Bangladesh’s political landscape, places where government institutions, political parties, and citizens interact to shape everyday governance. While the structure of rural institutions like the Union Parishad (UP) has changed since independence, the way people engage with these bodies has changed even more profoundly. Between 2009 and 2024, national politics reached deep into rural areas, concentrating power within ruling party networks and reshaping how citizens engage with, participate in, and understand local governance. Drawing on insights from BRAC Institute of Governance and Development’s (BIGD) study, “Evolution of Village Social Order in Rural Bangladesh: A 50-Year Analysis,” this article explores how political relationships in villages dramatically transformed between 2009 and 2024.

A Brief Historical Arc

In the years following independence, rural politics in Bangladesh was diverse and vibrant. The first Union Parishad elections in 1973 reflected a lively but fragmented local political scene. Citizens tended to vote for individuals they knew and respected—people of reputation, land, or social standing. Local leaders maintained close, reciprocal ties with villagers, and although patronage did exist, it was moderated by the familiarity and trust of community relationships.

During the regimes of Ziaur Rahman and Ershad, rural politics began to move toward a more structured form of patronage. The introduction of the Gram Sarkar system and the use of local representatives to implement national programs brought government institutions closer to citizens, while also deepening the reach of political parties into village life. By the 1990s and early 2000s, with multiparty competition firmly established, the Union Parishad became a central arena for distributing resources and securing voter loyalty. Candidates increasingly relied on party networks to connect them with the people controlling government resources, enabling them to secure roads, social safety nets, and employment programs for their villages. The idea of “development” became tied to political allegiance.

Even then, many citizens continued to view their Union Parishad chairmen and members as approachable intermediaries. Siddiqui (2000) showed villagers turning to them to resolve disputes, obtain government relief, or seek informal justice— services that blended official authority with personal influence. This hybrid form of governance was far from perfect, but it allowed room for dialogue and negotiation between citizens and their representatives.

The 2009-2024 Shift

The Awami League’s sweeping victory in 2008 and its steady consolidation of power marked a turning point in rural governance. The Upazila Parishad Act of 2009, which assigned Members of Parliament (MPs) as “advisers” to local councils, significantly shifted the balance of power away from local councils to the national authorities. MPs began to supervise development projects, manage social safety net distributions, and influence the flow of local government funds. Their authority extended deeply into Union Parishad affairs, often shaping who could run for office, who received resources, and who was sidelined.

The introduction of party symbols in the 2016 Union Parishad elections further reinforced this centralization of power. For the first time, candidates ran not as independents but under official party banners. This shift blurred the distinction between public service and political allegiance. A field report from Majumdar (2016) documented that chairmanship positions were often determined less by community support and more by party nominations, with many hopeful candidates spending significant amounts of money to secure endorsement from the ruling party.

This new power structure reshaped how citizens interacted with the state. Villagers who once approached local leaders directly for help now had to navigate party-aligned networks. Access to public benefits, such as the Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) program or road construction projects, increasingly depended on political connections. What was once a relatively equal, community-based relationship between leaders and citizens became more hierarchical, filtered through layers of party influence and bureaucratic control.

Changing Dynamics of Citizen Engagement

BIGD’s field observations from Evolution of Village Social Order in Rural Bangladesh: A 50-Year Analysis, conducted across districts such as Cumilla, Jamalpur, and Shariatpur, reveal how these structural changes play out in everyday life. Citizens, especially those not connected to the ruling party, reported feelings of fear and detachment, subsequently resulting in their limited participation in local governance. Public meetings like ward shavas, originally designed for inclusive local planning, are often dominated by ruling party activists, leaving little space for open discussion or differing opinions.

Although digital governance platforms and participatory budgeting were introduced to increase transparency, their use remains minimal. Many citizens now view the Union Parishad less as a space for solving community problems and more as an administrative branch of the ruling party. Women members, while present through reserved seats, often face exclusion from key decisions, with their authority constrained by male chairmen and party hierarchies.

Meanwhile, political patronage has made access to public services highly personalized. Villagers applying for old-age allowances or relief support frequently depend on “brokers” linked to local party offices, which blurs the line between political favour and citizens’ rights. As a result, people’s access to state services often feels like a privilege granted by party intermediaries rather than a guaranteed entitlement.

The Other Side of Connectivity

However, this shift has not been entirely disempowering. The spread of political networks has also expanded political awareness. Rural citizens today are more informed about government policies, social protection schemes, and elections, though their participation in local governance and access to these services are often shaped by partisan loyalty. Political engagement has become more visible, but less diverse.

Digital tools and migration networks have added another layer to this change. Returning migrants and educated youth increasingly act as intermediaries between villagers and local administrations, assisting others in accessing services or online platforms. Yet, many of these new actors also become entangled in patronage systems, reinforcing the same political dependencies they were expected to overcome.

Rethinking Local Governance

Between 2009 and 2024, the Union Parishad evolved from a form of representational institution to one that is based on party-based relationships. Authority now depends less on community trust and more on vertical links to the ruling party’s organizational network. As a result, the quality of citizens’ engagement with local government often hinges not on formal participatory processes but on their political connections.

Rebuilding citizen trust in local governance, therefore, requires more than structural reform; it demands a renewal of democratic practices in everyday administration. Strengthening the independence of the Union Parishad, maintaining neutrality in elections, and ensuring transparency in the distribution of social safety nets can help return a sense of agency to citizens.

The village remains the most direct point of contact between the state and ordinary people. Its political landscape continues to change, but the central challenge remains: to make sure that participation leads to empowerment, not dependency, and that citizens’ voices are heard above the pressures of partisan politics.

Mobile Money and Migration: Exploring the Connection Between Digital Financial Services and Women’s Participation in Overseas Labor from Bangladesh

Posted on 4 December 2025 | by BIGDAdmin | Leave a Comment

Mobile financial services (MFS) are transforming the way money moves across borders. In Bangladesh, one of the world’s leading sources of migrant labor, these services offer faster, cheaper, and more secure channels for remittances. But beyond convenience, digital finance holds the potential to reshape gender roles and empower women economically. When women gain direct access to their earnings through mobile money, they build confidence, strengthen their financial decision-making power, and participate more fully in both domestic and international labor markets. [1]

Our research team conducted an exploratory study examining how MFS affect Bangladeshi women’s participation in overseas labor. Working in partnership with the Development Research Initiative (dRi), we surveyed 2,500 low-skilled migrant workers in Bangladesh. The respondents were divided into five groups of 500 each: women who have returned and do not plan to migrate again; women who plan to migrate again; women preparing for their first migration; and male returnees, with or without plans to migrate again. The goal was to understand how access to digital remittance services influences decisions about working abroad, continued employment overseas, and the barriers that shape adoption across gender lines.

The preliminary descriptive results support the existing evidence that economic motivation is a key driver of migration decisions. In our sample, 77%of women who no longer plan to migrate live in households earning less than 20,000 Bangladeshi taka [2] per month, while among women planning to migrate again, this figure drops to 64%. The correlation suggests that financial necessity continues to drive women’s migration, but those who have already migrated and accumulated some savings may be better positioned to plan a second journey abroad. Migration thus functions both as a livelihood strategy and as a stepping stone toward higher earnings and social mobility.

The results indicate that MFS also play an important role in shaping migration outcomes. When women can send, save, and manage their income independently, they gain a stronger sense of agency and autonomy, which may encourage continued labor force participation at home or abroad. Mobile money also reduces reliance on intermediaries, offering a safer and more transparent way to transfer funds home. For women who often face social or mobility restrictions, the ability to transact digitally can be transformative. On the other hand, when access to mobile money improves work opportunities at home, it may discourage women from going overseas for work. Around 50% of surveyed women who have returned home from overseas migration and are planning to migrate again have used mobile money remittance services, compared to 39% among those who have returned home and do not intend to migrate again. Although overall adoption remains low, this statistically significant difference between non-migrating and migrating groups suggests that opportunity and usage of mobile money for international remittance services is likely to have a positive effect on women’s overseas labor force participation. Notably, women planning another migration scored higher than their non-migrating peers in financial literacy, digital literacy, and empowerment, suggesting that capability and confidence go hand-in-hand with aspiration. Those who understand digital tools and financial systems appear more able to imagine and prepare for a new migration cycle.

Yet, despite the promise of mobile banking, our findings show that women are significantly less likely to adopt these financial services than men. When we compared male and female respondents, the gender gap in digital and financial inclusion became clear. Approximately 71% of male migrant workers used mobile money channels for international remittances, compared with only 45% of female migrant workers. This divide reflects the gendered digital gap in Bangladesh, where women have historically had less access to mobile technology, internet services, and digital financial platforms. It also suggests that men are more likely to benefit from the efficiencies and cost savings associated with digital transfers, while women remain reliant on less efficient, often more costly, informal or cash-based channels. Further, male respondents, on average, score higher than females in financial literacy, digital literacy, digital financial literacy, and empowerment indices. These findings reinforce the structural gender disparities in both human capital and agency, which continue to disadvantage women in accessing the benefits of migration.

In addition to a sharp gender divide in the adoption of financial services, the findings highlight a substantial gender gap in education and income. While 88% of men reported some level of formal education, only 66% of women did so. According to World Bank data, the national adult literacy rates in Bangladesh stand at 79% for men and 74% for women. Hence, the male migrants in our sample appear more literate than the average Bangladeshi male, whereas the female migrants are less literate than the average Bangladeshi female. This contrast underscores a selection effect: men entering international migration may represent the more educated segment of the male labor force, while women migrants often come disproportionately from lower-educated groups. Around 45% of male respondents reported monthly household incomes of 20,000 taka or more, compared with only 30% of women. Although more than half of men live in households earning less than 20,000 taka per month, the share is much higher among women, at 70%.

The overall picture that emerges is one of uneven progress. Compared to men, women migrants face multiple disadvantages: lower education, lower income, reduced access to mobile money, and weaker financial literacy. Yet, within the female population, there are clear signs that digital inclusion can enhance empowerment and economic participation. Women who can manage money digitally and send remittances securely are more likely to remain engaged in the international labor market.

The next phase of research will perform a rigorous empirical analysis of the effect of MFS on women’s overseas employment outcomes and long-term financial stability. Specifically, we will examine how financial independence in managing remittances impacts women’s employment outcomes, ultimately affecting their households’ long-term well-being. This includes analyzing outcomes such as employment duration and stability. The findings will provide valuable policy insights into how women’s overseas migration can be leveraged to promote sustainable development.

[1] De Gasperin, C., Rotondi, V., & Stanca, L. (2019). Mobile money and the labor market: Evidence from developing countries. University of Milan Bicocca Department of Economics, Management and Statistics Working Paper, (403).

Field, E., Pande, R., Rigol, N., Schaner, S., & Troyer Moore, C. (2021). On her own account: How strengthening women’s financial control impacts labor supply and gender norms. American Economic Review, 111(7), 2342-2375.

[2] At the time of writing, 20,000 Bangladeshi taka is equivalent to USD 162,39.

Can Training Help Poor Youth Find Decent Employment in the Retail Sector in Developing Countries?

Posted on 4 December 2025 | by BIGDAdmin | Leave a Comment

Most developing countries have disproportionately large young populations. According to the United Nations (UN), 90% of the world’s 10- to 24-year-olds reside in these countries. However, most of these youth face dismal career prospects. In South Asia, over a quarter (26.4%) of youth (aged 15 to 24) are not in education, employment, or training (NEET), their unemployment rate is also higher than that of the older labour force, and most fail to find decent, secure employment, according to a 2024 report by the International Labour Organization (ILO). Bangladesh is no exception; 22% of its youth are NEET, and their unemployment rate is more than twice the national average, according to the Bangladesh Labour Force Survey 2022.

The fast-growing formal retail sector in many developing countries, including Bangladesh, presents a promising avenue for decent youth employment. Young people are finding work in formal grocery outlets and large retail stores that offer a variety of products, such as apparel, shoes, and electronics, primarily as sales representatives and store managers. Confidence and good communication skills are essential in these roles. Naturally, relatively better-off youth with better education are more likely to avail themselves of these opportunities compared to their poorer counterparts.

Worldwide, trade-specific vocational and entrepreneurship skills training are the two dominant strategies to help underprivileged youth find decent employment. Training youth for the retail sector, however, is a largely uncharted territory, primarily involving soft skills. BRAC has a well-established, specialized skills training program, with an equal emphasis on classroom training and apprenticeships under local master craftspersons (MCPs).

Realizing the potential of Bangladesh’s growing retail sector, BRAC launched an initiative in December 2019, titled Progressing the Retail Sector by Improving Decent Employment (PRIDE). The pilot phase of the initiative supported underprivileged youth (aged 18 to 35) to find employment in the retail sector in four major metropolitan cities—Dhaka, Chattogram, Khulna, and Sylhet. The program combined classroom training on physical store management, health and safety, and customer relationships with an apprenticeship in a retail store to allow participants to gain practical experience. Participants also received allowances upon program completion, amounting to BDT 6,000 for men and BDT 9,000 for women. The pilot training was delivered in four batches. The training was classroom-intensive for the first and third batches, with 40 days of classes and 15 days of apprenticeship. For the second and fourth batches, the apprenticeship training was eight and 40 days, respectively. The idea was to identify which model was more effective.

To evaluate the pilot initiative, the BRAC Institute of Governance and Development (BIGD) conducted a randomized controlled trial (RCT), randomly assigning eligible candidates to treatment and control groups in each batch. A total of 1,220 eligible youth were assigned to either the treatment group (960) or the control group (260). The baseline survey successfully interviewed 675 individuals in the treatment group and 213 in the control group. The endline survey was conducted in June 2023, successfully surveying 71% of the baseline sample.

Researchers analyzed three major indicators of career outcomes: employment, hours worked (labour supply), and income. They found no statistically significant impact of PRIDE on employment, neither among those who were offered the program (intention-to-treat [ITT]) nor among those who completed it (local average treatment effect [LATE]). However, employment increased by 9% of the control group estimate—an economically meaningful but statistically insignificant result. The impact on hours of work was weak; only the LATE estimate was significant, amounting to 30% of the control mean. The largest and most statistically significant impact was on income—the LATE estimate was 48% of the control mean income. The higher increase in income compared to hours of work indicates an increase in productivity. When the researchers investigated the possible mechanism of the impact on earnings, they identified improved analytical and communication skills of the participants due to the program as key drivers.

The classroom-intensive training performed significantly better than the apprenticeship-intensive training, which had no statistically significant impact on any of the career outcomes.

Gender-disaggregated analysis revealed no statistically significant impact for men overall, though the ITT estimate showed a meaningful 17% increase in income relative to the control mean. For women participating in the program (LATE), the increase in earnings was very large, at 84% of the control mean.

Almost two-thirds (73%) of the study participants were enrolled in school at baseline. The impact was large and statistically significant for this group, while no impact was found on participants who were out of school. Importantly, the researchers did not find any negative impact on school enrollment among the in-school participants.

Overall, the classroom-intensive training was found to have a meaningful positive impact on the income and productivity of underprivileged youth—particularly underprivileged women, one of the most disadvantaged groups in society. PRIDE also gave these youth a chance for upward mobility, signalled by the significant number of job changes among program participants. Finally, a benefit-cost ratio of 1.93 provides a strong argument for scaling up the program.

Access the journal article here.